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DOCTORATE IN PUBLIC HEALTH SUMMARY STATEMENT 
The DrPH degree aims to equip those who expect their careers to be in the practice of public 
health rather than in research to be able to understand and adapt scientific knowledge in 
order to achieve health gain, and was therefore highly relevant for my situation. I have been 
working as an inspector in the Thai Food and Drug Administration since 1980 and had 
encountered problems in enforcement. I felt fresh ideas and greater expertise would be the 
needed if I was to understand better why there were difficulties in pharmacy enforcement in 
particular, and I wanted to be able to contribute to changes in regulation policy. The three 
components designed for the DrPH programme appeared to offer access to a wide range of 
skills and insights from a range of pertinent disciplines, which could complement my own 
field experience. 
The first, taught component, widened my perspectives and gave me better understanding of 
scientific knowledge. The compulsory courses - Communication Skills, Management, and 
Social Science Research Methods and Paradigms combined well to provide skills as well as 
basic knowledge needed for pursuing effective management and research. The content of 
the Management course exposed me to organisation and management problems both in 
UK health care settings as well as in other countries. The course on Social Science 
Research Methods and Paradigms was exceptionally significant for me, as I came from a 
pharmacy background and had little knowledge regarding different social science research 
methodologies. I learned a great deal about qualitative research approaches, and how they 
could complement quantitative methods, helping to understand the underlying reasons for 
certain behaviours. In particular, the Qualitative Workshop in the second term provided 
academic as well as practical knowledge regarding qualitative research design and methods. 
During the Workshop I practised developing questionnaires, interviewing, analysing data and 
writing-up. I found that qualitative methods were both relevant and appropriate for gaining an 
understanding of why things go wrong in enforcement policies. Discussion during the 
workshop period laid an important foundation for my selection of appropriate research 
methods for my study. Besides, I learned a great deal from the exchange of experiences with 
other DrPH students. 
I also took advantage of other courses, which I considered to be useful for my career 
development. Medical Anthropology in Public Health and Population and Development 
courses were good examples, deepening my understanding of how to relate enforcement 
problems into a broader context of health behavioural problems, which are relevant to my 
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work. The courses Health Policy: Process and Power, and Epidemiology for Policy Making 
significantly gave me a more systematic and scientific understanding of what happens in the 
real world of policy-making, and helped me to understand better how the processes of policy 
formulation and implementation impact on the effectiveness of policy. Concepts from these 
courses were particularly useful in both my professional attachment and my research thesis. 
Finally, I also audited a course on Comparative Health Care Systems at the London School 
of Economics, which, although it focussed on European health care systems, enhanced my 
views of different health systems which was helpful given Thailand's current health reforms. 
I chose to do my professional attachment - the second component of the DrPH degree -
with the Drug Control Division in the Thai Food and Drug Administration (TFDA), Ministry of 
Public Health. The Drug Control Division is the main part of the TFDA responsible for 
enforcement for health consumer protection regarding medicinal drugs. My own work in the 
TFDA, has always been in another division, the Inspection Division, currently is responsible 
for import and export inspection. Working in the Drug Control Division gave me an insight 
into a different part of the TFDA, and I paid particular attention to the implementation of 
policies regarding consumer protection. In my professional attachment report, I used 
Hogwood and Gunn's framework to test how far the Drug Control Division was able to meet 
the ten pre-requisites for successful implementation. The attachment provided me the rare 
opportunity to step back and observe closely the working of my organisation from a more 
objective and relatively 'outsiders' view, within a scientific academic framework. For this part 
of the study I used research techniques of participant observation and document analysis. 
This was a valuable experience, and by the end of the four months, I had a more in-depth 
and systematic understanding of some of the constraints and management problems 
affecting the effectiveness of health consumer protection. This understanding was useful in 
approaching my research study on the role of inspectors because it made me aware of the 
nature of the policy-making process and the important role of management in reaching the 
organisation's goals. 
The research study, the third element of DrPH degree, gave me the opportunity to explore 
in-depth one specific problem in my organisation - the one which I had experience of, and 
was interest in - the issue of regulation of pharmacies as conducted by inspectors. I was 
concerned about the gap between policy intent, as embodied in the 1967 Drugs Act, and 
policy implementation. For this research, I used a broad policy analysis approach to explore 
this gap, based on Walt and Gilson's framework of actors, process, context and content. 
Doing the research allowed me to have a first-hand experience in conducting qualitative 
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research from scratch - the interviews and documentary research were an important part of 
the research. The conceptual framework for the study was developed with the aim of 
exploring existing problems in the TFDA within the system of management, and the role of 
inspectors in enforcement. I hoped that the insights gained from the research would 
contribute to future policies or solutions for better enforcement practice. 
This study is the first in Thailand to provide an in-depth analysis showing implementation 
deficits in the area of enforcement in pharmacies, by looking at the attitudes and roles of 
inspectors, and the way the management system of the TFDA affects their roles and 
attitudes. The research points to many factors, which adversely affect enforcement but, 
have been taken for granted. It fills a gap in the understanding of the role of pharmacy 
inspection, the problems inspectors encounter in their work, and their attitudes to those 
problems. Given the high level of interest in this study of policy-makers in the TFDA, I 
believe that the difficulties detected in the study will attract sufficient attention so that at least 
some will be addressed. The findings should help to design and implement more 
appropriate and more accepted strategies for enforcing regulations. 
What I have learnt from the taught courses, my professional attachment and research 
emphasise the importance and possibilities for using and adapting scientific knowledge to do 
research for health gain and effective management. Together the range of skills, experience 
and knowledge from the three elements of the DrPH degree, have helped me to bridge the 
academic and practice arenas. 
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ABSTRACT 
The Thai Drug Act 1967 regulates private pharmacies in Thailand, but violations are 
common. Effective enforcement is vital because pharmacies are the main drug distribution 
channel and have direct contact with consumers. However, independent studies suggest 
that there are wide discrepancies in regulation - and that the number of prosecuted cases 
does not reflect the number of violations that actually occur. 
It seems that the reason for this discrepancy is that the Thai Food and Drug Administration 
(TFDA) inspectors do not fully exercise their authority in enforcing the Thai Drug Act 1967. 
This study aimed to seek out the reasons for this discrepancy by exploring the Act, the 
regulatory management system and TFDA inspectors' views and attitudes. Documentary 
analysis and semi-structured interviews were the two main methods used to collect data. 
Interviewees were recruited from current and former inspectors and policy makers in the 
TFDA. 
There were three main findings. First, there is friction between the principle of a formal 
legalistic approach and the practice of the flexible approach used by the TFDA in 
enforcement. Second, interviews suggest that inspectors do not wholeheartedly enforce the 
Drug Act 1967 because the majority view the Act as unrealistic and impractical, and perceive 
that sanctions are not proportional to the harms caused. In other words, they feel that most 
of the sanctions are too severe. Third, inspectors described a number of obstacles to the 
exercise of their authority, resulting from business pressures, professionalism and the 
working process in the TFDA enforcement system. These constraints result in inspectors 
using unofficial methods (such as verbal warning) rather than fully using the sanctions 
available to them. This has led to under-enforcement and the erosion of the deterrence effect 
created by the Act. 
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Chapter 1 - Regulating Medicines, 
Regulating Pharmacies 
The Thai Drug Act 1967 regulates private pharmacies in Thailand, but violations are 
common. This thesis focussed specifically on inspectors' points of view in expressing what 
they perceived as problems preventing them from using their legal authority. The thesis is 
arranged in six chapters. Chapter 1 provides general information, the rationale of this study, 
the context of the medicinal drug system focusing on pharmacies, problems or violations in 
pharmacies and the three groups of actors in pharmacy. It is narrowed down to the specific 
situation in Thailand. Chapter 2 reviews the general literature regarding enforcement, 
inspectors, how inspectors perform their job and what affects their decisions. Chapter 3 
describes the objectives of the study, choice of methods, data collection and analysis. 
Chapters 4 and 5 are the result chapters, and present data revealed from interviews and 
documentary research demonstrating the underlying reasons why inspectors fail to fully use 
their authority. Chapter 6 presents the study's discussion, conclusion and recommendations. 
1.1 Introduction 
Enforcement is a main component to assure public safety concerning medicinal drugs 
(WHO 1988), referred to hereafter as 'drugs'. In view of their life saving and life threatening 
effects, drugs are a highly regulated commodity (Davis 1997), and following the catastrophe 
of Thalidomide 1 in 1960s, are registered with more stringent criteria regarding safety, quality 
and efficacy before being marketed (Jasanoff 1994). Regulating manufacturers helps to 
ensure that drugs are produced in compliance with required standards. Drugs are then 
distributed to hospitals, clinics, health facilities, pharmacies or grocery stores depending on 
the types of drugs and regulations in each country. 
Pharmacies are the main drug distribution channel in most countries. In 1994, medicinal 
drugs distributed globally via pharmacies had a value of £136 billion (Anon.1995). In many 
developing countries, 70-80% of all drugs are distributed through pharmacies (Malek 1994, 
WHO 1994, Bapna 1996, Stenson et aI1997). 
1 A medicine for moming sickness found out later that it caused infant malformity. 
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Pharmacies, though a part of the health care system, are mostly in the private sector, and 
driven by the need to make profits. They are usually regulated. Pharmacies have direct 
contact with consumers; the quality of care provided at this level is, thus, critical since drugs 
are provided directly to consumers who are not usually knowledgeable about them. A licence 
is usually required to assign responsibility to those who dispense medicines. Restrictions, 
which vary from country to country, normally cover conditions for licensing, quality and types 
of drugs sold, and who is allowed to dispense drugs. At pharmacies, it is mainly qualified 
pharmacists who are assigned as the responsible professional to provide appropriate 
services to the public (Angorn and Thomison 1989). They are commonly referred to as the 
professionals-in-charge. 
1.2 Drug regulatory administration 
Most countries have Drug Regulatory Authorities appointing their enforcers - inspectors - to 
visit premises to ensure that regulations are observed (Barnett 1990, Allsop and Mulcahy 
1996). Therefore, inspectors are the enforcement arms or policy implementation tool of the 
agencies. Inspectors normally have a professional pharmacy qualification (WHO 1994). Most 
countries rely on their governments to implement regulations (Kamat and Nichter 1998), 
although in many developing countries the state's role regarding the implementation of 
regulations is generally passive (Bhat 1996, Kumaranayake 1997). Implementation is left to 
the inspectors. In contrast, in many developed countries, professional organisations playa 
significant role in regulatory control as well as promoting an ethical code of practice, which 
increases law adherence. For example, in the Great Britain the Code of Ethics 1992 is used 
in parallel with the Medicines Act 1968 (Appelbe and Wingfield 1998). 
Although regulations exist in most countries, the degree to which they are enforced and 
effective is varied. Most developing countries have problems related to irrational and illegal 
dispensing practices. Malpractice is mainly through overuse of antibiotics, injections, poly-
pharmacy, dispensing prescription drugs without prescription and dispensing withdrawn and 
unqualified drugs (Sterky et al 1991, Paphassarang et al 1995. Goel et al 1996, Stenson et 
al 1997, Kamat and Nichter 1998). Small countries tend to have problems of counterfeit 
medicinal drugs (WHO 1994). Where enforcement seems weak, often lack of budget, 
manpower and other resources are considered - with rare empirical data - to be causes 
(Asiimwe and Lule 1993, Yesudian 1993, Mujinja et al 1993, WHO 1994, Kumaranayake 
1997. Tonteerawongs et al 1997). Violations in pharmacies can be varied in terms of nature 
and magnitude. Common transgressions found in pharmaCies include (Roemer 1991, 
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Wieringa et al 1992. RPSGB Annual Reports 1993-2000. TFDA Annual Reports 1994-2000. 
Davis 1997. Stenson et al 1997): 
• Sale or supply of substandard drugs 
• Sale or supply of prescription drugs without prescriptions 
• Sale or supply of expired drugs 
• Sale of unlicensed or withdrawn drugs 
• Unsupervised sales 
• Incorrect labelling 
• Sale without premise licences 
• Sale or supply of incorrect medicines 
• Sale of excessive quantities of substances liable to misuse 
• Inappropriate advertisement 
• Unprofessional conduct 
Violations in pharmacies mean that consumers are exposed to health hazards caused by 
sub-standard or inappropriate drugs. unnecessary side effects or drug resistance due to 
irrational drug dispensing. As a result. both individuals and countries may experience 
economic loss. However. enforcing regulations in pharmacies is difficult. There is a 
profession-profit tension - the need for profit as well as maintaining ethical practices 
(Cunningham-Burley and Maclean 1987. Cederlof and Tomson 1995. Goel et al 1996). 
Unfortunately. research to date has rarely gone beyond describing malpractice to understand 
the underlying causes of problems in pharmacies (Ross-Degnan et al 1992, Goel et al 1996). 
1.3 The three groups of actors at pharmacies 
To demonstrate problems in pharmacies, three groups of actors can be distinguished. They 
are drug sellers, clients and inspectors. Their interactions are illustrated in Figure 1.1. 
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Figure 1.1: Interactions among drug sellers, clients and inspectors 
drug sellers 
regulate 
I 
inspectors 
seek drugs 
and/ or adv ice 
dispense drugs 
and/or give adv ice 
.. 
I 
clients 
The term 'drug seller' includes many groups of people who contact consumers in selling 
drugs. They can be professionally qualified pharmacists or other health professionals such 
as nurses; some may own pharmacies, others may work in pharmacies owned by 
businessmen as employees. They can be businessmen who own pharmacies and hire staff 
to sell drugs professionally or unprofessionally with informal training, or sell drugs by 
themselves. The informal training can be learning from drug labels, from their former 
employers and/or from medical representatives. Drug sellers also include those who sell 
drugs in unlicensed pharmacies such as grocery stores. This group of sellers is relatively 
uneducated and commonly referred to as 'grocer' in Thailand. 
A number of studies have looked at drug sellers and found that few are professionally 
qualified, and that they often make poor decisions on medicines (Katie et al 1992, Muschell 
1995, Goel et al1996, Kumaranayake 1997, Stenson et aI1997). Their practices often seem 
to be profit driven. They perform illegal practices despite knowing that they are violating the 
law (Bhutta and Balchin 1996). However, the effect of such practice has not been studied 
much, although it is suspected to be an important issue (Cederlof and Tomson 1995, Ross-
Degnan et al 1992). 
Contextual factors such as cultural or socio-economic, accessibility to public health care 
facilities as well as sellers' attempts to protect their profit have also been suggested as 
influencing sellers' behaviour, possibly more than the effect of regulations (Cederlof and 
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Tomson 1995, Kumaranayake 1997, Stenson et aI1997). But there has been little research 
on how much such factors matter (Cederlof and Tomson 1995). 
In many developing countries drugs are frequently bought on the customers' own initiatives, 
which can cause violations because of their demands (Goel et al 1996). Most customer 
demands are influenced by traditional beliefs and/or commercial pharmaceutical 
advertisements (Ross-Degnan et al 1992, Wieringa et al 1992, Dingelstad et al 1996). 
Pharmaceutical advertising is a big business, though it is regulated in most countries. In the 
US, it was estimated that in 1999 £1.3 billion was spent on direct-to-consumer prescription 
drugs advertising alone (Anon. 2001). The President of PT Warner-Lambert Indonesia, a 
large pharmaceutical company, said that medicinal drug advertisements on TV, radio and in 
print ranked first among the total advertising in Indonesia (Latchem 1995). 
Contrary to the first two actor groups, studies regarding the effects of regulation on 
pharmacy have been rare (Goel et al 1996). While interventions to improve sellers' and 
consumers' behaviour have been implemented and evaluated, none has been found related 
to drug inspectors (Murray 1997). Drawing on research undertaken in the areas of pollution 
and occupational health and safety control, several potential research issues can be 
identified. These studies reveal that enforcement weakness is not simply an issue of 
corruption or ignorance or lack of staff, as often claimed, but in fact is due to a complex 
series of factors (Richardson et al 1982, Hutter 1988, Baldwin 1995, Yeager 1993, Black 
1997). To have a healthy regulating mechanism, these studies suggested that many 
interrelated factors have to be implanted in enforcement systems; for example, the design, 
scope and form of regulation, the attitude of officers towards offences and offenders, the 
legal proceeding and penalties, the prosecution process, the background and training of 
officers, the policy conflict, the implementation process and administration in general. 
Support from a suitable and appropriate social and health infrastructure as well as 
administration are also recognised as important (WHO 1988, Kumaranayake 1997). 
1.4 The situation in Thailand regarding private pharmacies 
Thailand is a developing country situated in Southeast Asia with a population of about 59 
million, of whom 31.5% are urban. The per capita income decreased from £1,524 in 1996 to 
£942 in 1997 due to the devaluation of the Thai currency (MOPH 1997). 
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The country is known as having a relatively non-conflict culture and strong hierarchical 
system (Klausner 1997, Kiatying-Angsulee 2000). Although Thailand has been under a 
democratic political system for many decades, vote buying is common (Economist 2002). 
Consequently, most politicians have close relationships with businessmen for financial 
support (Economist 2002), and political influence over government civil servants is felt to be 
increasing (Green 2000). Regulation enforcement, in general, is not perceived to be strong 
(Klausner 1997, Kiatying-Angsulee 2000, Economist 2002). 
Private pharmacies are a significant drug distribution channel, distributing 50-60% of the 
total value (Working Group on Thai Drug System Analysis 1994). In rural areas, pharmacies 
are a significant source for self-medication because only 47.3% of the population has access 
to health facilities with physicians, compared to 81 % in urban areas (Wibulpolprasert 1999). 
Studies suggest that 40-74% of people with minor illness seek first care from nearby 
pharmacies (Chuengsatiansup et al 2000). Drugs are distributed through 14,664 licensed 
pharmacies nationwide (see Table 1.1). In addition, it is estimated that 100,000 grocery 
stores in remote areas sell drugs without licence all over the country (Sringernyuang and Ie 
Grand 1990). The number of grocery stores selling drugs without licence in Bangkok is not 
known, but there are many grocery stores selling drugs without licences. 
1.4.1 The Drug Act 1967 and its control of pharmacies 
The first Thai Drug Act appeared in 1936 but has since changed. Currently drugs are subject 
to three Acts according to how they are classified. The Psychotropic Substance Control Act 
1975 covers drugs that are classified as psychotropic substances, mostly sedatives, anti-
anxiety and hypnotic drugs. The Narcotic Substance Control Act 1979 covers chemicals 
such as morphine, ecstasy and codeine. The remainders fall under the responsibility of the 
Drug Act 1967. Each Act covers both modern and traditional medicines. This study focuses 
only on the Drug Act 1967, and on modern drugs. 
The current Drug Act 1967 regulates the quality of drug products and the manner in which 
drugs are manufactured, imported and sold. The Act covers premise licensing, product 
registration, advertisement control, and inspection. In pharmacies, there are two main 
responsible groups: the professionals-in-charge and the licensees. Different duties and 
responsibilities are imposed accordingly. Consumer safety lies heavily upon the 
professionals-in-charge who are pharmacists, nurses, physicians, veterinarians or the 
Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) trainees depending on type of pharmacies they are 
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employed by. Owners or licensees of pharmacies are not required to have minimal 
professional or educational qualification, but must meet the specified standards, which are 
mostly about the capability to run a business. They must employ professionals-in-charge as 
specified by the law. 
Most pharmacies in Thailand fall into two categories - type A and type B. The two main 
differences are types of drug they can sell and types of professionals-in-charge. Type B 
pharmacies can sell only specified items, while type A can sell all legitimate drugs. 
Professionals-in-charge of type A pharmacies are pharmacists, while those of type B 
pharmacies are MOPH trainees or nurses. Type A pharmacies are more common in 
Bangkok, the capital, and its vicinity, whereas type B are more common across the country 
(see Table 1.1). Most pharmacies are also residences, except those in department stores or 
in supermarkets. 
Table 1.1: Number of licences in Thailand 
Type Bangkok Up-country (75 provinces) 
Modern drug manufacturers 120 54 
Traditional drug manufacturers 273 451 
Modern drug importers 479 31 
Traditional drug importers 144 7 
Modern drug pharmacies 3,611 7,483 
-type A pharmacies (2,973) (3,197) 
-type B pharmacies (638) (4,286) 
Traditional pharmacies 411 1,600 
Total 5,038 9,626 
Source: DCD, TFDA, 2000. 
All professionals-in-charge are required by the 1967 Act to register their duty hours. The Act 
allows professionals-in-charge to register their duty hours during speCific periods, mostly 
5.00 - 8.00 p.m. By this interpretation one pharmacist can work full time at one place, for 
example in governmental offices, and work part-time at pharmacies (for more detail see Box 
1, Chapter 4). In practice, most professionals-in-charge do not usually work in their 
pharmacies during their registered hours; pharmacy owners, who are businessmen and hire 
professionals-in-charge, sell drugs outside the registered duty hours as well as during the 
registered duty hours without supervision of professionals-in-charge. Currently it is hoped 
that these problems are declining due to the increased number of pharmacists who own and 
work in their own pharmacies, which account for about 30% of type A pharmacies. Figure 1.2 
shows pharmacy services in type A pharmacies. 
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Figure 1.2: Pharmacy services in type A pharmacies in Bangkok 
Modern drug classification according to the Drug Act 1967 in Thailand is more detailed than 
the general classification in many countries . There are four groups of drugs sold under 
different conditions (see Table 1.2). First, the Household Remedy Group, which aims for self-
medication. These drugs can be sold anywhere, as in the UK General-sale list or the US 
over-the-counter list. The List is restricted by the nine criteria2 set by the National Committee 
of Household Remedy Selection . Although they are extremely safe, they are not popular as 
people perceive them as 'weak drugs ' (Sringernyuang and Ie Grand 1990, Jaiwithi 1993). 
Promotion from government is weak (Chuengsatiansup et al 2000). The Government 
Pharmaceutical Organisation is the main producer, but production is limited, as it does not 
earn much profit (Chuengsatiansup et al 2000). Private pharmaceutical companies are not 
interested in this market. 
Second, the Ready-packed medicines not categorised as dangerous or special controlled 
drugs, the so-called the Ready-packed drugs, are relatively limited too. These are usually 
drugs for common illness such as cold remedies, antacid and vitamins. The drug items in 
this group would be classified as in the UK's General-sale list or the US's over-the-counter 
drugs. This is the only group of drugs that type B pharmacies can sell in addition to the 
Household Remedy group. 
2 The selection criteria are 1) Commonly used and/or relevant to the national health problem, 2) For common illness 
treatment or palliation that fits for self-care, 3) High safety and low possibility of misuse or abuse, 4) High stability, 5) 
Easy to use, 6) Not expensive - with consideration to consumers, 7) Suitable package size, 8) Necessity and 
popularity. 9) Do not contain parts of legally protected animals (The Drug Committee Minute Report 1/2541). 
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Third, the Dangerous Drug Group is the biggest group. It comprises many drugs that are 
classified as prescription drugs in other countries, such as antibiotics, anti-hypertensive 
drugs, anti-diabetic drugs and the like. In Thailand, drugs in this group do not require 
prescriptions, but do need to be sold under the supervision of professionally qualified 
pharmacists. This group of drugs will be referred to as pharmacy drugs. 
Fourth, the Special Control/ed Drug Group is equivalent to the widely known prescription 
drugs. They require both prescriptions and pharmacist supervision before dispensing. This 
group will be referred to as prescription drugs. 
Table 1.2: Drug classification and eligible types of pharmacies 
Drug classification Eligibility to be sold No of registered 
Items • ( 1993) 
Household remedies Anywhere, no licence is required 148 
Ready-packed drugs Type A and Type B pharmacy 4,604 
Pharmacy drugs Type A pharmacy 12,367 
Prescription drugs Type A pharmacy 1,533 
* Klatylng-Angsulee, 2000; 13. 
1.4.2 Common violations in pharmacies in Thailand 
In Thailand, commercial advertising to consumers is allowed for the Household Remedy 
drugs and the Ready-packed drugs only. Yet drug advertisement expenditure, excluding 
radio, is ranked among the top five highest in 1993 at a cost of 600 million baht (Working 
Group on Thai Drug System 1994). Advertising is believed to have a strong impact on drug 
utilisation, as well as 'word-ot-mouth' (Chartbunchachai et al 1990). Studies show that the 
majority of clients come to pharmacies in Thailand with pre-decision; they specify drug 
names, shape or colours of drugs which they had used themselves, been told of by friends 
or relatives or seen in advertisements (Chartbunchachai et al 1990, Sringernyuang and Ie 
Grand 1990, Khwanlertmongkol 1994). These incidents cause problems in both professional 
practices and regulatory control because a number of demands are based on misbeliefs 
such as the more items the more effectiveness the drugs are (Chartbunchachai et al 1990, 
Sringernyuang and Ie Grand 1990, KhwanlertmongkoI1994). 
Studies in rural areas have shown that villagers have positive attitudes towards modem 
medicines. They believe that the drugs on the market must be safe otherwise the 
government would not allow their sale or advertisement (Limdool 1991, Chuengsatiansup et 
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al 2000). They also believe that modern medicines are more potent than traditional 
medicines especially for acute sickness (Sringernyuang and Ie Grand 1990, Pradabmook 
1990), and that drugs from grocery stores are more potent than those from health centres 
and the Household Remedy Drugs (Sringernyuang and Ie Grand 1990, Jaiwithi 1993). 
Consequently, most grocery stores, especially those in remote areas, illegally sell various 
kinds of drugs. Although common drugs sold are for minor illness such as common cold, 
headache, fever, cough, stomachache, peptic ulcer and malaise (Chartbunchachai 1990, 
Kornkasem et al 1995. Sringernyuang and Ie Grand 1990). about 10% of drugs sought for 
self-medication are prescription drugs (Sringernyuang and Ie Grand 1990). 
Not only grocery stores. but also licensed pharmacies are found violating the Drug Act 1967. 
Type B pharmacies are regularly found selling drugs other than the permitted Ready-packed 
drugs (Tonteerawongs et a11997. Hongsamoot et a11999, Saorumnee and Bunyarat 2001). 
Most type A pharmacies sell drugs outside the registered period and sell drugs without 
pharmacist supervision, as mentioned in section 1.4.1. In terms of drug items, one common 
problem found in most pharmacies is selling prescription drugs without prescriptions. A study 
showed that in Bangkok requests for steroid tablets, which are prescription drugs, were met 
in 65.4% and 21.2% in type A and type B pharmacies, respectively (Hongsamoot et al 1999). 
The percentages were higher up-country (Tonteerawongs et al 1997, Hongsamoot et al 
1999, Saorumnee and Bunyarat 2001). The illegal and irrational supply of pharmacy drugs 
such as antibiotics and non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs is also rampant (Podhipak et al 
1993, Tonteerawongs et al 1997, Thamlikitkul 1988, Saorumnee and Bunyarat 2001). The 
TFDA 2001 survey showed that 23.8% and 21.7% of tetracycline dispensed in type A and 
type B pharmacies, respectively, had expired (Saorumnee and Bunyarat 2001). 
1.4.3 Inspectors and their jobs 
Before 1984. the Thai Food and Drug Administration (TFDA) was exclusively responsible for 
regulating pharmacies across the country. Since then the authority has been decentralised 
and its responsibilities delegated to the Provincial Health Offices (PHO) which belong to 
another MOPH department, but the TFDA still holds the authority to inspect wherever there 
are suspected problems. In the TFDA, responsibilities used to lie with the Inspection Division 
to monitor the 1967 Act and the Drug Control Division to register products. However, in 
1997, the inspectorate was amalgamated under the Drug Control Division (see Annex 1 for 
the staff). Inspectors, all of whom are pharmacists, are the main enforcers authorised by the 
Drug Act 1967 who carry out routine enforcement (MOPH Ministerial Order 1984). Inspectors 
22 
Chapter 1: Regulating Medicines, Regulating Pharmacies 
carry out inspection at all licensed drug manufacturers, drug importers and pharmacies 
including those who are unlicensed but perform activities related to the 1967 Act. 
Currently, there are 12 TFDA drug inspectors inspecting mainly in Bangkok and about 800 
PHO inspecting in the 75 provinces (see detail in Table 1.3). However, PHO inspectors 
spend no more than 10% of their total time on drug inspection due to the burden from other 
responsibilities (Interviews 2000). 
Data, though not perfectly matched, from inspection reports showed low frequency of 
reported violation, which contrasts with the results from independent studies (see Table 1.3 
for details). The discrepancy between violations and those reported is puzzling, and 
suggests that the policy of regulation is failing. Without thorough understanding it is difficult 
to improve the situation. As the three groups of actors interrelate, understanding the actions 
of each group would be helpful for improving enforcement. In this particular study, a better 
understanding of the inspector's role was the focus in order to maximise quality of work in 
the government within the limited resources. In the absence of studies as to why inspectors 
fail to implement the law fully, material from other spheres may help. This is explored in 
chapter 2. 
This study sets out to explore enforcement conducted by the TFDA inspectors, and to ask 
why inspectors fail to implement their authority, as indicated by the discrepancies between 
the inspection reports and independent studies. Clearly, the implementation of regulations is 
not the only factor involved in the correct supply and use of drugs in the community in 
Thailand. It is a multi-component problem. Consumer knowledge, control of advertising, the 
attitudes of drug sellers, the health care system, and other factors are likely to be important 
as well. Nevertheless, within the resources of the current study, only one issue can be 
addressed - the implementation of regulation by inspectors. The results that emerge will, 
therefore, only address one part of the quality supply and use of medicines. 
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Table 1.3: The discrepancies in violation data between the TFDA inspection reports and independent research studies 
Source of data. Inspection data Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 
year. type of 
pharmacies • 
number of 2000 1999 1996 1995 1994 ( Saorumnee and (Oonhalekaka (Tonteerawong 
pharmacies Bunyarat 2001 ) 1999 ) et al1997) inspected • 
offences 
A 8 A 8 A 8 A B A B A B A B A B 
310 62 718 61 320 215 1,069 659 364 41 260 198 1.995 2.134 1032 731 
Sell non- 12 0 108 0 10 2 12 4 4 3 N/a N/a 2 25 N/a N/a 
registered drugs 3.9 0.0 15.1 0.0 3.\ 0.9 0.9 0.6 1.1 7.3 1.0 1.2 
Sell expired drugs I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 62 43 133 304 N/a N/a 
0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.0 23.8 21.7 6.7 14.2 
Sell drug other N/a 0 N/a 24 N/a 2 0 87 0 6 N/a 171 N/a 1,229 N/a 299 
than pennitted 0.0 39.3 0.9 0.0 13.2 0.0 14.6 86.2 57.6 40.9 
Sell withdrawn 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 Nla Nla Nla Nla N/a N/a 
drugs 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 
Sell fake drugs 3 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N/a Nla N/a Nla N/a N/a 
0.9 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Sell without 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Nla N/a 1,492 N/a 178 N/a 
prescriptions 1.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 74.8 17.3 
Sell out of the I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Nla Nla N/a N/a Nla Nla 
duty hour 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Absence of 6 0 4 0 0 0 24 0 0 0 N/a N/a N/a N/a N/a N/a 
professionals-in- 1.9 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 
charge 
Incorrect labelling 5 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 2 0 Nla N/a N/a N/a Nla Nla 
1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.5 0.0 
False advertisemet 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 Nla N/a N/a N/a Nla Nla 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.0 
Incorrect entry 3 0 0 0 1 0 4 0 2 0 Nla Nla N/a N/a N/a Nla 
record 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.5 0.0 
A = type A pharmacy B = type 8 pharmacy 
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Chapter 2 - Inspectors: an Enforcement 
Arm of the Regulatory Agency 
Laws are recognised as government mechanisms or state power, or embodiments of policy 
decisions, to affect behaviour of certain groups in order to maintain good social order 
(Rhodes 1981, Cotterell 1992, Black 1997). After promulgation, enforcers are those who 
ensure law adherence. This chapter provides a general overview about regulatory 
enforcement by inspectors. 
2.1 Enforcement, discretion and compliance 
Enforcement is a way of social control with the ultimate goal of bringing compliance into 
effect to protect public safety (Rhodes 1981, Bardach and Kagan 1982). Enforcement can be 
carried out by various measures but generally there are two approaches, compliance and 
deterrence, both of which aim to prevent violations but differ in the means of securing that 
goal (Kelman 1981, Bardach and Kagan 1982, Hawkins and Thomas 1984, Cotterrell 1992). 
Firstly, the compliance or rewarding approach secures conformity with law by acting to 
prevent potential violations and remedy underlying problems without the necessity to detect 
and penalise violators. Giving incentives is the main strategy such as granting registration 
codes, licences or certificates. One example is the registration codes issued to 
pharmaceutical products that meet the specified standards, which allow them to be 
marketed. Secondly, in the deterrence or punitive approach law adherence is assured by 
penal ising violators in order to deter violations in the future. Enforcement, thus, does not use 
only punishment or coercion to gain compliance. In fact, where violation is high, the use of 
the compliance approach in supplement to the deterrence approach is essential due to the 
limits of the deterrence approach (Packer 1968, Kelman 1981, Rhodes 1981, Kagan 1994). 
However, within the deterrence approach, laws can be enforced differently. Generally, there 
are two styles or strategies: legalistic strategy or 'going by the book,1 and flexible strategy 2 
1 All offences have the same priority. They are charged whenever detected with the sanctions provided 
by laws. 
2 Regulatory requirements and sanctions are applied flexibly depending on situations. Bargaining, 
persuasion or education is often used in place of legal actions. 
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(Bardach and Kagan 1982, Hutter 1986, Baldwin 1990). Both have advantages and 
disadvantages, and there has been no evidence showing which style works better (Hawkins 
and Thomas 1984, Aoki 2000, Kagan 2000). 
There are a number of advantages in legalistic enforcement. First, it pursues one of the 
principles of enforcement, uniformity and sense of fairness (Baldwin 1990, Schwartz 1994). 
Decisions at both site-level or in prosecution process are easier and faster because they are 
based on standards specified in laws (Bardach and Kagan 1982). This ought to bring 
regulatory authorities efficiency. Second, highly experienced enforcers are not necessary 
and less training can be expected because judgements are made based on the rules. 
Regulatory authorities therefore do not have to pay high salaries or spend resources on 
training programmes (Rhodes 1981). Finally, regulatory authorities are less likely to be 
accused of being biased against the regulated (Bardach and Kagan 1982). 
However, the fact that most laws are not perfect (see section 2.4) is one of major constraints 
against legalistic enforcement. In the case of imperfect laws, rigidly following the laws can 
produce resentment, legal resistance or increase political tension because of the close ties 
between business and politicians (Schwartz 1994). In addition, it can create an atmosphere 
that works against voluntary compliance, which is an important part of the enforcement 
system, or create greater inducements to corruption (Aoki 2000, Kagan 2000). 
Resources have a major implication on deterrent enforcement as the job is labour-intensive 
(Anderson 1975, Baldwin 1990, Cotterrell 1992). First, lack of resources makes it is 
impossible to inspect frequently enough to ensure that statutory requirements are being 
observed (Rhodes 1981). Second, laws often do not prioritise offences. However, the lack of 
resources, especially staff, is a driving force for regulatory authorities to prioritise 
seriousness of offence to gear their efforts towards the more serious ones (Bardach and 
Kagan 1982, Scholz 1994). It has been estimated that it takes three person-days per one 
prosecution to compile evidence and prepare cases to proceed for full prosecution (Baldwin 
1995). 
Consequently, flexible enforcement strategy is often the preferred approach (Rhodes 1981, 
Black 1998, Gunningham and Sinclair 1999, May and Winter 2000). It is argued that flexible 
enforcement by inspectors can be effective in bringing compliance, because inspectors 
possess authority which is a threat to the regulated (Rhodes 1981, Hawkins and Thomas 
1984). Regulated businesses are not certain what enforcers can or will do, so most of them 
26 
Chapter 2: Inspectors: an Enforcement Arm of the Regulatory Agency 
are ready to co-operate (Rhodes 1981, Bardach and Kagan 1982). In most cases inspectors 
bargain for prompt correction of certain violations in return for dropping prosecution, which is 
generally perceived by inspectors as providing the same public protection but costing less in 
terms of time and resources spent on official prosecution processes (Hawkins and Thomas 
1984, Kagan 1994). 
Discretion3 is key to effective flexible enforcement (Hawkins and Thomas 1984, Davis 1996, 
Baldwin 1997). But there are positive and negative sides to discretion. Discretion provides 
power to officers and uncertainties to the regulated (Bardach and Kagan 1982, Baldwin 
1997). This causes negative psychological effects to both the public and business as 
decisions are entirely dependent on officers, who may be biased, corrupted or influenced by 
powerful figures to be stricter or turn a blind eye to offences, leading to feelings of unfairness 
among the regulated (Bardach and Kagan 1982, Silveria 1997). 
Despite these drawbacks, there are benefits. Discretion is 'perceived as a technical tool or 
instrument used when lack of factual data or technical knowledge, or on account of the 
unavailability of sufficient information on all the interests and assessment factors to be 
weighed' (Silveria 1997; 51). It allows enforcers to play roles as bargainer, persuader, 
adviser, educator or negotiator along with the role of punisher, as fits the situation (Bardach 
and Kagan 1982, Baldwin 1990). With more flexibility, enforcers can better distinguish 
serious from non-serious violation and invest effort in the former (Bardach and Kagan 1982). 
This would increase enforcement efficiency. 
Discretion can quickly curtail loopholes in regulations (Bardach and Kagan 1982, Aoki 2000). 
For example, in Kelman's (1981) study, when the relationship between increased noise and 
hearing loss had not been established, the US government set up a study to seek the 
answer and took a long time before establishing the fixed limit. In contrast, the Swedish 
government adopted a limit that was considered safe and gave discretion to inspectors to 
deal with the cases where noise was higher. In this way the Swedish government saved 
money and time and achieved the same result as the US. 
Realising the problems and limits of the legalistic strategy, many regulatory authorities allow 
various forms of official discretion exercising by inspectors (Kelman 1981, Bardach and 
Kagan 1982, Scholz 1991); for example, giving discretion to judge the severity of offences 
3 In this study 'discretion' means freedom of judgement not bound by regulations inspectors are 
enforcing. Options can be inspectors' own decisions or pre-specified by regulatory agencies. 
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and act accordingly, to issue a warning in cases considered not serious, to fine at an amount 
considered appropriate, to issue a warning with no further action unless remedial measures 
are not in place in the next inspection or on-the-spot agreement on corrective actions. 
An effective management system should be able to check and prevent the misuse of 
discretion by using methods such as re-inspection, rotation, establishing special complaints 
channels. continuous training and discussion programmes, monitoring personal prosecution 
records. repeated stress on the organisation's purpose or through third party participation 
(Kelman 1981, Bardach and Kagan 1982). Openness of regulatory authorities, which 
includes availability of reasons or information on decisions or how laws are considered or 
interpreted. is another key way to maximise the appropriate use of discretion and 
demonstrate justice to the public (Silveria 1997). Nevertheless, the effective use of discretion 
requires enforcers' capacity to be reasonable, technically competent, possess good 
communication skills and good judgement (Bardach and Kagan 1982). 
Given the advantages and disadvantages of each enforcement approach and strategies 
including limits of punishment in changing behaviours, empirical studies suggested that 'a 
mix of strategies' according to the situation would be most effective (Katz and Kahn 1978, 
Braithwaite et al 1987, Scholz 1991, Kagan 1994, Gunningham and Sinclair 1999). The 
mixed strategy conveys the meaning of using bargaining, compromising, negotiating, 
persuading, rewarding, and educating techniques to bring compliance in addition to 
punishment strategy (Braithwaite et a11987, Baldwin 1990, Scholz 1991). Meanwhile, other 
conditions are simultaneously and actively required to promote effective enforcement. For 
example, punishment should be timely, the possibility for arrest must be high, the desired 
behaviour is known and understood, and offenders are a minority (Elliot 1992, Cotterrell 
1992, Scholz 1994, Suriyawongpaisal 1996). A combined package comprising criminal and 
administrative sanctions as well as the simultaneous use of positive with negative sanctions 
is suggested as essential for success (Baldwin 1990, Cotterrell 1992). In terms of the 
behavioural aspect, negative sanctions are not sustainable unless they are accompanied by 
rewards (Bandura 1969). Consequently, having effective enforcement is complicated. 
The constraints of using only enforcers to obtain compliance are recognised. The 
approaches of enforcement itself have changed over time towards including participation 
from other parts of society in the cycle of enforcement in order to better tackle the cause of 
violation not the violations per se (Cotterrell 1992, Klausner 1997, Braithwaite 2000, Hutter 
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2001). Given the different motivations for law-breaking behaviour, various types of measures 
are necessary for better compliance (La Fave 1962b, Bardach and Kagan 1982). 
Examples of broad participation include the concepts of self-regulation and empowering 
communities such as school, communities, workplaces or families (Bardach and Kagan 
1982, McGary 1996). The police, for example, use community relations as an essential 
element of effective crime control (Kleinig 1997). Studies in the US and UK also suggest 
close links between the capacity of state agencies to enforce the law and the willingness of 
citizens to playa role, as essential for effective enforcement (Blackie 1970, Cranston 1979, 
Hutter 1986,Cotterrell 1992, Morgan 1997). 
Sensitising the public about the health rationale or socia-economic justifications underlying 
the laws could bring congruency to behaviours that are not conforming to existing laws 
(Klausner 1997). Education is, thus, one measure used to alter deep-rooted problems, which 
enforcement alone may fail to do. The US alcohol prohibition in 1920-1930 is a good 
example where the number of convictions rose six times but there was no change in 
consumption (Cotterrell 1992; 55). Raising awareness of self-protection through health 
promotion activities or having special channels for consumer complaints are also used to 
create public pressure on the regulated (Scholz 1991, Schwartz 1994). 
Expanding citizen-group rights to partiCipate in regulatory policy-making process is another 
way to break up informal relationships between regulators and regulated (Bardach and 
Kagan 1982). Making the enforcement process more visible, and accountable to monitoring 
and influence by advocacy groups and individual complainants, can also strengthen 
enforcement (Bardach and Kagan 1982). 
2.2 Inspectors and their implementation of regulations 
Crime is divided broadly into two types (Sutherland 1949, Cotterrell 1992): first, real crime, 
which is dealt with by the police who usually use criminal sanctions as their punishment 
tools; and second, white-collar crime or technical crime, in which victims usually cannot 
clearly recognise the hazards and which is committed by a person of respectability and high 
social status in the course of his/her occupation. Violations in the area of medicinal drugs are 
good examples of 'white-collar' crime. Clients would not normally know whether the drugs 
they are consuming are of good quality or dispensed to them correctly or rationally. 
Negative consequences are seldom identified, especially at the time violation is committed. 
29 
Chapter 2: Inspectors: an Enforcement Arm of the Regulatory Agency 
Regulatory authorities that deal with technical crime are usually separate from the police. 
They have various punishments ranging from using administrative sanctions, such as giving 
notice requiring compliance with the law, using court enforceable orders, to actual 
prosecution (Cotterrell 1992). The administrative measures usually affect the productivity of 
the sanctioned business, by suspension or revocation of licence, product recall, issuing 
improvement or prohibition notices, or public advertisements (Rhodes 1981). 
Regulatory authorities have their enforcers known as inspectors. Inspectors work in private 
places where the police would not normally go (Rhodes 1981, Bardach and Kagan 1982, 
Hawkins and Thomas 1984). Examples of inspectors' work areas include occupational health 
and safety; teaching; pollution generated by factories; medicinal drugs manufactured, 
distributed and sold; food safety; transportation; building; nursing home and so on. Each of 
these requires different kinds of expertise, for example engineers, pharmacists, teachers, 
managers, health personnel or food scientists. Inspectors can be called an enforcement arm 
of the regulatory authorities. They are equipped with authority to enter private property, 
examine and copy books and records, take samples, and interrogate executives and workers 
in order to uncover evidence of non-compliance with the law. 
Although possessing authority to monitor law adherence, inspectors do not work like police. 
Most inspectors have specialised knowledge related to the areas they are enforcing, in which 
they are assigned roles other than merely detecting crime for prosecution (Blackie 1970, 
Kelman 1981, Rhodes 1981, Bardach and Kagan 1982). Many studies suggest that 
inspectors should be flexible, use discretion as central to sound professional decisions, and 
have wider promotional and advisory roles in seeking compliance and furthering the 
underlying purposes of the legislation rather than being bound by rules (Schuck 1972, 
Rhodes 1981, Bardach and Kagan 1982, Kleinig 1997). 
Inspectors are viewed as a bridging mechanism between legislative intention and the 
realities in order to minimise drawbacks which laws or enforcement processes may possess 
(Rhodes 1981, Bardach and Kagan 1982, Hawkins and Thomas 1984). Their discretion is 
expected to decrease enforcement limitations or constraints due to the lack of staff and 
resources (Kadish and Kadish 1973, Anderson 1975, Lloyd-Bostock 1987). In many 
instances they can variably deal with offences detected by issuing prosecutions on 
infringements to issuing verbal warning (Rhodes 1981, Hawkins and Thomas 1984). 
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To pursue their mixed role effectively, inspectors' capabilities are essential, as Blackie (1970; 
71) has said • the quality of the inspector cannot be too high'. They initiate decisions, 
interpret regulations, make on-the-spot assessment, decide how to proceed with breaches 
detected and act on behalf of organisations they work with (Rhodes 1981, Hawkins and 
Thomas 1984, Black 1997). Their technical knowledge is important to ensure they can detect 
problems and provide advice (Rhodes 1981, Bardach and Kagan 1982, Cotterrell 1992). 
Their experience is likewise indispensable. Together, their knowledge and experience 
enable inspectors to make independent decisions; otherwise they would need to depend 
upon information provided by the business. It also helps inspectors to spot problems, 
understand and think through the problems, see through unjustified excuses, make decisions 
intelligently and elicit co-operation by giving useful advice (Bardach and Kagan 1982). 
In many countries, recruitment of inspectors is based on experience, personality and attitude 
(Blackie 1970, Kelman 1981). The job is generally competitive and considered prestigious, 
with a high salary (Blackie 1970). The the US pharmacy inspector's minimum salary is set at 
the same level as the pharmacy manager (personal communication). Given the fact that 
inspectors are the professionals with first-hand experience in the field, they are always 
perceived as a major component in the enforcement system. High participation in policy 
making to provide their field experience is recognised as important (Rhodes 1981). 
Inspectors in many regulatory authorities are pioneers in reform or consultants to Ministers 
(Blackie 1970). 
Despite being a professional job, inspection can be daunting. Inspectors work in the field, 
make decisions in face-to-face contact, and sometimes are directly exposed to offenders' 
reactions of outrage, pleas of mercy, and on occasion, threats or bribes (Hawkins and 
Thomas 1984). The confrontational environment and risky nature of the job can demotivate 
inspectors (Fincham and Rhodes 1999). 
Studies suggest that enforcing regulation in the field is not as simple as it is written in law; 
there is an obvious paradox between the power given by statute and the use of those 
powers. Inspectors seem to be saying that it is neither desirable nor practicable to perform 
legalistic enforcement and use those powers except as a last resort; that flexible 
enforcement is likely to be the first-choice (Rhodes 1981,Cotterrell 1992, Baldwin 1995, 
Black 1995). They indicate that flexible enforcement enables them to cope better with the 
variety of situations in the field, to get their job done effectively with less conflict than the 
legalistic approach (Bardach and Kagan 1982, Gunningham and Sinclair 1999, May and 
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Winter 2000). Inspectors take many components into consideration before making decisions 
(Rhodes 1981, Hawkins 1984, May and Winter 2000). 
Inspectors often claim that they are closest to the real situation, and given their professional 
background, they should not be slavish followers of regulations and administrative 
procedures, which are not responsive to the real situation (Allsop and Mulcahy 1996, Kleinig 
1997). Consequently, in the field, inspectors commonly utilise a number of enforcement 
techniques rather than the heavy-hand of the law (Rhodes 1981, Baldwin 1990, May and 
Winter 2000). Dropping prosecutions for minor violations in return for prompt remedial action 
on more serious ones, though officially not permitted, is often found (Bardach and Kagan 
1982). 
The fact of having high qualifications and professional background may mean inspectors 
themselves prefer to use their education and professional skills in judgements, rather than 
acting to police those inspected (Rhodes 1981). These views and attitudes inspectors 
possess may make them try to ensure that licensees fully understand and fulfil their 
responsibilities under regulations before taking any legal action. Compromising would be a 
way to resolve conflicting interests, or they may prefer using negotiation to correct a problem 
(Hawkins and Thomas 1984). Flexible enforcement techniques are sometimes useful to get 
'inside' information to trace back or further investigate serious cases (Bardach and Kagan 
1982). 
In the field, with a mixture of 'bad and good apples', inspectors tend to assess each offender 
independently as they realise that the regulated are different in capacity and intention to 
comply with law (Bardach and Kagan 1982, May and Winter 2000). Harm and risk caused by 
violation form a main factor taken into consideration before making a decision, in conjunction 
with other factors (Kadish and Kadish 1973, Rhodes 1981, Benson 2001). There are 
continuums of actions ranging from 'professionals talk to professionals' to heavy-handed 
actions depending on the situation (Braithwaite et al 1987, Baldwin 1990). Coercion or use of 
inspector's authority is likely to apply to those 'bad apples' who tend to be problematic or 
difficult to deal with (Baldwin 1990, Black 1998). Where improvement on the legal standards 
of performance is wanted, the advisory strategy is likely to be adopted; but advice tends to 
be confined to areas where compliance is considered unproblematic, where risks are low or 
where it is thought that formal legal enforcement is not feasible (Baldwin 1990). 
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Threat of punishment is viewed by inspectors as ineffective, especially in the case of 
widespread offences where inspectors would never inspect frequently enough to provide 
adequate deterrence (Katz and Kahn 1978). Prosecution is often undertaken after a second 
visit and where 'serious irregularities' are found (Kagan 1994). 
Inspectors are often inclined to patience and sympathetic consideration of the difficulties of 
those inspected, with sanctions remaining very much in the background (Rhodes 1981, May 
and Burby 1998). Inspectors' sympathetic attitudes on the regulated are sometimes 
suspected by the public to be because inspectors identify themselves too close to the 
regulated, or because they may expect to work with the regulated in the future (Kelman 
1981, Bardach and Kagan 1982, Schwartz 1994). In order to prevent this allegation, some 
regulatory authorities regularly provide or remind inspectors of the worst cases so that the 
inspectors' knowledge of possible risks is broadened, whilst at the same time boosting their 
morale and motivation (Bardach and Kagan 1982). 
In general, inspectors seem inclined to use their professional expertise and experience in 
flexible ways due to their perceptions on their roles and their jobs as mentioned earlier. 
Nevertheless, they are influenced by the context within which they work, the laws that direct 
their work, and the characteristics of the agency that employs them. These factors all affect 
the way inspectors implement regulations and how they use their authority. 
2.3 Contextual factors 
Independence of regulatory agencies is essential to inspection work but hardly exists 
(Blackie 1970, Anderson 1975). They fall between consumer protection and business and 
political pressure. Often, it is difficult for the agencies to work independently and this is true 
in both developed and developing countries (Dukes 1985, Cotterrell 1992, Kiatying -
Angsulee 2000). Economically powerful actors (especially large business enterprises) have 
much greater control over the manner in which law is enforced than do other actors (Cotterell 
1992), because they are capable of arranging organised pressures or can sue regulatory 
authorities while consumers are seldom able to (Anderson 1975). In the US for example, 
businesses have exerted influence over the Congress in postponing or overriding state 
agencies' efforts in important areas such as pollution, food safety and pesticide safety 
(Dempsey 1994). The private-public co-operation, a strategy employed by many regulatory 
authorities, is another way that allows business to influence regulatory authorities' decisions 
through advisory groups or working groups (Anderson 1975, Jasanoff 1994). 
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A regulatory agency's enforcement style can be pressurised by politicians who may be 
influenced by businessmen. The aims and objectives sometimes change in accordance with 
policies from top-level executives leading to changes in enforcement practices (Blackie 
1970, Rhodes 1981, Bardach and Kagan 1982, Cotterrell 1992). For example, when the US 
Congress criticised the Occupational Safety and Health Administration of being too relaxed, 
serious violation cases jumped from 2% of the total violation to 6% (Kelman 1981). 
Afterwards, with the new President, the organisation was claimed to be • overregulated' 
(Kelman 1981). 
Even in countries with relatively similar traditions, there can be marked differences in 
regulatory policies, because of varying national situations and the differing pressures exerted 
on policy makers (Dukes 1985). A number of studies (Cotterell 1992, Dempsey 1994, Kagan 
2000) conclude that business pressures have usually been extremely successful in limiting 
the scope of legal control, or the effectiveness with which control can be exercised. As these 
pressures affect managers' decisions, they would unavoidably affect inspectors' decisions in 
order to comply with their managers (Kelman 1981). 
Public interest and social pressure, either for or against enforcement practice, is vital to 
regulatory authorities, which are usually politically sensitive. Positively they can counteract 
business pressure, such as in the case of non-governmental organisations countering the 
pharmaceutical business in South Africa to bring HIV drug prices down. Hawkins and 
Thomas (1984) illustrate that drunk driving enforcement was better achieved only when 
attitudes of the public changed through campaigns about loss of life from drunk driving and 
have led to greater social acceptance on drunk driving enforcement. 
Criticisms, complaints or dissatisfaction with the result of inspection are obvious possible 
influences on an inspector's choice of methods (Rhodes 1981). The absence of effective and 
critical public opinion may result in failure to enforce the law especially when enforcement 
goals and objectives are largely set by inspectors themselves; or when inspectors are 
pursuing their own interests in reaching an accommodation with those they are set up to 
enforce, rather than acting in the public's interest (Lipsky 1980, Rhodes 1981, Hudson 
1997). 
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2.4 Good laws 
Laws are central to enforcement, and enforcement failure may result from inappropriate 
laws, which cause conflicts in enforcing regulation in the field (Baldwin 1990, Black 1995). 
Good laws must not appear utopian but practical, reasonable and responsive (Anderson 
1975, Bardach and Kagan 1982, Cotterrell 1992, Elliot 1992). Nevertheless, most laws are 
imperfect; and making good laws has not been a major focus of attention in bureaucracies 
(Black 1995). 
Laws must be designed to have compatibility and continuity with the established cultural 
principles (Anderson 1975, Klausner 1997). However, occasionally laws are contradictory to 
customary behaviour, which results in non-compliance (Kerwin 1994). This is a real problem 
in developing countries, which adopt western laws, which frequently conflict with customary 
behaviour based on traditional beliefs and economic pressures (Klausner 1997). 
Exemptions, if predictable, should be provided. For example, the UK Medicine Act 1968 
provides a section called 'Emergency Supplies' allowing prescription drugs to be sold by a 
pharmacist without prescriptions if the specified criteria are met. 
Laws should demonstrate a certain degree of specificity. Theoretically, the deterrent effects 
of law should vary considerably from one kind of offence to another according to the 
seriousness of the offence, but to establish them appropriately is problematic (Rhodes 1981, 
Cotterrell 1992, Black 1995). Field enforcers see difficulties in applying one set of rules 
across-the-board where offenders can violate laws in different degree (Baldwin 1990). 
Flexibility at site-level can erode sanction effects of regulations (Bardach and Kagan 1982). 
Inspectors who try to avoid unreasonableness may be accused of 'taking the law into their 
own hands', of favouritism toward a particular enterprise, or of jeopardising the health and 
safety of innocent persons (Bardach and Kagan 1982; 204). 
The nature of law is anticipatory, so limitations of foresight are inevitable (Black 1998). The 
fact that laws are mostly in the hands of regulatory officers, who do not usually have 
experience in the field, makes laws sometimes either too broad (over-inclusive) or too 
narrow (under-inclusive); and they often aim at the worst case scenario (Cotterrell 1992, 
Kerwin 1994, Maccormick 1996, Black 1998). Empirical studies indicate that laws tend to be 
over-protective, especially laws that involve specific expertise where professional ideology is 
brought into the process by experts with the patronising sense of 'mother knows best' 
(Kelman 1981). A study about meat packaging regulations found that if regulations were 
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strictly enforced, no meat processor could remain open (Schuck 1972). Laws that are too 
strict possibly cause adverse effects such as an enforcer's reluctance to enforce them, 
corruption and bargaining (Kelman 1981, Kagan 1994). 
Lawmakers are usually compelled by political pressure to make the law approved within the 
shortest time possible (Bardach and Kagan 1982, Black 1995). Time constraints and 
complexity of problems can result in lack of thorough responses from both the regulated and 
the regulators. Laws subsequently are defective, resulting in unreasonableness and 
unresponsiveness to the real situation (Bardach and Kagan 1982, Black 1997); leading to 
conflict with enforcers. 
The impact of technical crime is often not easily seen at the time of conduct. Evidence or 
information from the field and causal relations on hazards are often inadequate, especially in 
drug regulations where decisions are usually based on texts or logic-based evidence 
(Bardach and Kagan 1982, Dukes 1985). One good example can be seen in the medicinal 
drug field where legalised drugs are withdrawn because of hazardous effects found after 
approval (Abraham 1995). These weaknesses cause inspectors difficulties in imposing harsh 
enforcement; but on the contrary, executives often demand rules that are more stringent with 
heavier sanctions as a sign to show their sense of responsibility (Bardach and Kagan 1982). 
The clarity or predictability of harm caused by offences affects an inspector's decisions. 
Unfortunately, the harm caused by white-collar crime is not always clear; and accordingly 
there are problems in assessing the seriousness of offences to match with sanctions in the 
judicial system (Walker 1997, Francis et al 2001). Enforcement approaches are, thus, 
mainly determined by inspectors' subjective assessment of the type of hazard at issue 
(Baldwin 1990). Minor hazards or risks tend to prompt a less legalistiC, less confrontational 
approach on the part of inspectors (Baldwin 1990). Conversely, in the case of major or 
serious hazards inspectors are more inclined to demand strict compliance, give direct threats 
of notices or prosecutions. Problematic hazard, hazards where possibilities and probabilities 
are not explicit, difficult to measure, define or decide what is a safer way, are often subject to 
a genuine process of persuasion and negotiation (Baldwin 1990). 
The unclear harm or risk does not affect inspectors only. Courts are usually reluctant to 
punish 'white-collar' crime, especially by imprisonment, as the impact of the violations is 
often diffuse and complex compared to real crime such as manslaughter, rape or murder, 
especially when offenders are usually legitimate, SOCially useful enterprise (Sutherland 1949, 
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Benson 2001). Court decisions usually discourage inspectors from using their authority 
because judges frequently impose penalties that inspectors feel do not reflect the 
seriousness of the offence (Bardach and Kagan 1982). Besides, the courts often criticise 
inspectors' cases as not serious enough to bring to court where they are already 
overwhelmed (Rhodes 1981). 
Laws should be designed for easy prosecution process (Baldwin 1990). There are many 
punishment measures to reduce court involvement, save resources and speed the 
prosecution process other than using only criminal sanctions, such as the use of disciplinary 
sanctions, adjudication or other administrative measures (Scholz 1991, Black 1995). Many 
regulatory authorities are allowed to use adjudication within the organisations, for example, 
the Statutory Committee of the Royal Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain, which is 
empowered by the Pharmacy Act 1954 in respect of pharmacists, and also has powers 
under the UK Medicine Act 1968 in respect of registered pharmacy business. 
The legislative process is as important as the aforementioned good characteristics of laws. 
Anticipation or identification of enforcement strategies or enforcement models along with the 
legislative process is important for effectively enforcing laws (Baldwin 1990, Cotterrell 1992), 
the same as it is in policy process (Pressman and Widalsky 1973, Walt 1994, 1998). 
Interaction among policy-makers, lawmakers, inspectors and other parties concerned should 
take place at the beginning of formulation such as in the form of consultation (Hogwood and 
Gunn 1984). Decisions in rulemaking, which are not centrally focused on how to make them 
operate effectively, make inspectors work in sharp contradiction among the existence of 
strong penal powers, and the practical preference of the use of persuasion and advice in the 
achievement of aims; and finally would end up in conflicts. 
2.5 Working styles of regulatory authorities 
Working styles of regulatory authorities can vary depending on their aims and objectives. 
The change in enforcement philosophy (mentioned in section 2.1) would expand an 
organisation's functions from limited prosecution functions to cover non-inspecting kinds 
such as education. The broader and more complex aims other than enforcing the laws may 
raise problems in interpreting the enforcer's roles and how the authority should be 
implemented, and coercive enforcement strategy may be undermined, all of which affect an 
inspector's job performance (Rhodes 1981). Regulatory organisations are affected by 
external factors, namely culture, business influences, political pressures or government 
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policies, resulting in changes of working styles as demonstrated in section 2.3. 
Consequently, working styles can shift over time. 
Agency culture or working style is important to how enforcement is carried out (Kagan 
1994, May and Burby 1998, Gunningham and Sinclair 1999). This is because the agency's 
aims or intentions are reflected in their administration process, behind the approaches used, 
the organisation's instruction to inspectors and how far the responsibility of inspectors 
extends for the maintenance and improvement of standards (Rhodes 1981, Cotterrell 1992). 
For example, in 1982 the UK Lord Robens's Report of the Committee on Safety and Health 
at the Work Place guided the direction for inspection that, . The provision of advice and 
assistance towards progressively better (safety) standard is the basic function of inspection 
service' (Rhodes 1981; 179). In this case, the management system and inspector's decisions 
would be geared towards adviSOry enforcement rather than punitive enforcement. 
Consequently, the gap between inspectors' practices and the organisation's expectation is 
reduced. 
Inspectors come from different backgrounds and may have different aims or expectations 
regarding their job (Rhodes 1981, Baldwin 1990). These differences could drive inspectors to 
make different judgements from being coercive to accommodative (Rhodes 1981, Hawkins 
1984, Baldwin 1990, Gunningham and Sinclair 1999, May and Winter 2000). Difficulties in 
enforcing laws arise when an inspector's personal aims do not fit with those of their 
organisation (Rhodes 1981). A clear working style would help in setting clear roles for 
inspectors so that they can perform in accordance to the organisation's aims or objectives 
(May and Burby 1998, May and Winter 2000). 
A clear working style is also essential in giving direction to inspector training programmes, 
which will be streamlined towards the roles expected by the organisations. Enforcement can 
be carried out in many forms, so inspectors' roles can be that of many as well such as 
experts, advisers, lawyers or architects (Rhodes 1981). Fincham and Rhodes (1999; 43) see 
the importance of training as, 'to make clear what roles they are expecting to perform?'. 
Role ambiguity is perceived as a threat to organisations as it creates stress and reduces 
organisational commitment, job involvement and job satisfaction (Handy 1999). Officers who 
are stressed in performing their jobs tend to not thinking beyond the immediate decisions, 
being un bothered by the discrepancy between what they are supposed to do and what they 
actually do, and make decisions without seeking out or considering relevant information 
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(Hudson 1997, Kanz and Kahn 1978). Inspectors whose roles are clear have less stress 
than inspectors who have mixed roles (Bardach and Kagan 1982). 
Despite specificity of standards, different inspectors may see different things and evaluate or 
interpret the relative seriousness of a particular offence in different ways (Bardach and 
Kagan 1982); and there are also conflicts of interest in deciding whether a statutory 
requirement is being observed (Rhodes 1981). The differences regarding these judgements 
mostly depend on inspectors' views and attitudes (Rhodes 1981, Cotterell 1992). Training is, 
thus, a way to infuse a sense of mission and to balance officers' personal feelings, thoughts 
and behaviour with the organisation's goals and expectations (Kelman 1981, Fincham and 
Rhodes 1999). In a situation of imperfect correlation between regulatory requirement and 
actual hazards, lack of proper training could lead inspectors to make non-standardised 
decisions - being based mainly on their own attitudes. Many regulatory authorities spend 
more than one year on their training programmes to attune inspector's views and attitudes to 
comply with the organisation's working style (Kelman 1981, Lloyd-Bostock 1987). 
Inspectors work out of sight of their managers. Monitoring is, hence, an important part of the 
inspection system to minimise laxity that possibly occurs, especially in situations where 
violation is rampant, as well as to prevent authority misuse (Scholz 1991). However, it is 
difficult to have an optimum monitoring system due to the lack of staff and evaluation criteria 
(Hudson 1997). Number of premises inspected provides evidence of activity, but not how 
effective the activity is (Hawkins and Thomas 1984). For example, inspectors may note only 
no-problem cases, and ignore those that violate the law, as they are more difficult to deal 
with and take longer. Likewise, if evaluation is aimed at number of offences detected, 
inspectors would show their efficiency by dealing more with easy cases or cases with 
greatest probability to be amended rapidly, and ignoring or overlooking the less obvious or 
complicated cases that could cause greater harm (Hawkins and Thomas 1984). 
Lack of staff makes joint or re-inspection difficult. In the medicinal drug field where inspectors 
are understaffed, capable and experienced drug regulators have often been induced to 
accept senior positions with the pharmaceutical industry, apparently at substantially higher 
salaries (Dukes 1985). Many regulatory authorities use the form of supervision, in place of 
evaluation with the functions of monitoring and inducement, through inspection reports 
(Kelman 1981, Scholz 1991), for example, comparing inspectors' citation percentages, 
average penalty, number of inspections with serious violation, number of warnings or 
number of written inspection notices. It is suggested that the enforcement process should be 
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reviewed by outside agencies to increase the credibility of regulatory authorities (8ardach 
and Kagan 1982). 
In bureaucracy the tall hierarchy and centralised administration creates top management 
conflict or misunderstanding with operative works, like field inspection work (Collins 1994, 
Morgan 1997). The tall hierarchy also leads to a greater possibility that information is filtered 
or distorted, and communication blocked (Collins 1994). Hierarchy can also adversely affect 
the free flow of ideas and information in an organisation, because subordinates may hesitate 
to advance proposals they think may run counter to 'official' policy or antagonise their 
superiors (Anderson 1975). Conflict regarding inspectors' decisions arises when hazards 
found in the field do not follow theories, which the laws usually are based on. A managerial 
system that supports systemic exploration of the views of field-level inspectors would help 
legitimise decisions made in headquarter offices thus would decrease the clash between 
theory and experience. However, that kind of climate does not frequently exist (Morgan 
1997). 
Inspection is a job involving professional judgement and a certain degree of discretion, which 
needs flexibility and responsiveness. These requirements conflict with the nature of the 
bureaucratic system where a number of regulatory authorities belong. This bureaucratic 
system is rule-bound, which does not allow responsiveness. This could cause conflict with 
inspectors who always legitimise their decisions with the back up of professional judgement 
(Friedson 1994, Morgan 1997). It would benefit the public if the authorities can move their 
administration towards Yechnocracy' which is defined as 'rules are exercised through uses 
of knowledge, expert power and the ability to solve relevant problems' (Morgan 1997; 157). 
2.6 Summary 
This chapter indicates that the enforcement continuum is broad with various use of 
techniques including incentives, bargaining, persuasion, education and coercion. 
Enforcement philosophy has changed over time. Instead of relying solely on enforcers, all 
parties concerned are involved in enforcement cycles. Recently innovative strategies such 
as self-regulation and community-based strategies are used in conjunction with punitive 
enforcement to achieve better compliance. 
Enforcers are one of many mechanisms to minimise crime. Inspectors deal with technical 
crime, which requires special knowledge relevant to the field they are dealing with. Imperfect 
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laws, inspectors' professional background, and administrative problems collectively drive 
regulatory authorities to grant inspectors discretion, hoping to lessen the drawbacks and 
promote objectives of laws instead of merely punishing offenders. The professional 
background and experience of inspectors are perceived as important features in their making 
sound and intelligent decisions. 
With limitations to each enforcement approach and style, a mixed strategy is perceived as 
the most effective. Most regulatory agencies are identified with the preference use of 
bargaining, persuasion, and advice giving, affecting the ways inspectors perform in the field. 
By using discretion, efforts can be geared towards more serious violations, administration 
can be more cost-effective without unnecessary cases being put through the time-consuming 
prosecution process. Management strategies, such as increasing openness or transparency, 
rotation system or re-inspection, are among measures to counterbalance discretion abuse. 
Inspectors also argue for discretion as the persons closest to the real situation, and as 
professional workers who should be free at some level to make the best professional 
decisions for the public benefit. In their work, authority is preferably used as a last resort. 
4~ 
Chapter 3 - Research Methods 
The previous chapters indicated that only having regulations could not guarantee effective 
enforcement. This chapter elaborates on the framework used in this study to explore 
inspectors' roles in the regulation of private pharmacies, and methods to acquire and 
analyse the data collected. 
3.1 Main objective 
To identify the underlying reasons preventing the TFDA inspectors using their legal authority 1 
in pharmacy inspection. 
3.1.1 Specific objectives 
1. To study the regulations and the codes of practice used in pharmacy inspection in terms 
of content, inspectors' authority, sanctions and prosecution processes; and to compare these 
with what actually happens. 
2. To contrast the official management system for managing inspectors and the inspection 
process with what actually happens. 
3. To explore inspectors' views and attitudes towards the regulations and the management 
process. 
3.2 Study framework 
The discipline of policy analysiS was adopted in this study in view of the fact that regulations 
are one form of policy - statements by organisations showing their functions and 
responsibilities to the public while imposing restrictions on the behaviour of individuals or 
groups (Lowi 1964, Anderson 1975, Cotterrell 1992, Black 1995, 1997). Policy analysis is 
useful because it focuses on the dynamics of process within organisations, exploring four 
phases of policy cycle; problem identification and issues recognition, policy formulation, 
1 Authority given to inspectors to enter licensed pharmacies and premises selling drugs to check law 
compliance as well as to collect, seize or detain suspected products for the purpose of prosecution 
issued by the Drug Act 1967. 
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policy implementation and policy evaluation (Walt 1994). This study sets out to explore 
inspection, one instrument by which government seeks to ensure the implementation of 
policy. The aim - identifying why inspectors do not use their legal authority - is to explore the 
policy gap between intent and implementation, focusing on actors - the inspectors. 
There are a number of policy analysis approaches, but few related specifically to 
implementation (Hogwood and Gunn 1984, Walt 1994, Altenstetter and Bjorkman 1998). 
They can be roughly categorised into two approaches: the 'top-down' and the 'bottom-up' 
(Sabatier 1986, Lane 1987, Walt 1994). 
The top-down approach is linear, normative and prescriptive, and starts with a policy 
decision at central level which is passed down for execution at lower levels. Implementation 
is judged by the extent to which legally mandated objectives are achieved over time 
(Sabatier 1986). Although it seems to fit the TFDA administration, there are a number of 
drawbacks to this approach. The linearity of the model is not compatible with the 
implementation, which is interactive (Grindle and Thomas 1991, Walt 1994, 1998). The 
model lacks a dynamic characteristic and so cannot provide a good analysis of policy 
change (Sabatier 1986). The conditions themselves are subjective and may be interpreted 
differently (Lane 1987). Finally, the top-down approach hardly focuses on the actors, 
especially those who are implementors - assuming that those who execute policy do not 
exercise any control or discretion over policy. 
The top-down model is clearly criticised by Hogwood and Gunn (1984), who propose ten 
preconditions for perfect implementation as part of this prescriptive 'ideal' model. It is meant 
to be an instrument to help analysis of why perfect implementation is unattainable, and is 
based on the concept of authority - hierarchy, obedience, control and perfect co-ordination 
(Lane 1987). Hongsamoot (2000) tested this model to explore TFDA implementation, and 
found none of the conditions for perfect implementation was met. That is, contextual factors 
affected TFDA's functioning, resources were constrained, there was no agreeement on 
policy objectives and so on. This suggests that the top-down model is idealistic, and 
prescriptive, but not useful in explaining why policies are not executed as intended. 
The bottom-up model, on the other hand, is less explicit about the factors involved in 
implementation compared to the top-down approach (Sabatier 1986) and does not see the 
policy process as linear. Implementation is viewed as involving actors in the process of 
negotiation, bargaining and exchange rather than the imposition of authority alone (Lane 
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1987). The model views implementors as active participants in the implementation process 
(Hjern and Porter 1981, Walt 1994). It starts by identifying the network of actors involved in 
service delivery to detect those involved in the various levels of policy-making, and assumes 
differences in goals, strategies and activities used in implementing policies (Sabatier 1986). 
The strength in focusing on the perception of actors brings the main disadvantage to this 
approach. Important or interesting issues can be excluded if actors cannot recognise those 
factors, and hence cannot reflect on them (Sabatier 1986). 
For this study, a broader approach to implementation was taken, in order to overcome some 
of the weaknesses of the top-down and bottom-up approachs. Walt and Gilson (1994) 
propose a broad policy analysis framework that focuses on the interdependence and 
interaction of four factors - content, context, actor and process (see Figure 3.1). The last 
three dimensions, which are often neglected by other approaches, are viewed as possibly 
making the difference between effective and ineffective implementation (Walt and Gilson 
1994, Rathwell 1998, Walt 1998). Process is particularly emphasised as an important 
element 'providing understanding why the desired policy outcomes fail to emerge' (Walt and 
Gilson 1994: 354). Their framework allows the exploration of interrelationship between 
actors, context, process and content, to explain why there may be a gap between policy 
intent and implementation (Rathwell 1998, Walt 1998, Mayhew 1999, Kiatying-Angsulee 
2000). It provides a way of analysing policy implementation as an interactive and ongoing 
process of decision-making rather than a linear one (Walt and Gilson 1994, Walt 1998). 
CONTEXT 
"as individuals 
"as members of groups 
CONTENT PROCESS 
Figure 3.1: Walt and Gilson's framework for policy analysis 
Source: Walt and Gilson, 1994; 354 
The advantage of Walt and Gilson's approach is that it encourages analysis based on the 
interaction between the four differ dimensions, with actors firmly in the centre. Actors are 
seen as a broad group - ranging from individuals to organisations. In pharmaceutical policy, 
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actors include various groups such as drug sellers, clients, lawmakers, experts or advisory 
groups in the law making process, regulators, the pharmaceutical business, interest groups, 
and the media. For this study, it was decided to focus on inspectors because it is they who 
initiate decisions on whether to use their legal authority or professional knowledge 
implementing TFDA rules and regulations. Although it might have been useful to explore the 
attitudes of pharmacy owners and pharmacists to inspectors and their use of authority, after 
due consideration this was dropped. First, as the researcher is an inspector, the reliability of 
interviews would be questionable especially in the Thai hierarchical society. Second is the 
problem of representative selection from 3,611 pharmacies and time limitation. Third, due to 
the lack of information and research in this area, the time required to prepare and pilot 
questionnaires is expected to be longer. 
Personal attitude is found to profoundly influence decision-making (Ajzen and Fishbein 1980, 
Fincham and Rhodes 1999). A study of Thai community pharmaCists shows that their 
personal attitudes have more effect in determining their dispensing behaviour than social 
influence (Plianbangchang 1999). The TFDA inspectors' pharmacy background is likely to 
affect their decisions; and understanding actors and their attitudes is important if 
implementation is to be improved. In this study, the inspectors' views and attitudes regarding 
pharmacy enforcement were explored including issues such as use of authority, job 
satisfaction and attitudes to the regulations they were enforcing. Concepts in criminology 
were also used to explain their decision, for example the principle of proportionality (Bagaric 
2001). 
Organisations do not work in a vacuum but are usually bound by their context or their 
environment (Walt 1994, Barker 1996) which varies over time. Context can mean structural, 
economical, political, historical or cultural factors; and can be at national or international level 
(Walt 1994, 1998, Grindle and Thomas 1991, Collins 1994). Context affects organisations in 
many ways, and others have shown that organisations' administration is controlled, designed 
and shaped in relation to its context (Pfeffer and Salanick 1990). Actors are influenced by the 
context surrounding them in both personal and work lives (Walt and Gilson 1994). In this 
study, two particular contextual factors were relevant to the TFDA enforcement in pharmacy: 
political influence and cultural influence. 
Political context is a powerful factor that cannot be isolated from any organisations (Minogue 
1983, Grindle and Thomas 1991, Walt 1994, Jacobson and Wasserman 1999). Thailand, 
since the absolute monarchy was abolished in 1932, has not had radical change in terms of 
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political ideology. This may be because no government has lasted long enough to initiate 
major change; the average life of a government is 16 months, or 6 months if the longer-lived 
army-backed regimes are removed (Economist 2002). Changes in government do not 
appear to have greatly affected the TFDA (the 6th and 7'h Consumer Protection Programme 
Evaluation 1996, Kiatying-Angsulee 2000), although such changes appear to have more 
impact in developed countries, especially in relation to big business (Schwartz 1994, 
Jacobson and Wasserman 1999). What impact changes of government might have had in 
Thailand are probably reflected largely in appointment of executive levels where positions 
change frequently. Political impact, in this study, was explored through inspectors' 
perceptions. 
Within the political context, the influence of business was also included, although it was 
extremely difficult to assess. Regulatory authorities are caught between business and 
consumers; and are often pressurised by business through the political system as indicated 
in chapter 2. In Thailand, business influence has become more powerful in the public sector 
through connection with politicians (Green 2000, Economist 2002). The influence of industry 
was explored in this study by asking inspectors how it affected inspection. 
Cultural factors are argued to be an important factor pervading the policy environment, and 
influencing policy-makers' perceptions and political environment (Grindle and Thomas 1991, 
Walt and Gilson 1994). Thai national social values were of interest in this study due to their 
uniqueness. The Thai are known for their politeness, hospitality, hierarchy and conflict 
avoidance (Klausner 1997, Kiatying-Angsulee 2000). These characteristics nurture a 
patronage system and are likely to be contradictory to strict enforcement. Besides, in 
general, some claim that in Thailand there is generally lax conformity with rules or 
regulations, and that rule bending is often found (Klausner 1997, Kiatying-Angsulee 2000, 
Economist 2002). 
Policy content has usually been the focus for policy analysis (Hogwood and Gunn 1984, 
Sabatier 1986, Walt 1994). In this research, the Thai Drug Act 1967 represented policy 
content. From the literature review, it is clear that inappropriate laws can harm effective 
enforcement, but designing good laws is difficult. The lengthy and formal legislative process 
itself creates limitations to have responsive and reasonable laws. Although there are no fixed 
rules of what constitute good laws, there are certain characteristics of law that could hinder 
effective enforcement. The Drug Act 1967, including the TFDA legislative process, was 
explored to find characteristics facilitating or hindering enforcement. 
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Finally, the central concern here was with the process of implementation. It is often found 
that policies are distorted after formulation during the process of implementation (Lipsky 
1980, Sabatier 1986, Grindle and Thomas 1991, Jacobson and Wasserman 1999). The 
process or strategy is argued to be important for the success of implementation because it is 
the process that puts intent into action (Walt 1994, Jacobson and Wasserman 1999). The 
processes involved in this research aimed at the TFDA enforcement management process -
how the TFDA enforcement process worked including how the Act was implemented and 
inspection undertaken. The official was contrasted with the actual process to discover 
constraints preventing inspectors from fully using their legal authority. 
By using Walt and Gilson's framework in this study, the analysis covered organisational, 
procedural, behavioural and political factors, which should be helpful in exploring the failure 
of implementation and inspectors' roles in it. As a highly simplified framework, concepts from 
other disciplines are needed to enrich some of the analysis. This could be said to be a 
characteristic of policy analysis, which is both inter-disciplinary as well as multi-disciplinary 
(Hogwood and Gunn 1984). 
In this study it was useful to draw on some organisational theories to explain some of the 
findings of the study, concepts related to motivation, role, conflicts in organisations and 
bureaucratic organisation characteristics were applied. For example, inspectors' roles are 
sometimes contradictory - protecting consumers and punishing offenders - which may be 
uncomfortable yet they keep working. Motivation was felt to be an issue relevant for the 
situation. There is no definite explanation of what motivation is, but it can be illustrated by 
Handy's (1999; 38-39) summarisation; Why work here and why work harder?'. Motivation 
theories were used to understand what motivates inspectors to carry on their jobs, and how 
far they were satisfied with them. The theories were also used to explore the TFDA concerns 
in motivating inspectors through such things as training programmes, career ladder and 
advancement. Role ambiguity, which includes uncertainty about how one's work is 
evaluated, uncertainty about scope for advancement, uncertainty about scope of 
responsibility and uncertainty about other's expectation of one's performance (Handy 1999) 
may well be relevant to inspectors. Role ambiguity is said to be a cause of stress and leads 
to performance withdrawal (Fincham and Rhodes 1999, Handy 1999). The concepts of roles 
and conflict were, thus, applied in the analYSis. 
Concepts were also borrowed from the organisational literature, concerning the TFDA 
administrative process. The TFDA possesses the characteristics of a bureaucratic 
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organisation described by Weber (1947): its rule-bound functions are bound by rules, the 
division of labour and the principle of hierarchy. These characteristics, although presented 
by Weber for their greater technical efficiency, have a number of shortcomings. Bureaucracy 
concepts were used to explain the TFDA management problems. 
3.4 Study methods 
3.4.1 The case study strategy 
The study aimed to explore the reasons behind inspectors' actions. The study used a case 
study strategy because it was focused on a specific contemporary group with a specific 
function without any control over contextual conditions (Stake 1994, Yin 1994). A lack of 
previous empirical work and the heterogeneous enforcement situation in each regulatory 
agency suggested the use of a case study method to obtain in-depth understanding, 
especially about the processes occurring in an organisation with limited time and resources 
(Hartley 1997). A case study strategy is appropriate for organisational study because it can 
provide an analysis of the phenomenon under study, both formal and informal, without 
isolation of the context and process involved (Hartley 1997), which were the objectives of 
this study. 
Although the case study strategy has some limitations in terms of generalisability, it is 
important to have a detailed case study as a step towards generalisation (Stake 1994). The 
detailed examination, the specified conditions observed, can provide basic information 
needed for further research development or for comparison in different settings. Although it 
could have created richer information and greater generalisability (Miles and Huberman 
1994), a comparative case study, such as a comparison between the TFDA and the UK drug 
inspectors, was not possible due to the limits of time and resources. Clearly, with any case 
study, adequate understanding regarding cultures, society, rules employed in the society, 
historical development, health care system and social value must be obtained (May 1994). 
The TFDA drug inspectors of the Drug Control Division (DCD) were selected as a case study 
for enforcers' decisions regarding enforcement in pharmacy for many reasons. First, this 
study concerned pharmacy inspection, for which drug inspectors are the main responsible 
group according to the Drug Act 1967. There are TFDA narcotic substance inspectors who 
inspect pharmacies for the Narcotic and Psychotropic Substance Control Acts, but they 
mostly inspect for complaints or in collaboration with the police. Besides, this job was 
formerly done by the drug inspectors and has been separated only since 1997. Second, the 
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TFDA is a central organisation in enforcing drug regulation, responsible for promulgating the 
laws through to implementing them. Although the inspection authority was decentralised to 
provincial health offices in 1984, the TFDA remains a policy leader and supports the budget 
for the provincial health offices' drug inspectors. Besides, the provincial health officers have 
other responsibilities - pharmacy inspection is a minor part of their work, on which they 
spend not more than 10% of their time (Interview 2000) - and each province has its own 
inspection infrastructures. Third, the TFDA drug inspectors, on average, have served the 
office longer than any other TFDA inspector groups. Thus the group is well established and 
equipped with rich experience. Fourth, almost 50% of type A pharmacies are in Bangkok. 
In this study, despite using the case study strategy, generalisabilty can still be obtained to a 
certain extent, especially for the Thai MOPH, which is currently where all health inspectors 
are working. All inspections are carried out in the same context of bureaucratic system; 
regulations are similar in terms of structures and application and all inspectors have the 
same professional background. 
3.4.2 The qualitative approach 
The nature of the topic, sensitive and complex, not only suggested that the case study 
approach was appropriate but also indicated that a qualitative approach was more 
appropriate than a quantitative one (Strauss and Corbin 1990, Bowling 1997, Hartley 1997). 
A qualitative approach was considered suitable for exploring the complexity of behaviour, 
organisational functioning and interaction of relationships and to assist in uncovering and 
understanding the basis for any phenomenon (Strauss and Corbin 1990, Silverman 2000). 
These factors are consistent with the aims of this study. 
Interviews were the most appropriate method for learning about inspector's attitudes and 
roles in regulating pharmacies. Data obtained from interviews can be of various types, such 
as factual replies, attitudes, ideas, feelings, precepts, expectations and conscious reasons 
(Oppenheim 1992, Silverman 1993), all of which were required for this study. This technique 
enabled certain topics to be addressed within the time available (Dey 1993). Focus group or 
group interviews were not selected for use as a primary method because inspectors are very 
close to each other and 'groupthink' could have occurred which could have weakened the 
data (Miles and Huberman 1994). 
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Documentary research is used for two reasons: to collect data and information; and for 
comparisons between the researcher's interpretation of the events and those recorded in the 
documents - method triangulation (May 1997, Rice and Ezzy 2000). The method is indirect, 
unobtrusive and non-reactive (Robson 1993), but it can be biased (May 1997). The 
document itself can be biased from selective recording and researchers can be selective in 
reading and analysis. In this study most of the documents used contained factual data so 
bias was minimised. Documents included regulations related to pharmacy inspection and 
inspector's authority, the official managerial system, annual reports, government gazettes, 
press releases and inspectors' reports. Secondary document sources included a review of 
independent studies, journals, books, and grey literature. There was also more obscure data 
from documents searched, which might not be independent from the context. These included 
documents to search for business influence, TFDA working style and TFDA work 
environment, such as articles from related magazines, independent studies, and minutes of 
committees' meetings. However, these types of documents were not many and the 
researcher employed methods to increase objectivity (explained later). A list of the 
documents used in this study is provided in Annex 2 (which is also used as a research tool 
described in 3.5). 
The study employed grounded theoretical sampling which stresses the importance of getting 
in-depth data more than number of interviewees (Strauss and Corbin 1990, Rice and Ezzy 
2000). Interviews were conducted until no new theme emerged. Interviewees covered a 
range of officers, all those involved in pharmacy inspection at the TFDA in terms of duty and 
number. They included 12 field inspectors and seven ex-inspectors; one Secretary-General 
(SG) and one ex-SG; five managers and two ex-managers; and two regulatory officers. Field 
inspectors were officers who were the main enforcers of the TFDA drug enforcement and 
worked in the field. Ex-field inspectors were those who used to work in the field, but no 
longer go out to inspect. SG is the TFDA top executive. Managers comprise those who do 
not work in the field but are involved in the process of planning, supervising and monitoring, 
which included SG, directors, planners, Head of the Post-Marketing Section and Chief 
Inspector. Non-inspectors are those not working in the field, which includes SG, directors, 
planners and regulatory officers - those who have a legal background and work on the 
TFDA legislative and adjudication process, they work in the TFDA Regulatory Affairs Unit. As 
the number in each group, other than inspectors, was not many, they were combined to 
protect their anonymity (see Table 3.1 for detail). A list of interviewees is provided in Annex 
3. 
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Table 3.1: Groups and number of interviewees 
Groups of Groups of Sub-groups of interviewees Number of 
interviewees interviewees interviewees 
Inspectors Inspectors Field inspectors 12 
Ex-inspectors 7 
Chief Inspector 1 
Head of Post-Marketing Section 1 
Secretary-General 1 
Managers Ex-Secretary-General 1 
Non- Planners 2 
inspectors Director 1 
Ex-managers 2 
Regulatory Regulatory officers 2 
officers 
Interviewing the ex-inspectors and the ex-managers was useful for their institutional memory 
of historical information. They were also more open and prepared to discuss sensitive issues 
such as interference or corruption, as well as to help clarify issues unearthed from the 
current inspectors in reference to the past processes. They, as well as other non-inspector 
interviewees, were recruited for the purpose of data triangulation (Rice and Ezzy 2000). 
Their opinions were used to clarify meanings because different interviewees may see the 
same phenomenon in different ways (Stake 1994). 
3.5 Research tools 
There were two tools used in this study; first the piloted open-ended semi-structured 
questionnaire (Annex 4 - 7), second the 'The Documents Pro Forma' (Annex 2). Four types 
of semi-structured questionnaires were developed for inspectors, managers, SG, and 
regulatory officers. They were translated into Thai and back translated to English to ensure 
the same meaning. The questionnaire for inspectors was piloted with four ex-inspectors to 
check content and clarity of the questions. The pilot was done three times in consultation 
with a Thai sociologist and my supervisor. The first two pilots deal with changes in content 
and how to put the right words into questions. The final pilot dealt with ordering and minor 
changes in wordings. The revised version was translated into English with back translation to 
Thai. The other three questionnaires were not piloted, but were adjusted during the process. 
The document pro forma was developed to clarify documents collected and analysed. It was 
piloted only once by the same four ex-inspectors, with a few additional documents. 
Documents were collected more if data from interviews indicated. 
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3.6 Gaining access to data 
The fact that the researcher has experience as a former inspector assisted greatly because 
of her insights into the problem and her ability to access material and to use questions 
appropriately (Miles and Huberman 1994). Official approval from the Secretary-General of 
the TFDA was obtained at the start. The purpose of the study was stated broadly to explore 
pharmacy inspection problems; the research question was not specified. Directors of related 
divisions and all interviewees were informed the SG approval, the meaningfulness of their 
contributions for the research was stressed in order to gain better co-operation. This was 
helpful to enable access to the required data and officers for the study. Documents used in 
the study were official and non-confidential. 
The researcher had her office in the inspectors' room, which was helpful in observing 
interaction among inspectors. In addition, the researcher participated in meetings within the 
inspectors group and with other related groups. The researcher also joined field visits with 
inspectors, which were very enriching to the thesis. 
For interviewing, the researcher also gained approval from the SG since government officers 
are not allowed to give interviews without prior approval. All interviewees were informed 
about the general scope of the study by a letter printed on the London School of Hygiene 
and Tropical Medicine headed notepaper. The school letter emphasised the importance of 
their contribution, and assured confidentiality and anonymity (Annex 8). The sponsors and 
an academic supervisor were named in the letter to encourage inspectors' participation. A 
letter of approval from the SG was attached. The researcher informed interviewees 
personally again before starting the interview. All participants were informed that the finished 
research would be made available to them. 
3.7 Data collection 
Given the researcher's background, bias was a main issue of concern from the beginning, 
which I tried to minimise (see section 3.11). I took a course in 'Social Science Research and 
Methodology', and attended a 'Qualitative Research Workshop' at the London School of 
Hygiene and Tropical Medicine to learn various techniques used in qualitative research and 
problems to be dealt with during the data collection period. This was to select the appropriate 
strategies and precautionary measures. These included consultation with my supervisors. 
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Before collecting data, I presented myself to inspectors and other colleagues as a student 
wanting to learn about enforcement in pharmacies. I also made it clear that I was trying to be 
objective and distant to the situation in the TFDA. This was to minimise any effects that 
might cause inspectors to feel a lack of confidence, or feel that I could report on their 
behaviour in the field to their superior (Fontana and Frey 1994). 
Data collection started by documentary research, using the document pro forma, as a way to 
get oriented. Data collected were formatted to be able to keep track of them (detail as shown 
in Annex 9). Most of documentary data was collected during August 2000 to January 2001. 
Additional documents were collected during and after interviews so as to triangulate 
information obtained from interviews. 
High participation was obtained as antiCipated since inspectors found the research a good 
opportunity to voice their problems. An interview documentation sheet was developed to 
keep track of the interviews (Annex 10). I was able to conduct interviews with all the 
expected interviewees during February 2001 - June 2001. Detailed explanation about the 
study was not given other than the statement in the school's letter, in order to prevent 
interviewees from creating diffused perceptions before giving interview which could result in 
bias (Fontana and Frey 1994, Wengraf 2001). General topics or factual topics were raised at 
the beginning of the interview. Sensitive issues were raised at a later stage to avoid 
disconcerting the interviewees. 
During the interview, where there were issues of jargon I followed them up and sought out 
the meaning to ensure that a full understanding of the issues was gained. Interviewees who 
failed to discuss issues of interest were prompted carefully, but without any expression of my 
opinion on the issues or on the interviewee's remarks, to minimise response error (Moser 
and Kalton 1971). 
I conducted all interviews to reduce variation. As anticipated, familiarity tended to lengthen 
the interviews and sometimes interviews took longer to get to the pOint. However, the 
researcher was enriched and gained more insight into situations through those dialogues. 
Three interviewees were asked for more clarification later. The interviewing took place in a 
private room with only the interviewee and I present, to avoid distraction, interruption and 
influence from colleagues. 
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Tape recording was used in order to capture words and expressions, which was helpful in 
analysis. This also helped the interviewer to better concentrate on 'listening', follow-up and 
questioning more effectively. Considering the established rapport between the interviewees 
and the interviewer, the use of a tape recorder should not create negative atmosphere. Each 
conversation was recorded on two tape recorders, the second one started about five minutes 
after the first, to ensure continuity in recording. The conversations after the recorders were 
switched off were included in the analysis. I wrote up the off-record data directly after the 
interviews finished to ensure completeness, including summary of the interviews. Normally 
one interview was conducted per day. 
3.8 Data analysis 
Document analysis was mainly finished before the interview started to give the researcher 
fundamental and theoretical information to facilitate the interviews. The issues analysed 
followed the document pro forma to make the process objective and this was used along 
with the data obtained from interview. The data were derived from 33 interviews of 30 
interviewees. All the recorded conversations were transcribed by a person who did not know 
interviewees and were checked with the original audio-records by another person who did 
not know interviewees, for cross-checking. The interviews were conducted in Thai and 
analysed in English. The Thai transcriptions were not translated into English to minimise 
translating which is suggested to avoid 'the original subtleties of meaning loss in translation' 
(Strauss and Corbin 1998; 286). 
Analysis of data from interviews was conducted along the interview period. Data were 
categorised to explore key constructs, patterns, themes, contrasts, regularities, variations, 
and singularities. (Silverman 1993). The coding approach employed grounded theory 
methods (Strauss and Corbin 1990), which means that the data obtained are categorised, 
then related and integrate into identified categories to find main themes to explain the 
phenomena observed. In this study, data from the transcriptions were first broadly divided 
into four groups based on context, content, process and actors. Overlapping data were put in 
to each group to which they belonged. All data were examined and assigned categories 
based on information obtained (open coding). Examples of categories were: heavy 
sanctions, peer pressure, self-motivation, negative reinforcement. Then, data were put back 
together to explore connections between categories (axial coding). Most of the concepts 
found at this stage were grouped as themes (for example, expectations or flexibility of rules 
and processes), and reported in chapters 4 and 5 under the various titles and sub-titles (4.1 
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Expectations of pharmacy enforcement; 4.1.1 The Thai Food and Drug Administration; 4.1.2. 
Enforcement of the Drug Act etc. Finally, core cross-cutting themes were drawn out around 
issues such as friction between the two enforcement approaches, inspectors' conflict with 
the Drug Act 1967 and constraints within the management system. 
Data collected from interviews were integrated and triangulated with data from documentary 
research. Constant comparison among the data was undertaken, and compared with issues 
identified in the literature and studies reviewed. This was to sensitise the researcher in the 
analysis process, and to reduce personal bias (Strauss and Corbin 1998). Direct quotes from 
interviews and factual data were included to show how the analysis and interpretation were 
obtained (Rice and Ezzy 2000). 
3.9 Reliability 
Reliability in documentary analysis was enhanced by employing measures that ensure the 
same findings would be obtained if the researcher or other researchers repeated the study in 
the same way (Silverman 1993, Miles and Huberman 1994, Yin 1994). One measure was to 
use the document pro forma, which was used firstly as a standardised way of categorising 
issues and collecting data, which is important for reliability (Silverman 1993). A second 
measure was to cross check the data, and to ensure correct understanding, analysis and 
interpretation. 
The topic of document analysis was largely fact-finding, thus bias was minimised. However, 
interpretation of documents was an issue of concern as Hodder (1994) mentioned that 
'documents, closer to speech, require more contextualised interpretation'. The researcher 
took into account the contextual factors, such as working styles at some specific period, 
characters of the involved SGs. The database obtained from document research was 
formatted and separated from the analysis in order to trace back the original data, another 
measure to increase reliability (Yin 1994). 
In interviews, a number of steps were taken to maximise reliability. Piloting the questionnaire 
was undertaken to ascertain clear respondent understanding of the questions (Silverman 
1993) - to ensure that the questionnaire was understood in the same way and then answers 
could be coded with minimal uncertainty (Silverman 1993).The researcher was the only 
interviewer, thus minimising interview variation (Silverman 1993). The interviews were 
transcribed verbatim with all expressions captured by tape recording such as pause, sigh 
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and intonation, which helps better interpretation and so increases reliability (Silverman 
2000). Transcription and analysis were in retrievable forms and kept separately, another 
measure to increase reliability (Rice and Ezzy 2000). My experience, as a former inspector, 
was helpful in probing, but not directing. At the end of each interview, I took note of the 
interviewee's main reaction and attitudes, including all remarkable events during the course 
of interview. During or at the end of each day, I wrote down full notes of observation of 
events that occurred during the day. 
3.10 Validity 
Validity was enhanced by a number of measures. My familiarity with the settings and 
materials helped to ensure accuracy and inclusiveness of the materials needed for the study, 
and the correct understanding of the content of documents, hence greater validity (Miles and 
Huberman 1994). In addition, the questionnaires and the document pro forma were piloted 
with four ex-inspectors to beUer ascertain the inclusiveness and to check for face and 
content validity. Then, the instruments were refined and adjusted. The study included all 
level of inspectors and managers, ex-inspectors, ex-managers and regulatory officers, the 
main stakeholders in enforcing the Drug Act 1967. In this way, the data obtained should be 
exhaustive and strong (Miles and Huberman 1994). 
Respondent validation was conducted after preliminary analysis was finished to gain more 
confidence on validity (Silverman 1993, Yin 1994). Two meetings were arranged for field 
inspectors to respond to the data collected and to assure the researcher's interpretation. 
Validity was enhanced with the use of multiple sources and mode of evidence, or 
triangulation (Denzin 1978, Silverman 1993, Miles and Huberman 1994, Yin 1994). Two out 
of four types of triangulation were used in this study: the data source and methods 
triangulation. Different groups of officers, not only the current field inspectors, were 
interviewed, including current and ex-workers. This was hoped to bring corroboration of data 
and ensured no premature closure of data collection (Silverman 1993, Rice and Ezzy 2000). 
It also aimed to have a cumulative view of data drawn from different contexts, which have 
different biases and different strengths so they are complementary (Miles and Huberman 
1994). Data collected from documents were triangulated with data from interviews and vice 
versa. Data from interviewees such as problems and speCific events received from any 
interviewees were triangulated with some other interviewees on an unidentifiable basis. 
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3.11 Limitations or the methods 
The fact that I am an inspector meant that I possibly identified myself too closely with the 
issues studied, regardless of the efforts to minimise this as described in section 3.7. One 
potential issue emerged during the study. A question about conflict of interest due to 
inspectors' double role of being both professionals-in-charge and inspectors was not 
included in the checklist of the questionnaire at the beginning; it was only during the 
interviewing process that I recognised this to be a potential problem. However, this also 
indicated the advantage of using an insider researcher, otherwise this issue would be missed 
as it is rather a personal issue that outsider researchers would hardly have known. 
Knowing all the interviewees had advantages in saving time to get orientation with the study 
setting, gaining access, understanding and collecting the information needed from both the 
documents and inspectors. Nevertheless, there were some potential disadvantages such as 
researcher's bias as mentioned earlier, on which many precautionary measures were 
applied. First was the use of grounded theory to develop the categories and themes instead 
of having them set before conducting the research. Second, the validity and reliability were 
carefully controlled. Third, triangulation was employed to verify and enhance the depth of the 
data. Fourth, the document pro forma was one measure to maintain objectivity and to 
prevent bias or self-selectivity. 
Despite all the precautionary measures and the use of triangulation, the Thai culture limited 
the depth of data collection to a certain extent. Open criticism is not common in the Thai 
culture, so true feelings or conflicts might not be identified. This was more difficult in this 
study which sought out the issues that were sensitive and could turn out to be negative to 
inspectors. On two occasions I was asked not to record. Although the topics were not directly 
related to pharmacy inspection, it showed the interviewees' sensitivity and caution. Criticism 
tended to be expressed about officers in other spheres, not about individual inspectors or 
close colleagues. I found it was difficult to get exhaustive or systemic data regarding 
allegation of corruption, unfairness of promotion, interference in the system or industry 
influence. Besides, these types of issues were hardly documented. However, this was 
compensated to some extent by interview with the ex-officers who were about to retire or 
were retired. 
While I made every attempt to be objective and transparent, there were some limitations due 
to the nature of the interview method. Interviewees sometimes were found to be defensive or 
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normative. Most of the data received resulted from interviewees' feelings which were 
subjective and existed in their individual frame of thought (Wengraf 2001). The issue of 
inspectors having personal relationships with pharmacies either through family businesses or 
being professionals-in-charge themselves was one example. Although this could mitigate 
inspectors' independence, only in a few cases was this perceived to be a potential problem, 
or that there might be conflicts of interest. Being colleagues, I had difficulty in probing deeply 
in this issue which was considered personal or private despite its potential to cause vested 
interest in inspectors' decisions. 
It is recognised that the issues touched on were sensitive and although most could be 
triangulated with documents, thus confirmed or negated, some could not. There may have 
been some untouched issues which others would have recognised. Nevertheless, given the 
triangulation of methods, the researcher feels secure that most of the information in this 
study is both reliable and generalisable. 
However, generalisability is limited where conditions are different from the settings in this 
study. For example, while provincial health office inspectors have the same educational 
background as the TFDA inspectors, and all work under the same Drug Act, according the 
same rules, it may be that the perceptions of Bangkok inspectors are slightly different from 
those inspectors in the provinces. Each province has different enforcement management 
processes, some being more flexible than others. There are thus potential limits to 
generalising the findings in this study, from Bangkok to the whole of Thailand, although from 
my experience in the TFDA I do not think there would be major differences. It is true, 
however, that the findings from this study would not necessarily be generalisable to other 
countries. 
3.12 Summary 
This study explored the policy implementation gap based on views and attitudes of 
inspectors. Walt and Gilson's approach was used as an analytical framework. Issues related 
to the actors, content, context and process were incorporated in the study to find out the 
underlying reasons why inspectors do not fully impose their legal authority. 
A qualitative approach was considered suitable for this study. Limited by resources, the case 
study strategy was selected with the main methods chosen being documentary analysis and 
semi-structured interviews. The researcher being an inspector herself had both advantages 
and disadvantages. Her familiarity with the data helped in getting and accessing the right 
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data. However, bias could have influenced her research. This was balanced by the 
document pro forma, developed as a main tool in documentary data collection, as an 
objective measure to increase reliability and validity as well as the use of grounded theory in 
collecting and analysing the data. The familiarity also helped in gaining the in-depth data 
from interviews. The main disadvantage was the issue of neutrality, and so a number of 
precautionary measures were carried out before starting data collection to increase reliability 
and validity. In addition, the use of grounded theory in sampling and analysis was hoped to 
build up the themes and analyse the data rigorously. Data from interviews were triangulated 
with data from documents where possible along the analysis process. 
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'Using only legal sanctions cannot solve the problems.' (Interview-1) 
Enforcement approaches can take various forms. This chapter explores the TFDA regulatory 
administration and contrasts it with inspectors' views and attitudes. There was a clash 
between the TFDA legalistic rhetoric on enforcement in pharmacy and inspectors' actions. 
4.1 Expectations of pharmacy enforcement 
4.1.1 The Thai Food and Drug Administration 
Consumer protection on food and drugs in Thailand was first documented in 1922. The then 
small department of the Ministry of Interior was moved and expanded to be one department 
of the Ministry of Public Health called the Thai Food and Drug Administration (TFDA). 
Medicinal drugs are one of the seven products under the TFDA regulatory control (see 
Annex 11 for details of staff). The TFDA functions are similar to consumer protection 
organisations in many countries such as the UK Medical Control Agency or the US Food and 
Drug Administration. 
The TFDA is a multi-functional agency. Enforcing regulation is one of its many functions (The 
Royal Gazette 1993). Harsh measures have been taken against those breaching the drug 
laws especially producers and sellers of fake drug (TFDA Annual Reports 1979-1987). 
However, these measures have declined over time as others have emerged around public 
relations and education (TFDA Annual Reports 1990-2000). Between two areas of 
enforcement, product registration (use of compliance enforcement) and inspection (use of 
deterrence enforcement), inspection has always had less staff support. In 1980, the number 
of officers registering products, who also proposed issues needing to be regulated, the so-
called pre-marketing control, was equal to those doing post-marketing, which includes 
inspection. Over time this has been eroded, as shown in Figure 4.1. 
The imbalance in manpower means that there are more officers working on promulgating 
regulations than enforcing regulations. This is the case in the Drug Control Division where 
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Figure 4.1: Pre-marketing and post-marketing staff 
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drug inspectors belong (Annex 1). Experts have criticised the resources imbalance between 
pre-marketing and post-marketing control, which has been likened to a boy with huge upper 
limbs and tiny legs, finally the boy could not walk well (Bowarnwattana and Siripan 1992, 
Loven 1994). The situation has long been reported and suggested for change, but there has 
been none. This has led to a common perception among inspectors that inspection is not a 
priority concern of the TFDA (Interviews). 
The TFDA has been well known for its contribution to education since 1990, and was 
recognised by Government for its outstanding activities in public education in 1990 and 
1997. The budget on education has risen from 35% to 53% of the total TFDA budget 
between 1990 and 1999 (TFDAAnnual Reports 1990-1999). 
Regarding drugs, the TFDA has achieved some success in promoting manufacturers' 
standards through promotion of Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP)\ while pharmacies and 
importers have been subject to largely punitive enforcement rather than educational 
strategies. However, the GMP policy is not recognised as a form of enforcement, but a form 
of 'technical measure' (TFDA Annual Reports 1989-2000). The number of GMP certified 
drug manufacturers has increased since the start in 1985, from 30.4% of the total 
manufacturers in 1989 to 73.9% in 1999 (the TFDA Annual Report 2000). The GMP issue 
espouses the TFDA policy to improve international recognition and increase export income, 
and caught the attention of MOPH ministers especially after the Thai financial crisis in 1997. 
There has been no enforcement goal other than the number of inspections required annually 
in the TFDA plans, despite the frequent statements of violation and lack of rigorous 
1 GMP is a universal principle mainly used in drug manufacturers for quality assurance. 
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enforcement (the TFDA Annual plans 1989-2001, the ihand 8th National Health 
Development Plan, MOPH). 
4.1.2 Enforcement of the Drug Act 1967 
The TFDA is the main organisation responsible for implementing drug regulations as well as 
assuming exclusive responsibility for proposing and revising medicinal drug acts. The Drug 
Act 1967, later called 'the Act' is supplemented by the 1994 Pharmaceutical Board Act, 
which gives the Board authority to monitor pharmacists' ethics and practices. The Board's 
roles, though limited and without official connection to the TFDA, are expanding to cover 
pharmacists working in private pharmacies (personal communication 2001). 
It was only in 1967 that administrative measures were introduced to recall unqualified or 
suspected products and suspend or revoke licences, in addition to criminal sanctions - fine 
and imprisonment. Licence suspension can be broadly applied to those who violate the Act; 
while revocation is only for those who are unqualified to be licensees. The Act is written 
objectively, all technical terms are defined and offences are clearly spelt out. From interviews 
(2001), there was no complaint regarding the clarity of the Act. No discretion is allowed by 
the Act, and there are no statements of exemption. 'Selling' is defined broadly covering the 
actions of possessing, keeping or maintaining drugs. The maximum penalty is for selling fake 
drugs, which is subject to 1-20 year imprisonment. The lowest penalty is a fine of 1,000 baht 
(The Drug Act 1967). 
Inspectors must act based on their designated authority as described in chapter 3. They 
have no authority to fine in situ, they can only make citations, collect evidence and send 
cases to the TFDA to act accordingly. According to the Act and the Thai judicial system, 
violations to the Act brought to the office by inspectors can be dealt with in two ways. 
1) The TFDA deals directly with offences having only a fine penalty; a fine or imprisonment 
penalty in which offenders are willing to pay the maximum fine; and requests for product 
recall, licence revocation or suspension. The last two measures must be carried out through 
the National Drug Commission, which is a national body functioning as an approval body. 
2) The police investigate offences with imprisonment penalties. They can detain suspects up 
to seven days without warrant. Cases are then passed to the state's attorneys for 
consideration. If approved, cases are then passed to courts for sentencing based on the 
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evidence collected by inspectors. Offenders to the Drug Act are treated as criminal 
offenders. 
The following sections show that, in practice, there is considerable deviation from the way 
the 1967 Act is stated. 
4.2 Implementing the Act at the TFDA level 
Implementing the Act does not follow the legalistic rhetoric the Act espouses. What actually 
happens in the TFDA regarding enforcement is that there was deviation at both the TFDA 
and the inspector levels. Uncertainty in the TFDA enforcement styles, a flexible approach 
and a lax situation in the TFDA environment were also found. The TFDA lax and inconsistent 
decisions and policies were felt by inspectors to be hypocritical and convinced inspectors 
that full enforcement was not encouraged (Interviews-1 ,8,11,12,14,22). 
4.2.1 Flexibility in the TFDA enforcement approach 
This research suggested that the Act is seldom implemented as designed, the TFDA 
seemingly took a flexible strategy. Instead of sending cases with imprisonment sanctions to 
the police, the TFDA had established the 'Violation Adjudication Committee' (VAC) by a 
TFDA administrative order, not endorsed by the Act, to determine what sanctions should be 
imposed on offenders (TFDA Order 387/1998). This was to avoid imposing too harsh 
punishment on those who transgressed unwillfully, but because of lack of knowledge or 
appropriate technology (Interviews-16, 18,23). 
By the Order, decisions were made by the VAC members who are all TFDA directors, 
regulatory officers from the Regulatory Affairs Unit working as secretariat. The VAC was 
presided over by one of the deputy-SG. Decisions were made by casting votes and were 
recorded in the VAC meeting minutes. Violations were judged based on the VAC Guidelines 
(1991). Its decisions could be various: dropping, reversing or upholding the cases; requiring 
further investigation or evidence; follow-up of cases; fines; warning; proceeding to police or a 
combination of measures. Warning is used in a significant portion of cases (TFDA Annual 
Reports 1979-2000, Inspection Reports 1990-2000). The use of a warning dates back to 
1979 and has been used often since then (TFDA Annual Report 1979-2000). This obviously 
indicates the flexible approach adopted by the TFDA. 
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However, it seemed that the VAC enforcement process was not well accepted by the 
members and inspectors. Normally Directors sent junior officers to represent them (VAC 
meeting minutes 1995-2000, Interviews-9,18,22). To some interviewees, this suggested a 
lack of interest from those who are not directly involved (Directors of not-related Divisions) or 
lack of interest in enforcement. At the same time, since 1991, the VAC no longer has the 
inspectors who detected the offences joining the process nor do they receive any feedback 
about the decisions (the 1991 VAC Guidelines). Inspectors know the outcome only when 
they have to follow-up particular cases (Interviews-1 .4,6,10,14,15,18,27). They are invited to 
the meeting only if there are unclear pOints, but this was rare (Interviews-18,23, VAC 
meeting minutes 1995-2000). This was said to save inspectors' time but met with little 
appreciation from inspectors (Interviews-4,14,15,18,21). On the contrary, the process seems 
to cause tension between the VAC and inspectors. 
A number of inspectors were doubtful about letting the VAC alone play its part in the 
adjudication process (Interviews-4,13,15). They felt that it was their responsibility to take 
their cases through the process, as they were the ones who knew the situation not the VAC, 
'who sit and make decisions in air-conditioned rooms' (Interview-1). Besides, they felt their 
participation would help them learn from their mistakes and make the next cases more solid 
(Interviews-4,13,15). 
With the lack of inspectors' participation or consultation in the VAC process, the principle of 
having the VAC seemed to be undermined. As well as creating tension between inspectors 
and the VAC, inspectors were disinclined to take cases for the VAC's consideration because 
they felt the VAC decisions were lax and inconsistent (Table 4.1). 
Table 4.1: The VAC contradictory cases 
Charges Total offence Cases not following 
reviewed the Guidelines 
Absence of pharmacist during registered duty hour 839 27 
Sell sub-standard drugs 5 1 
Selling and purchasing entry record problems 104 69 
Sell drugs without proper label 20 7 
Sell drugs other than permitted 17 1 
Sell withdrawn drug 3 1 
Sell expired drug 8 3 
Sell non-registered drug 17 4 
Sell fake drug 6 3 
Source: Inspection records dunng 1980-1996 
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4.2.2 The lax and inconsistency of the VAC decisions 
Despite the flexibility of the Guideline, the VAG did not follow its own rules. Table 4.1 
indicates the cases not sentenced according to the Guideline. Where prosecutions should 
have followed, the VAG gave only official warnings for offences such as selling without 
licence, selling fake drugs, sub-standard drugs or expired drugs (Inspection Records 1980 -
1996, Interviews-4,6,18). 
The inconsistency was likely to affect inspectors' decisions (Interviews-1,2,3,6,7). For 
example, there was a case against an international chain store selling drugs without licence; 
the VAG issued a warning instead of prosecution. Some inspectors later on used this 
sentence as a precedent not to make citation of small grocery stores, otherwise, they said, 
'It's unfair' (Interviews-6,13). 
Occasionally, sanctions were imposed unpredictably (Interviews-15,30), and inspectors felt 
that offenders not causing great harm were sometimes punished more than they deserved, 
whereas severe violations were sometimes only lightly punished (Interviews-1,3,10,18,27, 
30). Although they could not say how often this occurred because they did not follow all 
cases, the inconsistency made a number of inspectors reluctant to send small cases to the 
VAG for consideration. 
With no participation in the adjudication process and no feedback to tell them the reasons 
why cases were dropped, reversed or did not follow the VAG Guidelines, inspectors felt 
sceptical about the role of the VAG (Interviews-1 .4,1 O,13,15,18,27). Ambiguous decisions 
affected inspectors' decisions in many ways and were felt by them to be one of the obstacles 
to fully enforcing the Act. 
In interviews, inspectors assumed that political influences had intervened in the VAG process 
(Interviews-1 .4,6,10,14, 15,18,27,30). If offenders appeal, inspectors are rarely invited to hear 
whether appeals are reasonable or not, or otherwise clarify what they had observed. This 
lack of communication caused some inspectors to feel that the prosecution process was not 
transparent (Interview-1,1 O,18,27). This meant a number of inspectors felt they should not 
risk themselves to take cases to the VAG, which would be released later (Interviews-1,8,18). 
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4.2.3 The lengthy VAC process 
According to the hierarchical system, the official adjudication process can take 115-145 
days to proceed to the police (the 1991 VAC Guidelines, Pisajpen 1997). Besides the 
lengthy process, there was case lag. The VAC meetings being held only when there are 
sufficient number of cases to be considered (VAC meeting minutes 1995 -2000) is one 
reason why the process takes a long time before decisions are made. Usually it took more 
than one year to get offenders to court (Interviews-4,7). Serious cases requiring laboratory 
analytical results and cases that are appealed take much longer due to the complicated 
steps taken. A number of inspectors explained that the lengthy VAC system was ineffective 
and undermined their authority (Interviews-4,5,7). 
'The process is so long that even I myself can't remember the cases. How about 
the offenders, they would have forgotten their wrongdoings. '(lnterview-4) 
In their view the lengthy process cannot provide the immediate deterrent effect, which could 
reinforce offenders to make corrections (Interviews-1 ,3,4,13,15). They compared selling 
drugs without licence to the sale of alcohol without licence, where offenders are fined 
immediately, and as often as they are caught. 
4.2.4 The cautious role of the National Drug Commission (NDC) 
The NDC comprises 21 representatives from each department of the MOPH, two other 
related Ministries, two Faculty of Pharmacy and the National Council of State (The Drug Act 
1967). The NDC is presided over by the Permanent Secretary of the MOPH. One TFDA 
deputy-SG acts as the Commission Secretary, and the Drug Control Director as an assistant 
secretary. NDC meetings are held irregularly, between 3-11 times a year (NDC meeting 
minutes 1988-1999). The NDC is a national approval body for withdrawing product 
registration and premise licences including suspending licences. 
Inspectors did not view the NDC as a helpful enforcement tool. Most of the NDC meeting 
agendas were concerned with quality and availability of drugs. The NDC seldom suspends 
or revokes licences, though so empowered. Between 1988-1999, 75 meetings were held 
with only three in which licence suspension and revocation were proposed (NDC meeting 
reports 1988-1999). Licence suspension of pharmacies occurred only for two cases which 
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made repeated major violations; 21 licences were revoked mostly because of not having a 
registered professional-in-charge (NDC meeting minutes 1988-1999). 
For the NDC to make decisions, cases must be proposed by the TFDA. The rarity of 
occasions suggests that in fact the TFDA does not want to use 'heavy-handed' measures 
against those violating the Act. From the experience of one manager, the members of the 
Commission viewed licence suspension as a strong punishment that should be used only 
under special circumstances (Interview-29). 
4.2.5 Discontinuity in the TFDA pharmacy enforcement policies 
Policy discontinuation is a top cause of the administrative problems in the TFDA (Secretariat 
Working Group 1991, Bowarnwattana and Siripan 1992, Hongsamoot 2000, Kiatying-
angsulee 2000, DCD report 2001), including enforcement policy (Hongsamoot 2000). The 
Secretary-General seldom serves the expected four years at the TFDA. On average, the 
SG's term lasts for only two years and two months (see Figure 4.2) . There is seldom any 
explanation of the reshuffles , and the great majority of inspectors doubted the political 
neutrality of the SG apPointment (Interviews). 
Figure 4.2: Secretary-General terms 1979 -1999 
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The stability of the SG is important. In the TFDA bureaucratic system, h/she has the 
strongest voice and usually takes directive roles in the TFDA administration (Interviews-
8,17,23). It has been a tradition in the TFDA that top executives are physicians from other 
MOPH departments, and are appointed by the Prime Minister with approval from the Minister 
of Public Health (TFDA Annual Report 1999). Most inspectors felt that frequent changes 
caused problems in enforcement due to the lack of understanding, lack of familiarity and lack 
of long term policies (Interviews-5,8,9,11,12, 14,15,19). 
There were at least two occasions that two SGs used their own views to stop enforcement 
activities. The first occasion was when inspectors had been inspecting pharmacies selling 
drugs outside the registered duty hours in 1985 by the then deputy-SG's order (Inspection 
record dated 11 July 1985). Inspectors were asked to take serious action regarding the 
offence. This caused chaos to pharmacies as the great majority of pharmacies violated the 
law. But soon after the inspection had started, the owner of one of the inspected pharmacies 
appealed to the SG, claiming that it was unfair to prosecute him unless all pharmacies were 
inspected and prosecuted too. The then SG asked the Inspection Division to revise the 
activity (Inspection record dated 24 July 1985). Although he did not state clearly to cancel 
the activities but it implied his disagreement (Interview-9), which was strong enough to stop 
the activities (Interview-9). Second, a routine check for presence of pharmacists, which had 
been conducted since 1981, was stopped by one SG's order because he/she felt the activity 
was not worthwhile. This was decided without any consultation with inspectors (Inspection 
records dated 15 July 1991). These two examples indicate that the SG holds supreme power 
in the TFDA and can cause sudden change - a situation that can undermine inspectors' 
authority. 
However, a few SGs brought positive ideas regarding enforcement in pharmacy. For 
example, they tried to gain compliance through means other than inspection and 
punishment. They have viewed pharmacies as agencies which can co-operate with the 
TFDA to contribute better services to communities (Interviews-25,28). One SG in an 
interview with the Advance Business Magazine in 1988 said, 
Those pharmacy owners are not immoral or hardhearted. They have good social 
status, some of their children have pharmacy graduation. Their ancestors sold 
drugs all their lives, saving a lot of lives. They should not be problematic. '(Anon. 
1988; 15) 
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Such policies to encourage law adherence were introduced on three occasions. In 1987, the 
'Self-Regulating Policy,2 started and was implemented for almost four years (Inspection 
records 1990). During that period inspectors were ordered not to take legal action but to use 
the educational style instead. The Policy stopped after the SG was moved. In 1994 'the 
Standard Pharmacies,3 was introduced and re-introduced in 1998. These policies, which did 
not conform to traditional TFDA practices, were. again. discontinued after SG reshuffles. 
The pattem was a new SG came with his/her own ideas or with the MOPH Minister's 
policies, which are usually of high priority. and abandoned the previous SGs' policies. 
Meanwhile. the TFDA officers did not want to risk themselves pursuing policies which were 
not following the Act. or might cause conflict with the current SG (Interviews-8,24). The 
frequent changes caused a number of inspectors to feel that enforcement mostly got the 
SG's attention only from time to time and for a short period, and there was little interest in 
tackling the roots of the problems (Interviews-1,4,5.6,7, 12.21.30). For example (Interview-7), 
in 1999. there was a complaint to the then MOPH Minister about the absence of pharmacists 
as professionals-in-charge in pharmacies. Instead of using this opportunity to find a long-
term solution. inspectors were ordered to re-inspect pharmacists' presentation. However, 
before Inspection started. TFDA had publicised the inspection. The data from one week's 
Inspecllon was reported to the Minister. and the inspection stopped afterwards. 
In sum. the TFDA itself exercised flexibility in its enforcement administration at different 
levels, Illustrated in Figure 4.3. The thick lines represent the processes assigned by the 
Drug Act. The dashed lines represent the processes not assigned by the Drug Act but 
which are commonly used. 
This policy urged pharmacies to form a group to visit. advise and monitor pharmacies in their 
constituency. 
ThiS policy was to issue certificates to pharmacies that met certain standards set by the TFDA. 
Standards Ignored some legal items. 
69 
Chapter 4: Expectations and Realities of Pharmacy Enforcement 
Figure 4.3: The TFDA flexibility in enforcement 
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4.3 Implementing the Act at inspector level 
4.3.1 The TFDA drug inspectors and their work load 
RAU 
The TFDA Inspectors are officially required to have at least a pharmacy background. They 
mainly learn how to inspect by on-the-job training without formal job induction (Interviews-
8.9.11.20.21.22). New inspector recruits are paired with senior inspectors who are 
subjectively selected by the Director (Interviews-8.21). New recruits stay with their trainers 
for at least two months. and may only then be moved to work with other inspectors. Later, it 
depends on mutual agreement between inspectors and their superiors to select their 
partners because inspection is traditionally done in pairs or teams. Although there is pair 
sWitching from time to time. there are no fixed rules. Training is highly dependent on the 
senior Inspectors as to how seriously or consciously they impart their experiences. 
70 
I 
Chapter 4: Expectations and Realities of Pharmacy Enforcement 
The three inspection manuals and inspection training programmes do not spell out 
inspectors' roles or the TFDA expectation of inspectors (Inspection training curriculum 1992-
1999, Inspection Manuals 1979,1989,1998). The contents of the manuals are mainly on 
regulations, report writing and evidence collection for prosecution. The manuals are said to 
be more like textbooks than practical manuals (Sriprapanh et al 1994). All inspectors but one 
said that they had no time to read any manuals (Interviews), and preferred to ask or follow 
their senior partners because in reality there were a lot of different details that affected 
decisions, whereas the manuals state only principles or simple cases. 
Given the on-the-job training approach and the Thai hierarchical culture , group cohesiveness 
was enhanced, but senior inspectors could have considerable influence. High peer pressure 
was detected which causes inspectors to make relatively similar decisions. 
Figure 4.4: Three inspectors inspecting a pharmacy 
Up to 30 June 2001 there were twelve inspectors. They expressed satisfaction with their 
work, and eight out of twelve had been with the TFDA for at least 15 years. Figure 4.4 shows 
three inspectors while on their duty, one of which was a newly recruited inspector. Most 
inspectors and ex-inspectors interviewed had some ideas about inspection but without clear 
aims (Interviews). Most inspectors had worked before enrolling but their experiences were 
not directly related to community pharmacy practice (see Annex 12 for detail) . 
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Each year the 12 inspectors are responsible for inspecting 150 out of the total 180 
manufacturers, 700 out of 4,022 pharmacies and 200 grocery stores (to check sale of drugs 
without licence) (DCD Annual Plans 1998-2001). Pharmacies are selected at inspectors' 
convenience, there is no systematic selection. Recently, most pharmacy inspection is on 
complaint cases and follow-up cases (Inspection reports 1998-2000). Calculation by using 
work standards (two hours for one pharmacy) suggests that 46 inspectors are needed to 
cover the same target instead of the current 12 (Nantawijarn 1993) (see more detail in 
section 5.2). Officers from other sub-sections are borrowed from time to time, to fill the 
teams. The only way for inspectors to meet targets is to inspect quickly, which may lead to 
missed violations or turning a blind eye to them. One inspector said, 
'The target is very overloaded that we almost 'fly over' pharmacies. '(lnterview-6) 
4.3.2 Inspectors and warning authority 
The TFDA Order on Violation Adjudication No. 0701/RAU 80 (1992) authorises inspectors to 
issue official warnings but only in cases not related to manner of selling or product quality. 
Examples include not having sign plates in pharmacies, mixing up types of drugs on 
dispensary shelves and incorrect entry records. Those who were non-inspectors were 
reluctant to delegate more warning authority to inspectors; they felt that inspectors should 
take all offences to the VAC to avoid any accusation of corruption (Interviews-16,17,23,29). 
4.3.3. Inspectors and their implementation of the Act 
The study showed the gap between policy intention and policy execution at the TFDA level. 
The gap also occurred at the level of inspectors. All inspectors acknowledged that they were 
not empowered with discretion by the Drug Act, yet they admitted using discretion 
(Interviews). There has been a dispute among inspectors, at least since 1959, regarding 
their authority and eligibility of using discretion, without any conclusions (Interviews-8,9,11). 
How authority should be exercised was not found in any documents (Inspection Manuals 
1979, 1989, 1998, Inspection SOP 1996), so ideally inspectors are supposed to make 
citations and impose legal actions on all offences encountered. However, most inspectors 
believed that they should be eligible to drop charges where violations are conducted 
unwillfully (Interviews-1,15). This is in accordance to the Penal Code 1956 clause 59, which 
has higher status than the 1967 Drug Act. Clause 59 states that, I A person shall be 
criminally liable only when he commits an act willfully .... .'. 
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Despite the belief that they should possess some discretion, none used it openly 
(Interviews, Inspection Records 1980-1996). They were inculcated by their seniors not to 
record offences if legal actions were not imposed no matter what the reasons were 
(Interviews). This is because there is another regulation, clause 157 of the Penal Code, 
scrutinising all authorised officers to ensure the appropriate use of their authority. It says: 
Whoever being an official, wrongfully exercises or does not exercise any of his functions to 
the injury of any person or dishonestly exercises or does not exercise any of his functions 
shall be punished with imprisonment of one to ten years or fine of 2,000-20,000 baht or 
both.' Inspectors believed that they would risk being charged with 'duty negligence' if they 
recorded their exemption of any offences (Interviews-2,3,5, 14, 19). 
Although expected to have little room for discretion, historically inspectors have not followed 
this notion. With many reasons (see following sections) they did not use sanctions officially 
available to them but set their own 'substituted measures' to be used in place of the official 
sanctions (Interviews). The substituted measures have long been used without scrutiny as 
far as the most senior inspectors could recall, before 1959 (Interviews-9, 11). The measures 
can be used in combination with each other or with official measures depending on situation 
and seriousness of infringement (Interviews). They include destroying illegal products by 
owners, threaten using official sanctions on the next visit, threaten using frequent visits, 
giving verbal warnings and bargaining to take only minor offences into account in exchange 
for immediate correction of a major offence, bargaining to drop offences in return for giving 
more in-depth information. 
Imposing legal authority in all cases was not practicable (see more detail in section 4.4 and 
chapter 5). The VAC case lag and lengthy process were among other rationales given for not 
using official sanctions (Interviews-1,4,5,20,27,28). The great majority of inspectors felt that 
using their professional judgement and their substituted measures yielded greater benefit to 
consumer protection, otherwise most of their time and TFDA resources would have been 
spent on minor cases (Interviews). In their view all pharmacies commit violation one way or 
another (Interviews). 
From inspectors' experiences, the substituted measures helped inspectors get the job done 
with less confrontation or conflict and help them bargain better with offenders (Interviews-
4,9,11,26). Senior inspectors pass down the 'bargaining technique' to their juniors 
(Interviews-4,5,8,9,11,15,21 ). 
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, We show 'the regulated' all their offences. Then tell them that we are going to 
take only one or two offences into account because of whatever reason such as it 
is policy, it is evident, because they have been wamed before, or someone has 
complained. But the offenders must get rid of the illegal products found or assure 
us of improvement in their practices. It is preferable to explain to them all 
penalties including the dropped charges especially if the charges have 
imprisonment penalty. Usually, they accept because we normally take legal action 
on offences committed by intention or have moderate penalty. In this way we can 
leave the place safely and sometimes with 'thank you' from them too.' (Interview-
5) 
Consequently, cases officially charged and recorded are a minor portion of all cases 
detected. Transgressions were, thus, first screened along the inspection process followed by 
the VAC, the police and courts as illustrated in Figure 4.5. But no one could estimate the 
proportion (I nterviews). 
Given that measures have been used for a long time, and the Thai culture of avoiding 
conflict, inspectors might use the measures without thinking thoroughly about the pros and 
cons; and they seemed unable to see other alternatives. At first a number of inspectors felt 
that their substituted measures were tantamount to the official punishment (Interviews-
4,15,18), but they later accepted that they could not confirm how effective the measures 
were. Some admitted that offenders may sense that the substituted measures are not real 
and can bargain (Interviews-1,26). 
Figure 4.5: The triangle of inspectors' decisions on legal action taken 
Identify all offences on-site 
Classify all offences detected 
~ 
Give verbal warnings and use other substituted methods 
Select some offences for further legal proceedings 
1 
Proceed for official consideration 
Issue official warning 
Proceed for official 
Official 
1 
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There were drawbacks in using the substituted measures, inspectors accepted 
(Interviews). Some inspectors confessed that saying they would follow-up was an empty 
threat only because the chance to come back was slim (Interviews-13,26,27). As there were 
no official records, most use their own memories and only a few inspectors wrote their 
actions down in their personal notes (Interviews-3,4). But if they were moved to work in 
another geographical area, it was entirely up to the personal interests of those who replaced 
them as to whether they would use the informal notes or not (Interviews-4,6,26). 
4.4 Inspectors and the TFDA legalistic rhetoric 
The flexibility and uncertainty in the TFDA enforcement played only a part in inspectors' 
reluctance to use their authority. Other aspects were also highlighted in interviews. 
4.4.1 Inspectors and the context regarding enforcement in pharmacy 
4.4.1.1 Problem recognition and the Thai culture 
With concerns limited largely to researchers, problems regarding drug utilisation, partly 
caused by violations in pharmacies, have not been a high priority at national policy level 
(MOPH policy 1992-2000). Other health problems such as traffic accidents, smoking, 
occupational health and addictive substances have been on national public policy agenda 
(Pattapong and Anupong 2000). Problems regarding violation in pharmacies are of such little 
interest that even SGs showed a lack of concern. Two SGs expressed their views that the 
absence of professionals-in-charge and the sale of drugs without professionals-in-charge 
were not urgent issues, in a television programme (Anon. 1999) and in interviews (Anon. 
1988). 
Many inspectors felt that the problem of pharmacy regulation was too big for a single 
organisation, and that the lack of recognition may lead to laissez-faire management due to 
the lack of public pressures and scrutiny (lnterviews-1,4,13,15). Had violations caught 
continuous attention from newspapers, enforcement in pharmacy would have been 
supported more and carried out with less obstruction from the business sector. All inspectors 
interviewed felt overwhelmed by the long-term nature and enorm ity of widespread violation 4, 
4 Violations that occur regularly in most pharmacies. They include selling out of the registered duty 
hour, absence of professionals-in-charge during the registered duty hour, selling drugs without 
supervision of professionals-in-charge, selling prescription drugs without prescriptions, selling drugs 
without licences, selling drugs other than those permitted and offences about drug entry records. This 
type of violation is sometimes called 'customary violation'. 
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and expressed their feelings as 'impossible to change situations by using only inspection' 
(Interviews). 
In general, enforcement is not well observed in Thailand; violation in pharmacies is only one 
area among others. The Thai culture of avoiding conflict and hierarchy including the 
patronage system are not healthy for enforcement work and reinforce the preference for 
flexible enforcement. Punishment is viewed as fit for only the 'hard-headed' offenders, 
otherwise it should be used only as a last resort (Interviews-2,3,8). These views were shared 
by the great majority of inspectors and their managers (Interviews). 
'Our society likes the softly-softly approach. Tension is always expected after 
using strict enforcement. ' (lnterview-28) 
The views that enforcement is equivalent to punishment is one constraint. Some managers 
viewed punishment as against the MOPH philosophy: to help, not to punish people 
(Interviews-19,24,29). In at least two cases, two SGs had voluntarily changed their job 
because of this discomfort (Interviews-9, 11,22). Some SGs even suggested that the TFDA 
become a technical agency rather than a regulatory agency (Interviews-19,23). For some 
even the word 'enforcement' is undesirable as one senior officer explained, 
'Don't use the word enforcement, it gives a sense of punishment. Better use 
'Post-marketing surveillance', it sounds more technical. Thus better accepted. It 
is only us, inspectors, who accept the term enforcement, the others - especially 
most SGs - don't.' (Interview-24) 
The Thai patronage culture may create conflicts of interest through the relationships between 
inspectors and pharmaCists. They are all professionals and many are friends. Their 
managers and colleagues are also pharmacists, who have friends as pharmacists as well. 
Some inspectors complained that they are in-between, it is difficult to penalise those who are 
in the same profession. Yet, they were claimed to 'pick' on the same profession and turn a 
blind eye on businessmen (Interviews-1,21). Not only do pharmacists have links with 
inspectors, pharmacy owners also have some connections especially with managers and 
MOPH ministers. These relationships can cause pressures on inspectors, especially with 
cases that have imprisonment sanctions (Interviews-4,8, 11,14,20). Therefore, inspectors 
were trapped between their duty and business influences. Subsequently, many inspectors 
took legal action only in cases that were outstanding and serious so that they could explain 
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their justification to anybody that might ask for their help in mitigating the cases (Interviews-
3,4,8,11,14,21,27). 
The TFDA job of enforcement was sometimes in conflict with other MOPH jobs. For 
instance, the Thai traditional medicines being promoted nation-wide were mostly against the 
Act because most of them were not registered. This is difficult to enforce fully as it would 
disrupt traditional medicine promotion policy, which was run by another MOPH department. 
In addition it is known that licensing and registration processes required by the TFDA are 
complicated and take time, and it is very strenuous for small traditional medicine businesses 
to get approval. Traditional medicines are therefore often ignored by inspectors unless 
harms are clear or there are specific TFDA orders (Interviews-10,27). 
4.4.1.2 Business Influences 
Most inspectors felt that business influences exist (Interviews), and that was a reason why 
enforcement was not in the main interest of executives (Interviews-1 ,2,3,4,5,7,15). They also 
perceived that pressures from both individual pharmacy owners and the Retail Pharmacy 
Association (RPA), whose members are largely businessmen, are strong. None of the 
inspectors agreed that 'legalism' was viable (Interviews). 
'It is the SG who will be first in trouble due to pressures from pharmacy owners. 
Then, we will be pressurised by SG or other executives. Some violations have 
existed too long to be touched such as selling drugs without pharmacists' 
supervision or absence of pharmacists. It is also the pOlitics thing. ' (Interview-3) 
'Nobody in the TFDA or even the MOPH is affected by violations occurring in 
pharmacies. In addition, influences exist in that business. So, why should 
executives under departmental level be concerned about it?' (lnterview-17) 
'So far, SG has not touched issues about selling drugs, because they do not want 
conflicts with the RPA which is understandable. It has been this way since the 
beginning, why any of them need to push the button, especially they do not stay 
long. ' (Interview-25) 
The relationship between politicians and the RPA has long been established (RPA 
Magazines 1979-2001, TFDA Annual Reports 1979-2000) leading to co-operative relations. 
For example, the RPA annual meetings have been presided over by the Minister of the 
MOPH together with the SG (RPA Magazines 1979 - 2001). In return, the Association helps 
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the MOPH such as donating medicines and money in catastrophic events, disseminating 
educational information and circulating regulations. Two ex-SGs now are consultants to the 
RPA (RPA Magazines June 2001). 
The RPA also has close relationships with other powerful Associations, nationally or 
internationally, such as the Proprietary Pharmaceutical Association (of multi-national 
companies) and the Thai Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (of domestic 
manufacturers). The close links are indicated by supportive interactions between 
associations, and by names of people who are consultants to the RPA (RPA Magazines 
1979-2001 ). 
Supporters of the RPA are big businessmen, senior or high-ranking politicians, ex-MOPH 
Ministers, ex-SG including well-known academics (RPA Magazines 1979-2001). The RPA is 
powerful because it plays a significant role in supporting Members of Parliament, especially 
those appointed at MOPH Ministries (RPA Magazines 1979-2001). 
The power of the RPA can be indicated by its victories in major conflicts over policy with the 
TFDA and MOPH on at least three occasions. It started with the issue of the professional-in-
charge's duty hours in 1979 (Box 1). Most of the inspectors claimed that this case was the 
starting point of hard-to-solve problems in pharmacies and showed the powerful business 
influences (Interviews-1 .4,5,8,12,14,20). 
The second occasion was in 1981 (MOPH ministerial order 1981) when the MOPH tried to 
set quotas in order to encourage pharmacies to move to rural areas. Meanwhile new 
pharmacy licences were intended to be issued only to pharmacies where pharmacists were 
both owners and professional-in-charge, and must certify to the MOPH that they would be 
present all day. The Association took the issue to court, which concluded that such order 
was against the Thai Constitution regarding the right of performing business. 
The latest confrontation was in 2000, when the newly drafted Drug Act proposed to abolish 
type B pharmacies, within a five-year grace period. The RPA appealed to the MOPH Minister 
and the Parliament, and finally, the proposal was dropped (Interviews-16,23,25, the 
Parliamentary Health Subcommittee meeting minutes 1999). 
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Box 1 The Interpretation of professlonal-In-charge duty hour 
The 1967 Drug Act in its 1979 amendment has made clearer that professionals-in-charge are to be 
physically in their registered pharmacies during registered duty hours. This caused chaos to type A 
pharmacy owners. Before the revision, pharmacists were traditionally hired without any explicit 
demands for them to routinely work in the pharmacies where they were employed. The salary paid to 
pharmacists was. thus. on a part-time basis - not high. The new revision brought the sense that 
pharmacists were to be employed full-time and then their salary would be increased by at least three 
times. This did not mean only higher expenses for pharmacies, but it was estimated that at least 1,000 
pharmacies. about 25% of total type A pharmacies at that time. needed to be closed down. The 
estimation was based on the fact of the inadequate number of pharmacists. Actually the Act gave a 
three-year grace period for universities to produce more pharmacists and for pharmacies to adapt 
themselves. However. there was no compromise. 
The RPA heavily resisted for over four years (RPA Magazines 1982-1985), and ended up by going to 
the Council of State. the highest organisation for regulation interpretation. The decision reached in 
1985 was that the registered duty hours could be at any period of time during the business hours of 
pharmacies, but pharmacy and prescription drugs could only be sold with the pharmacist's supervision 
(the Tribunal Committee Decision 1985). 
After this interpretation most pharmacies (except those owned and run by pharmacists) hired 
professionals-in-charge to stay for a certain period, usually 5.00-8.00 p.m. In practice, pharmacy 
owners illegally sell pharmacy and prescription drugs all day violating the law. Professionals-in-charge 
usually do not stay during the duty hours. This interpretation causes three contravention -
professionals-in-charge absence during the duty hours, selling drugs out of the registered duty hours 
and selling drugs without professional-in-charge's supervision. 
Currently 70% of total pharmacies or about 7,800 pharmacies committed these three offences. The 
great majority of inspectors felt that these are national problems and enforcement alone by 12 
inspectors cannot help (Interviews-2,3.4,5,6,8,11 ,12.13.26.27). It is the TFDA that made this issue 
difficult by accepting the three-hour registered period in the first place (Interviews). 
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4.4.2 Inspectors' views and attitudes on their job and legal authority 
4.4.2.1 VIews and attitudes to their Job 
Despite the risky nature of their jobs, inspectors seemed to be relatively motivated. A 
number said that they are proud of themselves in maintaining their honesty throughout 
despite pressures and seduction (Interviews-4,5,8,1 0, 12,27). They appreciated certain job 
characteristics such as autonomy; flexible work hours; travelling around; learning from the 
real things, not just from theory or through papers; and investigating activities, which are 
more challenging than routine paper work (Interviews). 
Although they could not define precisely their roles, they broadly identified themselves as 
'protecting consumers from unqualified medicinal drug~ by inspecting pharmacies to ensure 
that the Act is observed, and to take legal action on offenders (Interviews-1,2,3,4,7,8,10,12). 
Yet, they felt that they needed to use their professional knowledge to make judgements and 
give advice to the regulated, not only to take legal action (Interviews-11, 18,27). 
'We are employed to use our knowledge in making deCisions, not just taking 
people to court. Why bother with our pharmacy background, if the TFDA wants to 
only check regulatory observance, anybody can do that. If we are supposed not 
to use discretion, we are just slavish to the regulations.' (lnterview-15) 
Inspectors' views and attitudes to their jobs were relatively similar (Interviews). They may 
transfer and adjust their ideas informally and naturally as they work in pairs or in teams. 
They share offices - often one large room - which gives opportunities to shift individual's 
ideas towards the group norm. Given the 'no conflict', 'hierarchical' Thai culture and group 
cohesiveness, this also strengthens peer influence on inspectors' decisions. 
4.4.2.2 VIews and attitudes regardlnglega' authOlfty 
Most inspectors interviewed were using their legal authority cautiously, and normally use it 
as a last resort. For them, using authority had many effects at the same time - protecting 
consumers, punishing offenders and creating confrontational atmosphere (Interviews). 
The great majority of inspectors felt that fully exercising their authority did not always solve 
problems especially for the 'widespread offences', which was opposite to the views of the of 
non-inspectors (Interviews-4,16, 17 ,18,19,23,30). From inspectors' experiences, violations 
are due to many exogenous factors, such as the Thai health care system, care seeking 
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behaviour. and economical factors. as well as the impractical and unrealistic Act (see 
chapter 5). Therefore. their authority may. at best. have only short-term deterrent effects. 
They preferred to pay attention to the optimum use of their authority while using other means 
- their substituted measures - to bring compliance and sort out causes of violations 
(Interviews-2.10.12). In the majority's view. prosecution was not the right measure to solve 
the widespread problems. because most offenders hardly changed despite being prosecuted 
(Interviews-1.2.3.12.22.26). They felt that apart from not being helpful, punitive enforcement 
can possibly cause chaotic situations (Interviews-13,15,26). 
For example, if the required presence of the pharmacist is to be checked more seriously, it 
could have the opposite result, and instead of ensuring that pharmacists stay in pharmacies. 
they may quit the job. Consequently, pharmacies would need to close down. and inspectors 
would have more work checking whether they were really closed or not. This would also 
adversely affect low-income people who cannot afford to go to hospitals or private clinics. 
Another example given was a collaboration with the police in 1994, when inspectors 
inspected one community well-known for selling traditional medicines, mostly non-registered, 
seven times in one year by an order of the then deputy-SG (Inspection records 1994). Each 
time about thirty offenders were arrested by the police and prosecuted. But the offences 
continued. Inspectors suggested that, given the popularity of the drugs, sellers with high 
profit were tempted to risk the chance of being caught. The majority of inspectors said that 
harsh enforcement was not the solution for this kind of problem and it was a waste of their 
time (Interviews-1 ,4,6,7). 
Most inspectors interviewed were more willing to impose sanctions on 'sporadic violations'5 
because they felt that this type of offence could be corrected (Interviews). Thus applying 
legal authority would be worthwhile to create deterrent effects. However, factors such as 
intention and penalty level were still matters of concern (see 5.1.3). 
Inspectors also viewed their authority as a supportive tool in dealing with complicated cases 
such as the issue of fake or withdrawn drugs, when pharmacy owners could be good 
sources of inside information. They felt, a 'softly-softly' approach often works much better 
than an aggressive approach (Interviews-8,27,28). In those cases, they bargain by ignoring 
some minor offences to obtain the needed information. 
5 Violations not regularly found in pharmacies. These include selling fake. non-registered. sub-standard 
or withdrawn drugs. 
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Most of the inspectors said that in deciding to take legal action or not, it is necessary to 
consider related factors such as harm caused and intention of offenders to decide whether 
they deserve the said penalty or not. Their decisions put high pressure on offenders: some 
committed suicide, some were imprisoned, some were corrupted by the police and so on. 
Most of the inspectors have heard or witnessed the greater-than-expected negative 
consequences that occurred to offenders (Interviews-2, 10, 12). Consequently, their decisions 
must be justified; risk and punishment was always weighed (Interviews-1 ,2,3,4,15). 
'Authority should not be exercised excessively, but needs thorough consideration. 
If offences are conducted because of carelessness or lack of knowledge, 
offenders should be given opportunity to make correction. This is the important 
sense for inspectors. ' (Interview-B) 
'There was an offender committed suicide after being charged. Although this has 
been rare and that inspector did as it should be, he could not cope with it. The 
rest of us just gave him support the best we could. ' (lnterview-1 0) 
'Once you apply your authority, there are consequences not only to the offenders 
but maybe also to their families and their children. So it must be used cautiously 
otherwise you may feel bad yourself.' (Interview-12) 
For inspectors, authority is there no matter whether it is used or not (lnterviews-7,8,12,21). In 
their views, 'a slap on the wrist' in most cases was enough, and that frequent visits without 
fully exercising their authority would reduce violation in pharmacy. But the problem was that 
nowadays they had much less time to spend on pharmacy inspection (Interviews-4,6,7 ,15). 
'From my twenty year experiences, frequent visits would deter wrongdOings. The 
owners are afraid of being caught. But, whenever this monitoring is ignored, they 
know and slip away from the right track to illegal things that are usually tempting 
in terms of profIt. Our visit is to remind them about the regulations. '(lnterview-21) 
4.4.3 Assault 
Inspectors' authority does not only give them power over the regulated. it also causes them 
difficulties too. Inspectors sometimes face threats or assaults from offenders. This may be 
one reason forcing them to use their authority cautiously. Although only one official record 
about assault on one inspector was found (Inspection record dated 9 September 1982), a 
number of inspectors had had some experience (Interviews-1 ,8.9.11.18). 
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'Someone phoned me at home asking what I wanted, implying threats. I 
explained him the situation and told him that it was not possible not to take legal 
action. He phoned two more times. The last time I challenged him to talk face-to-
face, otherwise I wouldnl keep quiet. But he quit calling since then. '(lnterview-1) 
' .... while writing records, I saw the owner came from upstairs with his gun. He 
put his gun down on another table nearby. My team leader came to the man and 
talked quite a long time. I kept on writing and nothing happened. '(Interview-B) 
For their own safety as well as to get the job done, most inspectors used the 'bargaining 
technique' and usually picked offences with moderate sanction levels, so that offenders 
would not argue, or feel outraged (Interviews-1 ,2,3,4,5,6,8,9,11). 
'We need to balance everything: our responsibility, our safety and time constraint. 
If you take all offences, they may not let you and will try eve!}' possible means to 
stop you. You can see the consequence, it will take you longer time to convince 
them and to make sure they are not angry with you. ' ( Interview-2) 
4.4.4 Discouragement 
The great majority of inspectors and ex-inspectors felt that their work was not understood, 
acknowledged or recognised in any level in the TFDA (Interviews-1,4,8,11,12,13,21,30). A 
few said that neither the SG nor deputy-SG has been out on inspection with them 
(Interviews-4,7,21). Though they seemed to be relatively self-motivated, for a great majority 
of inspectors it was exhausting to use only their authority without support from other 
measures; they expressed their feelings as 'havenY been able to get rid of any single 
problem since working' (Interviews-1 ,2,3,4,5,6,9,21,22,30). Inspectors felt that they received 
only lip service about the importance of their jobs from executives. Manpower shortage has 
never been a real concern, even while having poliCies focusing on inspection e.g. in 1997-
1998 (Interviews-1 ,4,8,11,12,21). 
Inspectors felt that they are the only group dealing with these problems, and that even the 
courts do not see the harmful effects caused by violations and usually deliver only 
lightweight punishments (Interviews-1,21). 
'The main thing is that no one has ever been serious about violation in 
pharmacies. There has never been a case such as death from drugs dispensed 
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from pharmacies publicised in a newspaper. It is just a routine work. Inspect to 
fulfill the action plan. That's it.' (lnterview-7) 
A number of inspectors felt that they are the minority in the TFDA and receive less promotion 
than those who work on the registration side (Interviews). Despite their risk and difficulties in 
confronting the regulated, most of the promotion or training abroad has been given to pre-
marketing officers (Interviews-4,21). Some braindrain occurred in 1989 - 1991 when 
inspectors were promoted to only level 6 whereas the other officers moved up to level 7. It 
took about two years to show the responsible organisation that inspection used technical 
knowledge as well as other kinds of officers, and by then the problem was solved 
(Interviews-8,21, Inspection Division Personnel Profile). 
4.5 Summary 
In this chapter, friction between the TFDA enforcement expectation and realities was 
identified. The TFDA gave out a mixed message. The TFDA did not show commitment to 
follow the legalistic rhetoric espoused by the Drug Act 1967. Though not endorsed by the 
Act, the TFDA has employed flexible measures such as giving warnings. Policy 
inconsistency and discontinuity regarding enforcement in pharmacy were indicated, 
especially in comparison to the well-established use of both compliance and deterrence 
enforcement approaches to drug manufacturers. The MOPH ethos, business influences, and 
professionalism were found to be against legalistic enforcement. 
On the contrary, inspectors were expected to perform legalistically - taking legal action on all 
violations detected. No guidelines or other evidence was found allowing inspectors to use 
discretion. Neither is there any exemption in the Act itself. All inspectors interviewed 
perceived that they have no legal discretion. They also felt that they could be punished as 
negligent if they do not impose legal action on offences found. Yet they insisted that legalism 
was neither effective nor practisable. Consequently, inspectors risk themselves in using their 
professional judgement not to pursue legal action in cases considered not worthwhile, and 
not report these exempted cases to protect themselves. 
Basically inspectors' views and attitudes were in contrast to the legalistic approach required. 
All inspectors interviewed shared similar ideas; they were dOing a professional job not 
merely punishing offenders. They felt it was salient that inspectors should use their authority 
cautiously. 
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'Just applying your authority is easy. But we are not doing jobs like robots. We 
have thoughts, we are pharmacists, we know about the problems in the medicinal 
drug and health care systems. Making decisions is the most difficult bit. You 
need to balance everything to make the most of it. Improvement should be gained 
at the expense of those offenders, otherwise you are just a slave to the 
regulations. ' (Interview - 1) 
From interviews, inspectors said 'going by the book' was easier to do than to think of how 
their authority should be appropriately exercised. Yet they risked using unauthorised 
discretion not only due to the context and their own attitudes indicated in chapter 4, but also 
because of imperfections they perceived in the Drug Act, which convinced them that a 
legalistic approach, or 'going by the book', is neither suitable nor able to increase 
compliance. Consequently, inspectors are only half-heartedly enforcing the 1967 Act. This 
chapter shows their conflicts with the 1967 Act and the TFDA enforcement management 
process that contributed problems in using inspectors' legal authority. 
5.1 Inspectors and the Drug Act 1967 
5.1.1 Inspectors' contribution to the legislative process 
Contrasts between inspectors and non-inspectors were found in interviews. Inspectors 
unanimously agreed that the Act was difficult to enforce fully and caused enforcement 
problems (Interviews). However, those mainly involved in the drafting process thought 
differently. They insisted that the Act was suitable, the problem was enforcement 
(Interviews). In their views, if enforcement were more effective, pharmacy practices would 
have been in better shape. However, none had been out in the field. This reflected the 
compartmentalisation in the TFDA, and the lack of communication. 
Traditionally, the TFDA Regulatory Affairs Unit, with lawyers and other experts appointed, is 
the main responsible unit for the legislative process in the TFDA. These expert opinions 
dominate the drafting or revisions with rare support from data in the field (Interviews-16,29). 
The 1967 Act adopted and amended the content of earlier Acts, which had been modelled 
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on the UK and the US with different health care contexts from Thailand (Tanasit et al 1996, 
Assawawilai 1999, Kiatying-angsulee 2000). Some interviewees regarded those involved in 
the legislative process as having a patronising attitude, 'Mothers know best', and a tendency 
to make 'over-protective' regulations to best protect consumers who are perceived to be not 
educated enough to protect themselves (Interviews-1,28,29). 
The inspectors interviewed perceived the Act to be the gold-standard for the country 
(Interviews). Despite being the main enforcers. inspectors' contributions to drafting or 
revision of the Act had been minimal. Usually. one inspector represented the whole inspector 
group (Interviews. the Drug Act Revision Working Group meeting minutes 3/1996) and field 
inspectors felt that their experiences did not count in the TFDA administration or the 
legislative process (Interviews-1.21.27). 
Those who are in charge of drafting and revising TFDA regulations felt their responsibility 
was only to draft a 'good law'. how the law will be enforced was not included (Interviews-
16,23.29). Lack of time was raised as the explanation. 
'It should not be our responsibility to think through enforcement. Just putting the 
content is ve'Y overwhelming. Usually we run out of time and are under pressure 
to finish it as soon as possible. '(lnterview-23) 
The management process employed was top-down (Hongsamoot 2000). Decisions were 
made at the top level and relayed downwards. and consultation with inspectors was not 
perceived to be necessary (Interviews-16.23). 
'They (inspectors) must follow the regulations once enacted despite their 
disagreement. ' (lnterview-16) 
Minimal consultation with inspectors throughout the drafting and revision processes meant 
there was no regular channel or meeting to collect feedback or problems from the field. for 
discussion with higher ranking officers. Although inspectors can make their own observations 
and pass them through the hierarchical system (and one interviewee said this sometimes 
had a good response). this was unusual (Interview-29). Inspectors were also concerned that 
they would be labeled as non-conformists if they challenged those of higher rank (Interviews-
2.3.6.26). 
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When there were new regulations such as withdrawal of certain drugs, inspectors were not 
informed thoroughly of the rationale or justification for new or revised regulations (Interviews-
4,11 ,20,27). They themselves needed to learn from the ordinance, which did not state in 
length the reasons. There were times when the lack of clear understanding affected 
inspectors' decisions. The phenylpropanolamine (PPA) case was an example. In 2000 the 
TFDA withdrew drugs containing PPA based on studies in the US (MOPH ministerial order 
No. 1140/2000). The products had been popular because of their effectiveness and low 
price . Most inspectors were not convinced about the said adverse reactions (Interviews). 
Two inspectors said they stocked some of these products for their children (Interviews-
15,18). Some inspectors said they would not take legal action against pharmacists or 
pharmacy owners in this case, as they felt unclear about the reasons (Interviews-13, 18). 
Figure 5.1: Inspectors inspecting the withdrawn PPA - contained drugs 
Given the minimal participation and consultation, this prompted the enforcement gap 
between the Act as drafted and the Act to be implemented, because problems in enforcing 
the Act were not taken into account in the legislative process. The next section showed 
confl icts expressed by inspectors. 
5.1.2 Inspectors and their conflicts with content of the Act 
In the view of most inspectors, widespread offences have always existed and are difficult to 
bring to compliance because of the impractical and unrealistic nature of the 1967 Act 
(Interviews); as two inspectors expressed , violations occurred 'once the first drug Act started' 
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(Interview-8), and 'you 'll always find offences in any single pharmacy' (Interview-11). The 
offences perceived and often raised by inspectors as examples of unrealistic and impractical 
over-regulation , reflecting the unrealistic and impractical nature of the Act, are selling without 
licences and selling drugs other than permitted (Interviews). 
As described in chapter 1, the group 'Household remedies' , which are allowed to be sold 
freely, is too restrictive and not popular, being perceived to be ineffective. The problem is 
hampered by the Act, which allows commercial advertising for both the Household remedies 
and the Ready-packed drugs. While the Government Pharmaceutical Organisation, the main 
producer of the Household remedies, does not promote its Household remedies, private 
pharmaceutical companies heavily advertise their Ready-packed drugs. Common products 
advertised include three popular cold remedies: Tiffy®, Nutacold® and Decolgen® (The 
Ministerial Order 1987). In 1991 , these three products had almost 100 million baht spent on 
TV advertisements (Working Group on Thai Drug System Analysis 1994; 571). Because of 
heavy advertising , most small grocery stores sold the three drugs, mistaking them for 
Household Remedies (Interviews-1 ,6, 11 ,18) (see Figure 5.2). 
Figure 5.2: Manners in which groceries sell drugs without licences. Drugs sold are in circles. 
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This caused conflict for inspectors. In their views the list is over-regulated, and those drugs 
for which commercial advertising is allowed, should be placed on the Household-remedy list. 
'If they were not safe enough, the TFDA should not approve the advertisement', one 
inspector said (Interview-6). The massive number of grocery stores violating the law was 
difficult to cope with. The items of drugs sold, from the inspector's standpoint, were relatively 
safe and in other countries they are OTC drugs (Interviews-4,7,15). 
Consequently, inspectors do not regard this contravention as serious, because they do not 
think these drugs are harmful unless they are sold wholesale, or with other potent drugs 
(Interviews-1 ,3,4,5,6,7,8,11,20,21,27). However, they are contravening the Drug Act by not 
acting on those drug sellers. This is indicated by the high discrepancies between inspectors' 
records and the independent study result shown in Table 1.3. 
Another conflict for inspectors regards the 'Ready-packed Drugs'. This group of drugs is 
perceived by inspectors to be so under-inclusive that 'no type B pharmacies can make a 
living if they strictly follow the Act' (Interview-13). Consequently, most inspectors usually 
charge pharmacy owners only when they carry prohibited drugs that are potent drugs, such 
as prescription drugs or injections, or carry too many items such as more than five types of 
antibiotics (Interviews-1 ,4,5,9,11,26). This means that they illegally allow drugs they perceive 
to be safe and necessary to be sold in type B pharmacies. 
All inspectors interviewed disagreed with the TFDA in using only inspection to tackle these 
widespread violations (Interviews). They felt that it was neither effective nor efficient. First, 
those who violated the Act were the majority, but inspection could cover and prosecute only 
a small portion (Interviews-1,4,26). The coverage of pharmacy inspection ranged from 12.1-
21.3 % (Table 5.2), and with insufficient manpower, it was unfeasible to prosecute all the 
violated pharmacies. Second, violations continue unless businesses are closed, which is 
impossible to oversee. Third, the majority of Thais, especially the poor, need the service 
provided by pharmacies, and inspectors feel sympathetic to their needs (Interviews-
8,11,13,26). 
Without clear policy statement or complaints, the great majority of inspectors would not make 
citations on such widespread violations as they might be blamed or sued for being selective 
(Interviews-2,3,6,13). However, policies sometimes had no effect if the inspectors did not 
agree with the principles. In 1995, inspectors were ordered to inspect all type B pharmacies, 
and enforce those violating the law. The number of type B pharmacies inspected jumped 
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from 41 in 1994 to 659 in 1995. but the citation rate remained almost same (14.6% 
compared to 13.2%. respectively) (Prosecution records 1994-1995, Wittayapiboon 1995) 
suggesting that inspectors were passively resisting the law they disagreed with. 
5.1.3 Inspectors' conflict with sanctions 
5.1.3.1 Penalty level and Imprisonment sanctions 
Sanctions determined by the legislative process were largely out of the hands of inspectors. 
Heavy punishment was viewed by executives as a measure to gain better compliance and 
show a sense of responsibility. Many SGs asked the TFDA regulatory officers to increase 
sanction severity. which the officers said they could not argue against despite knowing that it 
was not theoretically correct or suitable for many drug act violations (Interviews-16.23). 
Comparison of penalty levels between the Drug Act 1950 and 1967 supported the interviews 
(see Annex 13). 
In spite of pressure. inspectors still displayed reluctance in making decisions to impose 
sanctions on offenders. especially imprisonment.while non-inspectors argued that courts 
seldom imprisoned offenders unless cases were very severe such as producing fake drugs 
(Interviews-16.23.25). The usual sentences were probation for one or two years with a low 
fine (e.g. 700 baht); but in non-inspectors' view. it was essential to show tough enforcement 
for deterrence. 
'It is necessary to be tough to set an example, otherwise no one would respect 
the Act. • (Interview-17) 
Inspectors knew sentences might be relatively lenient. but they still felt that high penalties 
would not create as much deterrent effect as expected. unless they were used with other 
measures such as timely sanctions. certainty of sanctions or campaigning prior to 
enforcement (Interviews-4.19.26). Many inspectors expressed concerned about overkill or 
being inhumane (Interviews-2.3.8.12.20). while non-inspectors thought differently. This 
conflict may have been because non-inspectors were distanced from the 'offenders'. 
whereas inspectors had to face them. 
In reality. as explained by most inspectors. the situations did not go as smoothly as felt by 
non-inspectors. and there were predictable adverse consequences (Interviews-
2.3.4.8.11.12.13.14.15.18.26). For example. in some cases offenders would be investigated 
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by the police, and unless put on bail, they would be detained at the police station. Inspectors 
were informed directly from offenders or heard from other inspectors that the police officers 
involved charged offenders 'under the table' (Interviews-1,4,6,8,11,12,15,20,24). These 
illegal charges ranged from 50,000 - 400,000 baht, which inspectors felt offenders did not 
deserve compared to their breach and the harm caused (Interviews- 8,13,27). 
Before deciding to make citation of offences with an imprisonment penalty, inspectors 
usually balanced the evidence of intention, scale and impact of violation and harm caused 
(Interviews). Some inspectors suggested that the TFDA should use incremental strategies. 
For example, a fine for the first time transgression in cases that are not severe or where 
harm is not evident and keep imprisonment sanctions only for repeated severe offences 
(Interviews-1,27). 
5.1.3.2 Across-the-board cha,..cfw of penalties 
The Act, in the view of many inspectors, contained too many across-the-board sanctions 
regardless of the various degrees of offences. In many cases pharmacies are identified in 
the same penalty range as manufacturers and importers (see Table 5.1). 
Table 5.1: Charges and penalties on manufacturers, importers and drug sellers 
Charges Penalties 
Manufacturing, importing or selling without Imprisonment no more than five years 
licence and a fine of no more than 10,000 baht 
Manufacturing or selling drugs to licensees A fine of 2,000 - 5,000 baht 
not allowed to sell the drugs 
Manufacturing or selling drugs during A fine of 1,000 - 5,000 baht 
absence of professional-in-charge 
Selling or importing fake drugs, knowingly Imprisonment of 1 - 20 years and a fine 
of 2,000 - 10,000 baht 
Selling or importing fake drugs, unknowingly A fine of 1,000 - 5,000 baht 
Selling or importing sub-standard drugs, or Imprisonment no more than three years 
withdrawn drugs, knowingly and a fine of no more than 5,000 baht 
Selling or importing sub-standard drugs, or A fine of no more than 5,000 baht 
withdrawn drugs, unknowingly 
Manufacturing, importing or selling non- Imprisonment no more than three years 
registered drugs or a fine of no more than 5,000 baht or 
both 
Source: The Drug Act 1967 
A number of inspectors did not agree with these across-the-board penalties because selling 
can apply to international wholesalers as well as to small grocery stores in remote villages, 
yet all are subject to one penalty range. Non-inspectors argued that courts would sentence 
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according to the scale of violation, but this uncertainty discomforted inspectors (Interviews-
1,2,4.13,15,27). They gave examples of punishment regarding advertising (Interviews-3,30). 
Small companies selling traditional drugs were fined at the same rate as of those big 
companies advertising modern medicines with much greater coverage (Interviews-3,30). 
They felt that penalties should be more specific and not highly reliant on the court's 
judgement. Their concerns were that offenders might be punished more than the inspectors 
perceived they deserved (Interviews-1,26). Consequently, across-the-board sanctions made 
inspectors focus more on drugs they felt were more dangerous, and ignore offenders 
carrying less harmful drugs (Interviews-1,6,11,12,26). 
5.1.3.3 Sanctions In relation to harm caused 
From interviews, harm or risk was of major concern to inspectors (Interviews-1 ,3,4,8,9,11, 
12,27). Using their judgement, often based on the relationship between the level of sanctions 
and harm caused, was difficult because most contravention do not result in clear harm. The 
case of expired drugs is one example of uncertain harm that causes inspectors' lax decisions 
(Interviews-2,3,12,26). In their views, although drugs are supposed not to be effective 
beyond their expiration dates, manufacturers usually set expiration date three to six months 
shorter as a precautionary measure. Harm will depend on other factors too, such as types of 
active ingredient, how long they have been expired, storage conditions and manufacturers' 
standards. 
Uncertainty especially from consumers' utilisation of self-medication and lack of adequate 
data forced inspectors to use their professional background and experiences with regulatory 
control when confronted by violations (Interviews). Box 2 gives examples of inspector's 
concerns regarding harm. The more evidence of harm, the more willing inspectors were to 
make citations. However, there were always other factors taken into account in making 
decisions. 
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Box 2 Inspectors and their concerns related to harm 
Smuggled drugs 
Many of the modem drugs smuggled into Thailand are from Pakistan or India because of their cheaper 
prices. Inspectors were divided on this offence and made different decisions (Interviews-
1,2,6,23,27,30). Some felt that registration indicated quality, so they tended to be tough on non-
registered drugs. Others felt that registration was just a legal requirement and did not represent 
quality; most of the smuggled drugs were qualified, so they were more lax. 
In recent years, laboratory analytical results have showed that the smuggled modem drugs have 
changed from having good quality to containing lower than standard or almost no active ingredients 
(Interviews-4,15,26,27). This phenomenon has changed inspectors' views on non-registered drugs. 
Those who used to be lax are more serious (Interviews-1.4,27), resulting in more violation cases 
presented, as indicated in Table 1.3. 
Steroid tablets 
Professional judgement played a role in inspectors' conflict with the regulations in the case of steroid 
tablets. These drugs, though potent and can cause harm, are cheap and effective. Some inspectors 
believed that the consumption pattem clients used, off and on, is not as harmful as long-term use, on 
which the side effects are based (Interviews- 1.4,11,26). For them, selling steroid tablets without 
prescription was acceptable as there may be emergency cases for the poor who cannot afford to go to 
hospitals or private clinics, such as asthma, and in such cases steroid tablets can be life-saving. This 
was unacceptable to a few, but as there is little empirical evidence to prove their harm in the current 
situation, inspectors normally did not charge this offence. 
Sale of withdrawn drugs 
Inspectors had less sympathy with this offence because drugs are mostly withdrawn due to problems 
of efficacy and safety (Interviews- 3,11,12,20,27). Usually, names of the withdrawn drugs are circulated 
to pharmacies or some are publicised in newspapers. However, inspectors still tended to be reluctant 
to prosecute in two different instances. First, when the drugs were newly withdrawn. Second, for 
withdrawn drugs that are not potent or dangerous or not well-publicised. From their experiences, 
pharmacies owners are often not able to check the withdrawn drugs by themselves (Interviews-
3,11,12,20,27). The ministerial orders, though circulated to each pharmacy, are mostly specified in 
terms of generic names (chemical names) instead of brand names. A number of pharmacy owners 
know drugs only by tradenames and cannot identify generic names, which are usually in English. The 
orders do not state brand names because those brand names can be re-used after changing 
formulations (The Drug Act 1967). This made inspectors feel that the problem is partly due to the 
regulation itself, and that the owners deserve lenient decisions (Interviews-3,11 ,20). 
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In contrast to the above examples, inspectors mentioned one case where they had serious 
concerns despite there being no legal control. This concerned the 'sale of conditional 
registered drugs' - drugs, which are still on clinical trial in Thailand, and restricted to use only 
in hospitals or clinics. However, these drugs sometimes appear and are sold in pharmacies. 
Since this is a new phenomenon, it is not covered by the Act. Nonetheless, inspectors felt 
that this issue should be under strict control due to the potential danger the drugs may 
cause. But as it is not covered by the Act, inspectors have to take legal action on other 
transgressions instead, for example regarding records, despite having punishment only a 
fine of 2,000-5,000 baht (Interviews-18,27,30). One inspector (Interview-18) said, 'it's better 
than letting them go freely. ' 
5.1.3.4 Sanctions and ofFenders 
Basically, inspectors felt offenders should be given the opportunity to correct their offences, 
except for those committing serious transgressions or repeated violations (Interviews-
1,3,4,8,12,20). Offenders should not be punished 'to death' or be unable to run their 
business. The heavier the sanctions are, the more consideration inspectors take before 
making decisions. 
For sporadic offences, inspectors tend to be stricter, but from interviews, most inspectors 
wanted to be sure that the breaches were conducted knowingly. Therefore, they paid 
attention to quantity, location of products found, history of the pharmacies, manner of selling, 
and owners' co-operation in answering their questions (Interviews). Some said that if the 
products were found hidden in drawers, they tended to take the offence seriously 
(Interviews-1,4 ). 
Most of the inspectors shared the view that mistakes can unintentionally or recklessly occur 
in pharmacies where there are thousands of drug items (Interviews-1,4,12,26). Selling fake 
drugs and selling expired drugs were always raised by every single inspector, regarding both 
their harm and the certainty to take legal action (Interviews). Yet, most of the time their final 
decisions were asking pharmacy owners to destroy those products (Interviews-
1,4,8,10,11,12,15,27,30). They believed that most offenders committed offences because of 
recklessness, and they felt that the imprisonment penalties were too heavy. 
'From my experience, most of the time the sellers donY know, even though some of 
fake drugs are noticeable. They just simply donY take a close look at their drugs. 
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Mostly they trust their wholesalers. Sometimes fake drugs do look exactly the same 
as the original ones, making it hard for even us to differentiate. ' (Interview-27) 
Unclear harm when accompanied with heavy sanctions made inspectors more sympathetic 
to offenders, especially those who conducted widespread transgressions (interviews-
2,3,4,6,10,12,20). They perceived that this kind of offenders violated the law because the Act 
is not realistic. 
'No one has ever paid attention to causes of problems. So, the problems are 
there forever. Repeated violations occur because there is no solution. Pharmacy 
owners take those risks. I felt sorry for them, and afraid that taking legal action 
continuously will lead them to jail or licence suspension. ' (lnterview-22) 
Many inspectors felt that offences can happen due to lack of knowledge (Interviews). By law, 
pharmacists are required to check the quality of products, but in reality it is usually left to 
pharmacy owners who often do not have health professional backgrounds. Therefore, 
inspectors felt the owners should not be fully punished (Interviews-5, 12,27,30). Although 
inspectors generally feel sympathy towards offenders, this was not the case for easily 
identified violations, such as in the case of non-registered drugs, which can be detected by 
checking labels, and withdrawn drugs that had been publicised in newspapers (Interviews-
2,3,4,30). 
Regarding fake drugs, inspectors sometimes did not take legal action against sellers right 
away, in order not to alert the producers (Interviews-24,27,28). 
'If fake drugs are found, I won't tell the pharmacy immediately. But, I will try to 
trace back and collect more data to estimate the magnitude of the problem. I 
prefer to investigate more to crack the whole gang. However, it depends on types 
of fake drugs. If they are potent, sure, we can't be that quiet. ' ( Interview-27) 
Occasionally, inspectors do have conflicts in charging those who break the law. For 
example, they do not want to charge the elderly, but at the same time they do not want the 
elderly to sell drugs that might harm clients (Interviews-6,1 0). Or they do not want an 
infringement to continue but, at the same time, do not see how punishment can stop them 
(Interviews-1 ,5,6,9,10). 
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5.1.3.5 Difficulties In prosecution 
The 'zero-discretion' approach applied to inspectors means that they, in theory, are 
supposed to take all cases to the TFDA for consideration. However, the Act was found to be 
one of the barriers to prosecution, resulting in a number of cases not being brought to the 
TFDA prosecution process. 
The 1967 Act is controlled by the Penal Code 1956 clause 59, which says that 'A person 
shall be criminally liable only when he commits wilfully ..... '(lnterviews-1,12, the Penal Code 
1956). However, 'wilful' is not defined by the Drug Act. This means that selling or possessing 
only one illegal tablet is considered violating the Act. But, quantity and manner of committing 
violation are seriously considered by the VAC, the police and courts. 
All inspectors interviewed expressed the view that they would not take legal action against 
cases where evidence did not strongly indicate 'wilful' action (Interviews). Such cases, from 
their own experiences, were likely to be dropped or discontinued at the VAC, the police or 
court level, which they felt was a waste of time and resources. Besides, they often felt 
stigmatised as incompetent (Interviews-1,30). When intention is obvious, such as putting 
stickers over expiry dates, where large quantities of expired drugs were found or 
deterioration is evident (Interviews-1,3.4,6,15), they felt more confident about making a 
charge. 
In fact, illegal actions performed willfully or unwillfully are recognised by the Act. The unwillful 
offences are subject to only a fine. Nevertheless, in reality they are not easily differentiated 
and caused conflict between inspectors and the VAC. Some inspectors expressed that they 
risked themselves being mistakenly suspected of corruption in specifying that offences were 
conducted unwillfully, yet such specification was usually turned down (Interviews-18,27,30). 
Those who were in the VAC process explained that they wanted the police, who properly 
learn how to investigate thoroughly, to make that judgement (Interviews- 16,18). 
The definition of selling that covers possessing is difficult to apply in the case of expired 
drugs. If there is no proof of sale, pharmacy owners always appeal that though the expired 
drug are on dispensary shelves, they would take a look before dispensing, and cases are 
usually dropped, so most inspectors felt discouraged from making charges on expired drugs 
( Interviews-1,13,20). 
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In the absence of any guidance for decision-making in the manuals or guidelines (Inspection 
Manuals 1979, 1989, 1998, Inspection Training Curriculum 1992-1999), inspectors 
concluded from their seniors and their experience the conditions that would make cases 
solid enough for prosecution (Interviews-1,4, 12, 13,20). The conditions comprised issues that 
could be considered collectively or individually. They were quantity of illegal products, 
physical appearance of the products, location found, and actions disguising flaws. 
Consequently most offences were dealt with by inspectors' substituted measures and were 
not brought in for the VAC consideration (Interviews). 
5.2. Inspection working procedures 
5.2.1 Reporting and recording systems 
Inspection work procedures indicate greater workload if legal action is taken: more paper 
work and activities (Inspection SOP 1996). However, inspectors claimed that this has an 
effect only on minor cases (Interviews-2, 11,12,27). In dOing inspection, there are three 
official results - no offence found, offences found are subject to the inspector's warning, 
offences found are subject to VAC consideration - each of which has different cycles of 
management. 
Cases with no offence are the easiest. Inspectors only fill in the 'Inspection Form' and the 
'Sample Form' if samples are collected. Samples must be kept in a container sealed and co-
signed by pharmacy owners and inspectors. The container must be labelled with the same 
details written in the Sample Form - details of brand name, active ingredients, quantity 
collected, batch number, expiry date (if any), manufacturers, importers (if any), pharmacy 
address and collection date. Usually one inspector fills the forms while another checks drugs 
in pharmacies. In cases where offences found are subject to a warning, inspectors must 
write down the details in another form, the 'Interrogation Form', in addition to the Inspection 
Form. The cases are then passed to the DeD Director for endorsement and forwarded back 
to the same inspectors to follow-up. 
The most complicated process is when legal action is taken. Inspectors need to spend at 
least two hours on this, compared to the 20-30 minutes spent if no offence is found. They 
are required to fill in the Inspection Form, the Interrogation Form, the 'Product Seized Form' 
(if illegal products are taken to the TFDA) or the 'Product Detained Form' (if illegal products 
are detained at the pharmacy). Often, the illegal products need laboratory test results to be 
used in court, so the Sample Form is also needed. 
97 
Chapter 5: Inspectors, the Drug Act 1967 and the Inspection Process 
If offenders resist, it takes longer to convince them, because forms are supposed to be co-
signed by inspectors and offenders. Records are then considered official evidence. If 
offenders do not co-sign, inspectors need to ask the police to step-in or to have a policeman 
co-sign as a witness that there is no prejudice against offenders {Interviews}. Back at the 
office, inspectors must summarise and report to the Chief of Inspectors to proceed to the 
Head of the Post-Marketing Section and the Director respectively for further processes. 
Each case can take inspectors at least five working days if it is sent to the police {Interviews-
1.4,12,15,27,28}. Inspectors who make charges are appointed to make official complaints on 
behalf of the TFDA (Inspection Manual 1998). Then the appointed inspectors go to the police 
station and hand-in all evidence of violations and give all the details, but it takes time before 
appointments are set {lnterviews-1 .4,20}. If offenders defend, inspectors need to go to court 
too. 
All cases from the latter scenario are sent to the VAC. If the VAC decides to give a warning, 
cases are sent back to inspectors to fOllow-up to ensure that violations have been corrected 
{The 1991 VAC Guidelines}. The whole system of reporting, prosecution and follow-up (see 
Figure 5.3), some inspectors admitted, made them turn a blind eye on some minor violations 
in order to reduce their burden (Interviews-11,26,30). Often, it takes more than a year 
(except for very serious offences) to complete follow-up due to their occupation with other 
work that has deadlines, GMP inspection and complaint cases {lnterviews-4,27}. Having 
follow-up cases stocked up is seen as incompetence {lnterview-26}. Therefore, inspectors 
often act in a way so as not to create fOllow-up. 
'Sometimes, if the cases are not serious, / prefer to use substituted methods so 
that the cases would not pile up in my cabinet.' (Interview-1) 
'For every waming, we need to follow-up and report. / fee/ that it is better to just 
tell them that they have committed violations, sometimes bluff them about the 
next inspection. This saves our time for more serious cases.' (Interview-3) 
One inspector said that though authorised to give written warnings, he preferred giving 
verbal warnings, to avoid follow-up. 
'Imagine, if / record, I need to get back again for follow-up, and these issues are 
so insignificant. Lots of work is waiting, why should I spend much time on it? I just 
verbally warn them. ' (Interview-26) 
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If corrections are not completed, the VAC can order inspectors to take legal action at the 
next visit, as illustrated in Figure 5.3. Either way means more work for inspectors. From 
inspection records, the followed-up cases showed that the offences were corrected with no 
newly found offence (Inspection records 1980-1996). However, given the matter of the 
process, it is not clear that this reflected better practice by pharmacists or pharmacy owners, 
or inspectors turning a blind eye on small offences. 
Figure 5.3: The follow-up cycle 
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5.2.2 The evidence collection practice 
In addition to filling various forms, the procedure required for evidence collection is complex. 
Traditionally inspectors need to gather evidence by themselves; the requirement has never 
been revised for at least twenty years (Interviews-8,9, 11). For example. if there is a 
complaint of selling drugs without a pharmacist present, inspectors cannot just go there and 
take photos to show the selling activities (SOP 1996). They must get someone to pretend to 
be a client and use a marked banknote to buy drugs(SOP 1996). Evidence for prosecution 
includes the drugs sold, the marked banknotes (which indicates proof of sale) and other 
related material. Due to lack of budget and difficulty in getting surrogate clients, inspectors 
themselves sometimes pretend to be customers seeking illegal products (Interviews-2,10). 
The risky nature of this technique, and the fact that there are not many inspectors to take 
turns as simulated clients, make this technique possible only with serious offences 
(Interviews-2,3.4,11). Such actions also raise ethical issues, which, in a stronger legal 
system, could be used against inspectors. Consequently, offences requiring proof of sale, 
such as selling prescription drugs without prescriptions, are rarely prosecuted. 
5.2.3 Work prioritisation 
It is the same group of inspectors who monitor manufacturers, importers, pharmacies and 
grocery stores that sell medicinal drugs without licences. The prioritised work is that 
publicised by the media, complaints, or that with deadlines, in conjunction with seriousness 
of offence no matter what type of premises (Interviews-1,2,3,6,19,21, Inspection SOP 1996). 
By this categorisation, there has been much less attention given to pharmaCies compared to 
manufacturers. The manufacturer GMP inspection used up 60-90% of inspection time 
because of its fixed deadline1 and its importance in terms of policy (Interviews, TFDA Annual 
Plans and Annual Reports 1989-2000). Coverage of manufacturer inspection has been over 
100% (each manufacturer inspected at least once), while coverage of pharmaCies has been 
far less (see Table 5.2). 
1 The TFDA issue GMP certificates that are valid for only one or two years. If certificates expire. 
manufacturers cannot sell drugs to public hospitals as a part of regulations. Thus, practically. GMP 
inspection is likely to be the first priority followed by complaint inspection. pharmacy and importer 
inspection the last priority. 
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Table 5.2: percentage of manufacturers and pharmacies inspected compared to the total 
licences 
% Inspected of the total number 
Year Manufacturer Pharmacy 
2000 
1999 
1998 
1997 
1996 
1995 
1994 
1993 
1992 
1991 
• re-organisation in mid-1997 caused some work interruption 
•• were inspected more than once a year 
129.3** 12.2 
202.8** 21.3 
N/a* N/a* 
55.4* 3.3* 
106.9** 18.0 
103.8** 17.6 
102.2** 13.8 
118.7** 16.6 
220.2** 14.3 
402.6** 12.1 
Most inspectors prefer GMP to pharmacy inspection as it is a more professional and more 
educational process, while pharmacy inspection tends to be enforcement activities 
(Interviews- 1,2,3.4,13, 19,21,24,25,27). One inspector said, 
'You can see changes in manufacturers, they are willing to improve themselves. It 
is less confrontational than working with pharmacies. ' (Interview-26). 
In addition to professional preference, a number of inspectors expressed other reasons for 
leaning towards GMP inspection. Some inspectors felt that inspecting manufacturers was 
more important than the others, as they are origin of drug quality (Interviews-4,8,21,30). 
Many inspectors felt problems in pharmacies are gradually decreasing. There are more 
pharmacies owned by pharmacists, from 13% in 1967 to 30% of all type A pharmacies in 
1999. The increased numbers means fewer problems about selling out of the registered duty 
hours, absence of pharmacists and selling drugs without pharmacists' supervision 
(Interviews-1,3,13,21). Besides, the Board of Pharmacy also checks those pharmacies 
claiming to have a pharmacist staying all day long, which supplements inspectors' work 
(Interviews-1 ,2,3,12, 19,25). 
A number of inspectors pOinted out the importance of pharmacies in creating direct hazards 
to consumers (Interviews-4, 12, 18,19,27,29). They felt that situations of drug quality in 
manufacturing had stabilised. One analysis showed that in the last ten years the number of 
sub-standard drugs has been maintained, and the remaining problems are due to the use of 
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low quality raw materials and lack of R&D, which does not involve enforcement (Anon. 
2001 ). 
'It may be time to switch the focus on areas other than GMP since it is not much a 
problem now as it used to be.' (lnterview-29) 
Being increasingly overwhelmed by GMP inspection from the increased number of GMP 
certified manufacturers, inspectors have less time for pharmacy inspection. Consequently, 
they focused more on the coverage than taking legal action, if it was not necessary. They felt 
that Just visiting' has significant deterrent effect (Interviews-4, 12, 13, 15,21,26). 
5.3 Support from management system 
Once a law is enacted, managing its implementation is crucial, otherwise the law remains 
intention only. The data obtained suggested some potential management aspects were not 
conducive to legalistic enforcement in pharmacies. 
5.3.1 Salary and welfare 
Inspectors receive the same salary as other civil servants. As pharmacists, they also receive 
a special government supplement, which is given to civil servants in certain professions to 
maintain them in the government system. However, the total salary is still not competitive 
with the private sector. The only welfare the TFDA provides for inspectors is life insurance, 
which started in 1998, after repeated requests. Other MOPH officers do not have this kind of 
welfare. A number of inspectors felt that they did not have sufficient support and incentives 
from the government system in comparison to their risk (Interviews-3,6,7, 10, 13). 
All inspectors but one had extra part-time jobs to reduce wage discrepancies. Four out of 
twelve current inspectors work as part-time employees in hospitals in the evening, four work 
in pharmacies and three help their families run pharmacies. They are neither barred by any 
rules for having double roles nor required to declare their interests. Their direct involvement 
can be advantageous in gaining insights into what is going on in the regulated business. But 
it can also make inspectors feel sympathetic towards pharmacy owners, ignore offences or 
support the status quo to protect their own benefit. 
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'I, myself, find it is hard to go and work at my registered pharmacy every day. It is 
tiring both the journey and to make yourself compatible with the owners. How can 
I enforce other pharmacists to abide by their responsibility, while I cant' 
(Interview-4) 
Having two jobs is not only a problem of conflicts of interest, but it possibly affects how they 
work too. One inspector pOinted out that there were times inspectors did not take full legal 
action in order not to arrive late at their part-time work places. Further, it was mentioned that 
for cases requiring out of office hour inspections, it was difficult to get sufficient inspectors 
because they were occupied by their part-time jobs (Interviews-21 ,24,30). 
5.3.2 Advancement 
In terms of annual advancement, which concerns salary increase, inspectors are subject to 
the three appraisal categories of the civil servant performance evaluation: a rare decrease in 
salary, with or without other sanctions; a common one-step salary increase for satisfied 
performance; or one and a half or two-step salary increase for excellent performance. The 
great majority of officers fall in the second group because the quota allows not more than 
10% of total officers in each division to fall into the third group. The performance criteria were 
found to be subjective and to rely on manager's decisions (the Civil Servant Performance 
Appraisal Order 1995). 
Most inspectors interviewed could not tell how they were appraised. But they seemed not to 
be bothered by the system, although some said that only half of those graded as 'excellent 
performance' were accepted (Interviews-4,13). Most of them believed that their managers 
tried to give everybody a chance by rotation and compromising. 
There is another kind of advancement, which is far more competitive than the annual 
advancement appraisal. Inspectors start from level 3 and can move up to level 7 without 
ceiling if their capabilities meet specifications required by the government (the Civil Servant 
Performance Appraisal Guideline 1995). Higher competition is seen in moving to levels B, 9 
and 10. Decisions are made on behalf of 'the Selection Board' (the TFDA Performance 
Appraisal Guideline 1997), but the Director of the division with vacant positions usually has 
the strongest voice (Interviews). Appeals can be made but are unusual (the TFDA 
Performance Appraisal Guideline 1997, Interview-B). 
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Most inspectors felt that decisions were made based on the manager's satisfaction and the 
rotation system (Interviews-1,4,26). Again, no one could confidently tell what criteria were 
used (Interviews). The subjectivity of the appraisal and promotion systems could prevent 
inspectors from using their legal authority in two ways. First, they may try to conform to their 
managers and their colleagues. Being in step with others is important in the Thai culture as 
well as in the Thai bureaucratic system (Interviews-2,3,26). They do not want to be viewed 
as over-zealous, authoritarian or hard-hearted especially when criteria for job appraisal and 
promotion are subjective (lnterviews-2,3,5,14,30). Consequently, individuals' decisions are 
heavily patterned by pre-existing ones (Interviews), which tend to be lax. 
'I don Y want to be either a black sheep or a swan in group of crows, depending on 
one's standpoint. The image is with you forever, and definitely affects your 
promotion.' (Interview-3) 
Second, they were not confident that they were well protected if they used their authority 
straightforwardly (Interviews-15,18). Enforcement affects the business sector, and politicians 
(for example Minister of Public Health Ministry) or high-ranking officers (such as SG and 
Directors) as indicated in Chapter 4. Businessmen may put pressure on inspectors and the 
system. To avoid negative impacts, inspectors would have taken only serious offences. 
Consequently, the current systems of appraisal and promotion possibly induce inspectors to 
be less confrontational to both their superiors and the regulated to protect themselves for 
their career progress. 
Regardless of the uncertainty in advancement, inspectors earned self-growth through their 
work. The GMP inspection was in a better position than pharmacy inspection, which has 
much less training (Training Programmes, DCD, 1997-2000). Inspectors were systematically 
trained locally and internationally on the principles of and how to conduct GMP inspection, 
which is a world-wide principle. This could be one reason why inspectors paid less attention 
to the subjective appraisal and promotion systems. In contrast, punitive enforcement is used 
dominantly in pharmacy inspection without comprehensive training programs standard. 
Currently, eight out of twelve inspectors are in level 8 and they realised the difficulties of 
reaching level 9, since there are only nine positions for the whole TFDA. Working as GMP 
inspectors, they can be promoted in the international GMP system from local GMP 
inspectors to international GMP inspectors; or they can move from GMP auditors to be 
auditors in the ISO (International Standard Organisation) system, then be local lead 
assessors and international lead assessors respectively. Furthermore, the knowledge gained 
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can be used even after retirement as consultants or auditors or experts of international 
organisations such as WHO. 
Overall, advancement provided by the civil servant system was not conducive for pharmacy 
inspection, and probably hindered the use of legal sanctions. 
5.3.3 Monitoring system 
Inspectors were monitored in a hierarchical style. They were subject to their Chief Inspector, 
Head of Post-Marketing Control Section and the Drug Control Division Director respectively. 
Managers are usually overwhelmed with administrative work including meetings. However, 
they sometimes went out to help inspectors inspect when short-staffed (Interviews). There is 
no re-inspection system or any system to check the quality of inspections except through 
inspection reports. The rotation system, where inspectors take turns geographically, stopped 
four years ago when most activities turned to dealing with manufacturers rather than 
pharmacies (Interviews-4,27). Most inspectors felt that being familiar with their catchment 
would be more useful for improving manufacturers' practices because they can follow-up and 
assess changes, which usually take many months (Interviews-13,27). 
Generally inspectors were monitored from reports and checked on how many inspections 
were carried out compared to annual targets (Interviews-4, 11,15,21). However, most 
inspectors accepted that though there is no punishment if the target is not met, they felt 
obliged to meet the target (Interviews). There was a shared feeling between inspectors and 
their managers that inspectors did the best they could (Interviews-4,21). Managers 
interviewed said that although they had not been out very often, news usually leaked if 
inspectors misbehaved (Interviews). This was because, in their view, the community was 
small and connected in the system (Interviews-22,23,24) . 
The importance of monitoring was not recognised. Only two inspectors saw the importance 
of a good monitoring system as a way to encourage just and standardised performances 
(Interviews-22,29). 
'Monitoring system is key to enforcement. If inspection is not monitored properly, 
it will lead to under-enforcement. Basically, no one wants to exercise authority. It 
is much more easy to take no lega/ action. ' (Interview-22) 
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A strong monitoring system exists only on complaint inspection and issues appearing in 
newspapers (Interviews-3,6,10, Inspection SOP 1996). These cases are followed up by 
either the TFDA Complaint Committee, the DCD Director or SG (Interviews-1,4). Inspectors 
are required to report the results within certain periods, delays in action are negatively 
considered (Interviews-2,4). These cases are usually treated seriously and inspectors 
usually impose fully their authority (Interviews-4,6,13,24). 
5.4 Summary 
This chapter investigated support for the full use of inspector's legal authority through the 
Drug Act 1967 and inspection enforcement management system. A number of constraints 
existed in many forms. 
Inspectors were found not whole-heartedly enforcing the Act. The unrealistic and impractical 
content of the Act was felt by the great majority of inspectors as the cause of the widespread 
violations, and inspection should not be the only measure aimed at bringing better 
compliance. Heavy sanctions as well as across-the-board sanctions, viewed by executives 
as of greater deterrence, caused inspectors difficulties in taking legal action. A number of 
factors such as harm caused and intention were used to justify their decisions. In addition, 
inspectors clearly demonstrated a tendency to be sympathetic to pharmacy owners. The 
TFDA legislative process, with minimal participation and consultation of inspectors, probably 
exacerbated this implementation gap. Antagonistic views between inspectors and non-
inspectors were found in a number of instances. Besides, the Act possessed contents 
difficult to use in courts. 
The inspection work procedures and management were discovered not to be conducive for 
legalistic enforcement. Fewer chances for career advancement, and lower importance of 
pharmacy versus GMP inspection, difficulties in collecting evidence, the complicated process 
in prosecuting offenders and the weak monitoring system were all hindrances against 
legalistic enforcement. Further, because of double roles as both professionals-in-charge and 
inspectors, conflicts of interest may exist. 
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Recommendations 
6.1 Introduction 
Data revealed from independent studies and inspection reports suggest that many offences 
that break the 1967 Drug Act do not get officially reported. This formed a main research 
question for this study: why inspectors failed to fully exercise their legal authority by not 
reporting offences committed by those in pharmacies. The failure to use their legal authority 
could mean that the public who buy medicinal drugs directly from pharmacies may be prone 
to harm caused by illegal practices such as selling sub-standard drugs, expired drugs and 
non-registered drugs. 
The study focused specifically on inspectors' points of view in expressing what they 
perceived as problems preventing them from using their legal authority. This study is not 
intended to defend or judge inspectors' views and attitudes, but to understand the issue from 
their viewpoint. Such understanding is fundamentally important to policy makers if 
enforcement in pharmacy is to be improved. The main theme of this study was thus on policy 
implementation focusing on actors. The approach of the research followed Walt and Gilson's 
policy analysis framework (1994), which was used to explore four factors - actors, content, 
process and context - which would illuminate the research question. 
In this chapter, from the triangulated data, I will draw together and discuss the main findings 
arising from the study in order to explain why there is a discrepancy between violations 
committed and those reported by inspectors. Findings are presented together with 
recommendations and suggestions for future research with reference to the objectives of the 
study. 
6.2 Discussion of findings 
Regulation is one way that governments seek to protect the public. Inspectors are regulatory 
agency enforcement arms to ensure law adherence. To protect consumer safety in 
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consuming medicinal drugs, the TFDA is responsible for enforcing the Drug Act 1967, which 
falls within criminal law . 
In exploring the big picture, this study indicates a gap between the intent of legalistic rhetoric 
enforcement and the actual use of flexible enforcement in the TFDA. The strain between the 
uniformity required by policies or laws and the diversity exercised by implementors is not 
unique to the TFDA (La Fave 1962a, Lipsky 1980, Pressman and Wildavsky 1984, Jacobson 
and Wasserman 1999), but problems in other inspectorates may not be as big as that in the 
TFDA. For example, inspectors in other regulatory authorities are allowed some level of 
flexibility, unlike the TFDA enforcement strategy, which requires its inspectors to 'go by the 
book' - charging all offences. Since the inspectors do not agree with this legalistic approach, 
it seems that they do not exactly follow what is required of them. 
The gap in the TFDA is so large that most offences are not dealt with according to the rules 
laid down. Often inspectors use their professional judgement in unofficial ways, and not 
according to the 1967 Act and the TFDA administration. Cases reported and thus appearing 
in inspection data were a small fraction of the total offences detected. In general, only the 
most serious cases were considered as deserving prosecution, while cases perceived by 
inspectors as minor, or where harm was not clear, or evidence was not solid enough for 
prosecution, were dealt with unOfficially. The outcome of this phenomenon is not clear, but 
drawbacks are predictable. First, decisions are mainly dominated by inspectors' personal 
attitudes rather than being structured by the TFDA expectations and legal systems, so 
inconsistency possibly exists. Second, cases are treated unofficially and off-the-record, so 
they are unlikely to be followed up. This means there is less chance to set stricter 
enforcement if offences are not corrected. Third, data missing from the enforcement system 
means difficulties in strategic planning. Fourth, the actions possibly make lawbreakers feel 
that enforcement is negotiable or open to compromise. Finally, all the drawbacks would add 
up and erode the deterrent effects created by the 1967 Act. 
The situation in the TFDA is not encouraging, although inspectors seem to be able to justify 
their actions. They feel that they put themselves at risk in using discretion, but they cannot 
perform according to the rules. Consequently, inspectors are more comfortable in working on 
GMP inspection where less confrontation and better advancement are obtained; pharmacy 
inspection is perceived as routine work and is conducted mainly to meet the annual target. 
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The problems within the TFDA enforcement of pharmacies, reflected in this study, reinforce 
the notion that successful implementation requires conducive conditions, otherwise it will be 
adapted by the 'street-level bureaucrats' (Lipsky 1980, Jacobson and Wasserman 1999) no 
matter how precise policies are, such as in the form of regulations as suggested by this 
research . At 'street level' inspectors have clearly adapted their practices to suit their own 
perceptions. 
The four elements, following Walt and Gilson 's (1994) policy analysis framework, help to 
explain the implementation gap. There is no single issue that causes the gap. Figure 6.1, 
adapted from Walt and Gilson's framework (1994) , demonstrates the gap, interrelationships 
among the four elements involved and the result of the gap. The reasons contributing to the 
implementation gap leading to the failure to use legal authority can be summarised into three 
interrelated main areas: friction in enforcement practices; inspectors' conflict with the Drug 
Act 1967; and constraints in the TFDA enforcement management system. For the purpose of 
explanation and discussion, these are presented separately. 
Figure 6.1: The summarised situations of inspectors' exercising of their authority 
Legalistic 
enforcement 
approach 
The Drug Act 
1967 
tl!. TFDA conftlxt 
(1/JIP6c lors ' ,"In tJnd tJfflllJdu ) 
.... . .. " 
Flexible 
enforcement 
approach 
_---r----- --------------------------·-1-- -_ 
. - • _ The range of inspectors' decisions _ - -
.. ......... .",.,.. .. 
.......... ~. 
-......... ~. 
........... ~. 
.................... .",.,...~. 
.......... .."... . 
................. ..,..,... 
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6.2.1 Friction between the two enforcement approaches: legalistic and 
flexible 
Compared to other regulatory agencies, this study suggests that the TFDA appears to 
enforce its regulations less strategically. Generally, regulatory authorities show disparate use 
of authority, with the balance towards bargaining and advice giving (Rhodes 1981, Hutter 
1986, Braithwaite et al 1987, Cotterrell 1992, Baldwin 1995). The US Environmental 
Protection Agency bargains with both polluters and states and local officials in order to reach 
tolerable decisions and secure compliance (Anderson 1975). In Britain prosecution by 
regulatory authorities is relatively rare, being not more than 5% of the offences detected 
(Carson 1970, Gunningham 1974, Cranston 1979, Vogel 1986). In Australia, despite a shift 
towards enforced self-regulation and conciliation after 1970, one study showed seven types 
of regulatory agencies that ranged from being stringent enforcers to being largely 
conciliators, but none used only punishment measures (Braithwaite et al 1987). The mixed 
strategies used are hoped to enhance organisational flexibility in coping with the complex 
and uncertain enforcement situation and to reduce the burden of inadequate levels of staff. 
Theoretically, legalistic enforcement is the predominant TFDA strategy for pharmacies. This 
is in contradiction to the notion that legalism alone does not function well where the majority 
of the regulated are lawbreakers (Packer 1968), which is the case for pharmacies in 
Bangkok. Enforcers can be easily demoralised due to the overwhelming number of cases, 
seeing no hope for improvement, and feeling indifferent to offences (Hudson 1997, Bagaric 
2001). This is mainly due to the limits of punishment in changing offenders' behaviour, since 
it is known that most offenders do not change their behaviour even if punished (Bandura 
1969, Bagaric 2001, McLaughlin and Munice 2001). Besides, legalism can create very 
difficult situations for regulatory agencies. The insufficient numbers of staff means that only a 
minor proportion of the regulated are inspected and charged, which may become selective 
and cause resentment among the regulated. Offenders can appeal, political influence may 
be involved and the enforcement activity may finally be cancelled, which has occurred in the 
TFDA. This undermines inspectors' authority. 
Legalism does not promote organisations' efficiency in many instances, and it seems that 
TFDA inspectors recognise this and adjust their decisions. First, most regulatory agencies 
normally have inadequate levels of staff to inspect frequently enough to ensure regulatory 
observance. The TFDA inspectors can at best achieve an annual average of pharmacy 
inspection of only 21.3% of total pharmacies in Bangkok. This indicates the extreme 
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insufficiency of staff numbers. Coverage would be even lower if legal actions were applied to 
all offences detected because prosecution takes a much longer time - three to five days per 
case compared to the 30 minutes if offences are not reported (Baldwin 1995, Interviews). 
Second, severe and non-severe offences would be treated the same, with no prioritising, if 
legalism is used. Twelve inspectors to deal with 5,038 licensed premises plus outlets selling 
drugs without licences strongly suggests a need to prioritise the actions of the TFDA. 
Most regulatory agencies depend on inspectors' expertise and experience in the field to 
enhance their capacity. Inspectors are allowed certain levels of discretion so only cases 
considered by inspectors to deserve full prosecution are taken up. The US Occupational 
Safety and Health Agency divides violations into five levels based on severity, and 
inspectors can impose different fines on-site for violations in the lower levels. Inspectors of 
the Royal Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain can give verbal warnings for minor 
infringements, but more serious cases are referred to the Society's Council for further 
consideration. The TFDA inspectors' use of their professional jUdgement, in fact, is in line 
with many regulatory agencies as the way to maximise the efficiency of organisations, 
except it is not officially accepted. 
Ironically, the legalistic rhetoric, though required by the TFDA for its inspectors, is not 
followed by the TFDA itself. Numerous examples of infringement of rules were found in this 
study - from the establishment of the VAC, the VAC decisions, cases brought to the NDC 
and the GMP inspection policy (see sections 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3.2). These measures seem to 
circumvent strict adherence to the laws, and reflect many aspects of the Thai context, 
acknowledgement of low levels of knowledge among the regulated, the Thai social 
characteristic of compromising, the MOPH ethos of 'help not punish', and the existence of 
powerful business influences. The situation suggests that in reality the Thai context is not 
suitable for strict enforcement. Besides, the general situation in the TFDA shows a decline in 
enforcement interest. The TFDA itself has become a multifunction organisation with a 
greater budget towards education. Inspector staff numbers have been relatively eroded over 
time in comparison to other types of staff. Overall, the general context does not encourage 
inspectors to use the harsh enforcement required by the Drug Act 1967. By promoting a 
legalistic enforcement of pharmacies, but actually allowing considerable flexibility, the TFDA 
gives out a mixed message, creating friction for the inspectorate. 
Policies are sometimes not explicitly expressed but are reflected in the organisation's 
decisions (Anderson 1975). This was found in this study. The TFDA annual policy 
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announcement, and particularly in certain years, e.g.1997-1998, promoted strict 
enforcement. But enforcement has had minimal impact, since the TFDA policy is not 
vigorously implemented (Hongsamoot 2000). On the contrary, inspectors have adopted the 
flexible TFDA decisions as their policy, such as the VAC exemption in taking legal action on 
grocery stores selling drugs without licence. Another example was the victory of the RPA in 
the four main arguments with the TFDA (see 4.4.1.2). Although in principal, independence of 
regulatory agencies should be unimpaired, it is not always the case. Inspectors perceive the 
pharmaceutical business to be powerful, and may want to avoid difficult situations by 
performing strict enforcement only if necessary. Political influence does not exist only in 
Thailand, but seems to be universal for regulatory agencies. Many studies in the US show 
the changes between deregulation and re-regulation during 1970s to 1990s due to the 
change of presidential administration (Barnett 1990, Dempsey 1994). 
Friction with legalistic enforcement is apparent not only with the TFDA administration, and 
the general Thai and MOPH context, but also within the inspectorate body. This study 
suggests that the TFDA inspectors share the educational line of other inspectors, that they 
are doing a professional job not merely taking offenders to court. Consequently, they often 
use bargaining techniques or education rather than heavy-handed measures. The legalistic 
rhetoric is, thus, contradictory to inspectors' intentions. The bureaucratic administration that 
requires rule-bound decisions is clearly not compatible with how inspectors view themselves, 
which is often a problem found in regulatory agencies (Anderson 1975, Morgan 1997, 
Fincham and Rhodes 1999, Handy 1999). 
Drawing from this study, it seems that the nature of the inspection job is full of friction, 
anticipated and felt; inspectors do not like confrontation with powerful businesses, methods 
for enforcing regulations, hostile reactions from the regulated, or to feel themselves 
unwelcome at pharmacies. In general, they try to decrease confrontation by taking into 
account the objectives of their job and their own safety. Threats or assaults do not occur 
only with the TFDA inspectors but with other inspectors as well (Frank 1984). The safety 
issue, another clash with the legal rhetoric, may be one cause of inspectors' cautious use of 
authority. 
In general, inspectors are viewed as a bridging mechanism to reduce pitfalls occurring 
between regulations and management systems (Rhodes 1981, Bardach and Kagan 1982, 
Hawkins and Thomas 1984). However, this concept does not seem to be recognised in the 
TFDA. Based on this study, I would argue that the rule-bound nature of the TFDA does not 
112 
Chapter 6: Discussion and Recommendations 
benefit the agency, or take advantage of inspectors' expertise and experience in the field. 
Regulatory agencies would be better off designing enforcement strategies that are practical 
and effective. 
Regulatory authorities perform in context, such as business influence and culture, and within 
limitations in their administrations and punishment measures. Flexibility is thus generally 
adopted as a measure to cope better with the complexity in the real world, and to overcome 
problems caused by regulations and management. The results of this study suggest that the 
TFDA principle of legalistiC enforcement clashes with the context and inspectors' views and 
attitudes, and consequently does not produce effective enforcement as intended. 
6.2.2 Conflict with the Drug Act 1967 
This study suggests that inspectors' conflict with the 1967 Act is an essential factor in not 
using their legal authority, and reinforces the notion that implementors are, in fact, active 
participants in the implementation process (Hjern and Porter 1981, Walt 1994, 1998, Walt 
and Gilson 1994) and they adjust policies along the implementation process (Lipsky 1980). 
This section shows that implementation deficits occur when implementors' views and 
attitudes are incompatible with the organisations' goals. It is thus essential that implementors 
understand and agree with the policy they are implementing (Sabatier 1986, Hogwood and 
Gunn 1984), and that in formulating policy, implementation is seen as a strategic part of the 
policy process (Walt 1994). For effective policy implementation, it is necessary that potential 
problems be considered in advance of implementation itself and that appropriate procedures 
are designed into the programme (Hogwood and Gunn 1984, Cotterrell1992, Baldwin 1995, 
Walt 1998). However, this does not always happen since the process of making policy is 
often separated from the implementation process. 
This separation is evident in the TFDA. The various Drug Acts have been drafted with 
minimal contribution from inspectors. Consultation of inspectors in the enforcement process 
is also rare. Those involved in law making view inspectors as mere implementation 'agents', 
which may be a result of the top-down administrative style used in the TFDA (Sabatier 
1986), and may reflect power centralisation in the bureaucracy. The bureaucratic 
organisational structure of the division of labour may also contribute to high 
compartmentalisation in decision-making (Collins 1994, Morgan 1997). Further, the 
fragmented TFDA management process has contributed to the separation between policy 
formulation and implementation (Hongsamoot 2000). This separation may explain some of 
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the antagonistic views expressed between those non-inspectors who normally have stronger 
voices in the legalistic and regulatory process, and inspectors who view themselves as 
professionals who know the situation best 'at street level' and feel their decisions are based 
on better rationale. 
Generally, people with a power orientation - inspectors - will have different goals and 
ideologies from those with a role orientation - lawmakers (Handy 1999). Inspectors want a 
practical not utopian law that is based on the Thai situation. Lawmakers, on the other hand, 
want a 'good law', modelled on Acts from developed countries (Tanasit 1996, Aswawilai 
1999). They are not involved in responsibility for implementation. This difference in goals and 
roles would cause conflict (Fincham and Rhodes 1999, Handy 1999), as indeed this study 
shows. In addition to conflict, the distrust expressed in the interviews on both sides (for 
example, in the issues of giving discretion to inspectors and the VAC decisions) also 
jeopardises the possibility of successful implementation, which usually involves responsibility 
and trust of involved officers (Lane 1987). 
Lack of constructive interaction and negotiation between the two groups does not benefit 
organisations (Pressman and Widalsky 1973, Lipsky 1980) and affects implementation. The 
separation between inspectors and non-inspectors in the TFDA means that the Act is mainly 
based on legal experts' views, and tends not to be responsive to the real situation. Problems 
in executing the Act in the field are not considered. At the same time, inspectors lack the 
opportunity to learn the rationale and justification behind regulations, which would enhance 
their understanding and help their decision-making. Lack of consultation inflates inspectors' 
conflict with the Act and reduces their agreement and commitment to enforce the Act. 
Inspectors' disagreements with the contents of the Act and sanctions proposed deserve 
attention. Many studies in Thailand support inspectors' perceptions that the list of Household 
remedies should be expanded, and that Ready-packed drugs should be included in the 
Household Remedy list (Chuengsatiansup et al 2000). Efforts in using regulation to change 
drug consumption behaviour against the established beliefs without using education 
measures have been found ineffective and sometimes caused new problems due to 
products shifting (Sringernyuang et al1991, Jarupach et al1992, Bhutta and Balchin 1996). 
Sanctions can deter not only offenders but also inspectors. Imposing criminal punishment to 
'white-collar' offenders is usually not straightforward. First, it has been difficult to impose 
criminal sanctions against high-status offenders due to their roles in the society (Benson 
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2001). Second, inspectors, not only the TFDA inspectors, always justify their decisions as 
well as differentiating offenders in relation to sanctions imposed by regulations, instead of 
complying with laws which usually adopt 'the worst case scenario' principle (Baldwin 1990, 
Kerwin 1994). Nevertheless, the lack of clarity and uncertainty of harm caused by white-
collar crime does not allow easy justification for inspectors and even for courts. It has been 
argued that tobacco control in the US is not always effective because the police and courts 
do not believe in its danger despite heavy educational campaigns (Jacobson and 
Wasserman 1999). 
With unclear and uncertain harm caused by pharmaceutical products (Abraham 1993), plus 
the socially accepted status of offenders, this would inevitably mitigate against sanctions to 
be imposed on offenders by inspectors. Consequently, as seen from this study, heavy 
sanctions tend to induce reluctance in inspectors to formally note offences. Inspectors seem 
to use the concept of proportionality as used in criminal justice, for example an offender 
should be handed a sentence that is in accordance with what his/her act deserves, and 
mitigating circumstances should be taken into account (Bagaric 2001, McLaughlin and 
Munice 2001). This creates conflict between TFDA lawmakers and executives who want to 
promote greater deterrence across-the-board, and inspectors who usually take many factors 
into account to differentiate offenders and justify their decisions. 
Using discretion and justification is viewed an important part of exercising inspectors' 
authority to minimise drawbacks which laws or enforcement processes may possess 
(Rhodes 1981, Bardach and Kagan 1982, Hawkins and Thomas 1984). The nature of 
justifying decisions leads to more conflict in enforcing the 1967 Act when offences need to 
go to court, that is, need to be dealt with outside the TFDA sphere. The majority of TFDA 
inspectors shared the feeling with other inspectors that criminal sanctions are usually too 
heavy, especially for first-time offenders. The across-the-board nature of the Act - sellers, 
manufacturers, importers assigned in the same range of penalty despite having different 
scale of impact and let the court decide - aggravates this conflict. Across-the-board 
sanctions are seen as highly undesirable by inspectors - but not by managers and 
executives - because of their uncertainty. Inspectors cannot be certain of what penalty 
offenders will incur. Uncertainty is an underlying cause of stress and may induce easier 
decisions (Handy 1999). In such cases inspectors may control results by using their own 
discretion, justified by a different set of criteria than those set out in the law. 
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6.2.3 Constraints in the TFDA enforcement management system 
Management is responsible for organising the conditions and methods of operation so that 
people can achieve their own goals best by directing their own efforts towards organisational 
objectives (McGregor 1960). Successful implementation, thus, relies on good and 
appropriate management, and where implementation is largely seen as a technical process 
deficits occur (Walt 1994). Exploration of the management system in this study revealed no 
aspect that supported the TFDA's legalistic rhetoric. Pharmacy inspection is not prioritised. 
Most of the inspector's efforts were spent on manufacturer's GMP inspection, which provides 
better professional self-growth and career ladders for inspectors. The TFDA legal process 
requires much more work, especially cases with imprisonment. Evidence required for 
prosecution is complex and daunting. The monitoring system, in general, is weak. Job 
promotion and appraisal are perceived to be subjective and inspectors felt that they could 
not necessarily be free from business influences. 
Considering those constraints, I would argue, based on the result of the study, that the TFDA 
seems to perform enforcement as a symbolic activity, rather than aiming to decrease 
violations. In addition to the management constraints, enforcement at the pharmacy level is 
mainly left to inspectors to decide with little systematic involvement from the agency; 
inspection is used as the main enforcement strategy, despite inadequate numbers of 
inspectors, and the system does little to support or promote inspectors. 
In most countries, inspectors usually play important roles due to their expertise in the field 
(Blackie 1970, Rhodes 1981). This is in big contrast to the TFDA inspectors, who are 
separated from lawmakers and executives who make decisions on their behalf. They are not 
recognised for their expertise in the field, while those working in administration have higher 
status. Their perceived inferiority in relation to their peers affects their morale and motivation. 
With this kind of mindset, strict enforcement is unlikely to be pursued because of the 
confrontation and adverse effects possibly occurring. The effects may be considered as 
negative reinforcement which produce two actions - escape or avoidance - which could 
deter their decision to take legal action (Fincham and Rhodes 1999). 
The TFDA administration is fragmented and it is job-oriented rather than problem-based 
management (Hongsamoot 2000). These administrative problems cause difficulties in pulling 
together different parties to solve problems. From my participation in the inspector's annual 
plan meeting, the discussions were mainly based on how many inspections were to be 
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conducted without considering using resources from other divisions. Participants were all 
inspectors, except one from the TFDA Evaluation Section, Technical Division. Participation 
and consultation between different groups are rare (Hongsamoot 2000), which, in terms of 
management, is not fruitful for organisations (Fincham and Rhodes 1999). 
Lack of participation in the VAC decision process is another area of conflict, and this study 
found that the VAC has a closed system of decision-making, which excludes even those 
inspectors who have reported cases. Ambiguity in the VAC decisions, with minimal inspector 
participation and without feedback information, could de motivate inspectors as well as create 
tension and distrust (Fincham and Rhodes 1999, Handy 1999). In comparison, the 
adjudication process used by the Royal Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain is more 
open. Apart from the committee members, inspectors, defendants, as well as media are 
present. 
While in many countries, inspection is considered a prestigious, well-paid and highly 
competitive job (Blackie 1970, Kelman 1981, personal communication), TFDA inspectors 
have the same (relatively low) salary as ordinary civil servants. This means that many take a 
second job to reduce the discrepancy between their public sector wage and what they might 
earn in the private sector. Most inspectors are professionals-in-charge of pharmacies or drug 
importers. These two roles are not compatible and possibly lead to stress due to role conflict 
(Handy 1999). To decrease the stress, inspectors may try to rationalise their decisions. One 
inspector said 'No one can exactly follow the Act, even I can't do it myself, how can I enforce 
other people do it?'. That reaction, plus the fact they are themselves acting as pharmacists 
out of hours, would be one explanation for their lenient views in certain violations. Although 
the 1996 WHO Guideline for Inspection of Drug Distribution Channels does not clearly 
address the issues of independence and conflicts of interest, having a double role in such 
cases, inspectors can be seen as having a vested interest in weak enforcement, which may 
possibly lead to biased decision-making. Having double roles is particularly restricted in the 
US under the 'Ethics in Govemment Reform Act 1989', which prohibits federal employees 
from engaging in outside employment or any other outside activity that conflicts with their 
duties, especially with financial interest (Roberts 1994). 
The TFDA inspectors' roles are not documented, but the preferred role, suggested from 
interviews, is likely to be as educator rather than enforcer, compromising rather than sticking 
to the rules. Their adopted role, possibly passed on through inspectors' on-the-job training, is 
clearly against the TFDA legalism expectations. While on-the-job training is good in the 
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sense of creating high cohesion among inspectors, it may also create high peer influence or 
groupthink and lead to less reflexivity (Fincham and Rhodes 1999). So, it seems that 
inspector's decisions are quite similar, leading to what Foucault calls 'normalising judgement' 
involving 'the establishment of limits of accepted behaviour, standards to be achieved' 
(Foucault cited in Fincham and Rhodes 1999; 263). Those who comply are rewarded, but 
anyone falling outside the routine is automatically defined as deviant. In addition, decisions 
made in the same way are less likely to be criticised and ease the tension that may exist in 
using discretion (Silveria 1998). Peer pressure has a strong influence and decisions made 
can be adopted without thorough or critical thinking on the impact on enforcement. This is 
indicated by inspectors' reluctance to confirm the effectiveness of their substituted measures 
- the measures they have perceived as practical , morally accepted and been applied over 
20 years. 
Monitoring and evaluating inspection work is usually difficult due to the lack of appropriate 
criteria (see section 2.5). The TFDA role ambiguity may hamper these weaknesses. The 
historical use of discretion by inspectors and the problems of under-recording without 
scrutiny show the weak TFDA management systems of monitoring and evaluating job 
performance. Weak monitoring systems can lead to ignorance or laxity (Scholz 1994). From 
interviews, inspectors admitted that they were more stringent on complaint cases than 
routine ones because they were monitored. 
The complicated prosecution process also plays a part in discouraging legal action, 
especially in cases that inspectors considered not serious. From their experience, it can take 
five workdays per case. This is significant when they try to meet the targets set for them in 
the annual plan, targets which they feel are already overloaded. Consequently, cases with 
evidentiary problems are not brought to the TFDA; inspectors have learnt from their senior's 
or their own experiences that such cases are not usually prosecuted. This is done without 
approval from the TFDA but with the inspector's sense of saving time and resources, and to 
avoid being stigmatised as incompetent. 
An adequate level of staff is one condition for successful implementation (Hogwood and 
Gunn 1984). Lack of staff is a fundamental problem in regulatory agencies, including the 
TFDA, because inspection is a labour intensive job. The problem drives regulatory agencies 
to employ various strategies to compensate for lack of staff, as discussed in 6.2.1, but this is 
not the case for the TFDA. The insufficiency of staff is unlikely to be solved in the short run 
due to the Thai government downsizing policy. In combination with other constraints in the 
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TFDA enforcement system, the TFDA inspectors are convinced that using their professional 
judgement together with their substituted measures is the best strategy in the light of 
insufficient staff. 
6.3 Conclusion 
This thesis has reviewed the sensitive issue regarding the use of inspectors' authority. The 
study emphasises the importance of choosing the particular blend of strategies that fit with 
the agency's enforcement problems and context, and shows that where this does not occur a 
clash or conflict arises, resulting in deficits in implementation. The research suggests that 
implementors' understanding and agreement with policy should be of great concern to 
prevent adjustment or ignorance, their conflicts should be recognised and minimised. 
Implementation should be considered an interactive process, not merely 'top-down' activities; 
communication between implementors and lawmakers should be built into the whole process 
of law making and enforcement. Enforcement should be integrated as a part of legislative 
process where potential problems are considered in advance, together with the view of using 
other supplementary measures to achieve effective enforcement. The appropriate 
enforcement management process is important to help inspectors work in accordance with 
the organisation's goals and objectives. 
Inspectors reflect the aforementioned problems in terms of what they take into consideration 
in their decision-making. Analysis from the empirical data shows that there are certain 
technical factors inspectors collectively used to decide their actions. The factors involved are 
demonstrated in Table 6.1 below. To induce inspectors to use more of the official sanctions, 
the TFDA administration should aim at ameliorating the factors and their conditions in the far 
right column of Table 6.1, which are elaborated in more detail in 6.4. 
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Table 6.1: The salient factors considered by inspectors before making decisions 
Decisions 
Factors Likely to take legal action Unlikely to take leJtal action 
1. Harm or risk of offence Clear and certain Unclear or not certain 
2.The perceived impact of High Low 
violation on health 
3. How easy the offences can Easy Difficult 
be identified by the regulated 
4. Level of legal control High Low 
5. Penalty level Fine Imprisonment 
6. Feasibility of prosecution High Low 
7. Type of inspection Complaint Routine 
8. Burden to inspectors Little Heavy 
9. Effects of sanctions Cause changes Cause no changes 
10.Type of offence Sporadic Widespread 
6.4 Recommendations 
Four main potential areas of recommendations drawn from this research are suggested to 
decrease the implementation gap. They are built up around the four elements of Walt and 
Gilson's policy analysis framework. 
6.4.1 Inspectors' views and attitudes 
This study shows that inspectors' decisions rely on their professional knowledge and 
experience to make judgements rather than what is required by the 1967 Act. Peer influence 
through on-the-job training, the Thai national social value and socialisation process are likely 
to playa part in their attitude to the work that they do as well as their decisions. However, 
none of these issues facilitates the use of legal authority. Inspectors should be constantly 
tailored in relation to TFDA expectations as to how they should operate and the underlying 
rationale or reasons. Clear perception and clear roles are essential for organisations' 
expectations to be met (Vroom 1967). These are aimed to decrease the friction seen in this 
study. However, this will occur only when the TFDA makes clear its enforcement style, which 
is one recommendation suggested in 6.4.4. 
Regardless of TFDA enforcement style, inspectors should be more regularly and structurally 
trained, not only for work procedures as it is now (Inspection Training Curriculum 1992-1999) 
but also for the technical issues focusing on harm, risk or health impact of violation. This is to 
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overcome inspectors' tend-to-be lax decisions usually found in cases with unclear or 
uncertain harm indicated in this study. The TFDA may need to shift its research theme from 
situation analysis (Srikomol 1997) towards exploration of the cause of problems and health 
impact in the Thai communities. Such exhaustive knowledge and information does not only 
help inspectors make more appropriate judgement, but it could help in balancing peer 
pressures among inspectors and enhance standardised decisions. 
Apart from more structured training programmes, inspectors should be given time for regular 
meetings among themselves to discuss problems they encounter. This includes workshops 
or meetings for drug inspectors across the country. Regular group discussion would not only 
help inspectors release pressure and get encouragement from their peers, but would help 
bring confidence to their decisions as well as to discuss for better alternatives (Kelman 
1981). 
Stressing the significance of the job is another way to strengthen inspectors' motivation to 
overcome the difficulties and deficits in their work. The TFDA training programmes have 
never aimed at this type of objective. For example, how inspection can save people's lives 
from using fake, deteriorated or expired drugs. This kind of training is used in the US 
Occupational Health and Safety's inspectors (Kelman 1981). However, this needs to be 
cautioned not to create too strong feeling against the regulated. 
Pharmacy owners and pharmacists should be regularly trained by the TFDA especially on 
regulatory issues such as how to check labels for expiration date or registration number. 
Information to urge regulation compliance should be constantly disseminated to pharmacies 
such as a list of offences and penalties, recent problems found in pharmacies or guidance 
for rational use of medicines. The already co-operative style between the TFDA and the RPA 
would be helpful in arranging such training. This aims not only to decrease offences but to 
assure inspectors that the regulated have enough regulatory and technical knowledge, which 
would give them more comfort in imposing legal actions. 
The problem of inspectors having double roles needs to be re-addressed, though the issue 
was dropped more than twenty years ago due to difficulty in recruiting and maintaining 
inspectors. Independence is required not only for the regulatory agency but also for its 
inspectors to make unbiased judgement. However, solving this problem will be difficult and 
can only be tackled over the long term. One way will be to recognise inspectors as different 
from other civil servants and pay them higher salaries. Another way would be to promote a 
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law that forbids inspectors from playing a role in pharmacies. The potential impact of the 
double role on enforcement should be discussed and consulted in detail among all 
concerned, especially with the Bureau of Budget and Bureau of Civil Servants for legal 
amendment in the future. 
6.4.2 The Drug Act 1967 
The Drug Act was found to be constraining enforcement mainly in two instances - its content 
and its sanctions. Some aspects of the content need revision, and could be applied rapidly; 
for example, expansion of the Household Remedy List and the Ready-packed List, and 
revision of the prescription drug list. Other issues need to be re-visited and may need more 
strategiC measures; for example the issues of selling drugs out of the registered duty hour, 
selling drugs without supervision of professionals-in-charge and absence of professionals-in-
charge. 
Penalties need to be re-designed so they facilitate enforcement. The study has shown how 
heavy sanctions, especially imprisonment, are barriers to imposing inspectors' legal 
authority. The intention of having a strong law should be traded against the possibility of 
using it. This is not to suggest that the Drug Act should abandon its criminal nature, which 
stresses the importance of severe danger caused by some violations and provides a 
deterrent effect. Nevertheless, its disadvantages should be taken into account and more 
appropriate sanctions and penalty levels should be devised. 
Offences and sanctions should be classified in relation to their severity and harm caused, 
instead of imposing across-the-board sanctions as now occurs. This may reduce the 
unwillingness to impose sanctions from all parties concerned. In terms of sanctions, drug 
sellers should be considered separately from manufacturers and importers due to the scale 
and impact of violations. Sellers should also be differentiated between retailers and 
wholesalers. The differentiation would bring more certainty and confidence to inspectors that 
punishment would be within the scope expected and would satisfy their feelings about 
proportionality . 
The evidence or potential harm of drugs that are highly controlled, such as prescription 
drugs, should be made clear to inspectors in order to convince inspectors that sanctions are 
necessary. Training, as mentioned in 6.4.1, can do this. BeSides, new regulations should be 
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interactively addressed to inspectors through meetings, not simply through papers as it is 
now. 
The current criminal sanctions cause conflict for inspectors. Other regulatory authorities try 
to minimise dealing with the police or court in many ways. Using adjudication and imposing 
disciplinary sanctions is one measure, punishing only when violations are conducted 
repeatedly or there is a persistent failure to correct violation is another one (Kelman 1981). 
Giving regulatory agencies authority to fine or giving warning that appears in criminal records 
for the first-time transgressors of offences that carry an imprisonment penalty should be 
considered. The Thai government should equip a wider range of sanctions, leaving the 
serious offences with criminal sanctions for greater deterrence. More varied sanction 
measures would not only reduce conflict because offenders need not go through criminal 
prosecution procedures perceived by inspectors to be too heavy, they would also shorten the 
time spent in the prosecution process. Resources would be used more efficiently too. 
The adjudication process is used in the TFDA through the VAC. However, as it is not 
legitimised by the Act, the VAC cannot function in full and relies on the police and courts to a 
certain extent. If legitimised and authorised to impose disciplinary sanctions, the VAC would 
be more advantageous to the TFDA enforcement. However, the VAC would need to be open 
and transparent in its dealings in order to gain credibility and acceptance from both 
inspectors and the public. 
Some regulatory agencies decentralise authority to inspectors, by grading offences. This 
increases efficiency as well as enhances inspectors' motivation. However, it may not be 
suitable for the Thai context where the public tends to be cautious about the abuse of power 
unless there are clear measures to balance the possibility of misusing such power. Again, 
the TFDA needs to make such measures open and ready to be monitored. 
However, changing or revising laws takes a long time. In the meantime, to alleviate 
constraints caused by the Drug Act 1967, new management measures could be helpful. 
6.4.3 The TFDA enforcement management process 
6.4.3.1 The/nspectlon ptoCe$S 
In the light of the inadequate number of inspectors, their work should be more clearly 
prioritised, and redundant work should be reconsidered and reduced. From my observations, 
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too many reports are demanded of inspectors. Paperwork is the task that inspectors like the 
least about their job (Interviews, Kelman 1981). Instead of writing at least three report forms 
per case, reports could be integrated and reduced to only one form. 
The current follow-up system is daunting. Decisions regarding minor cases should be treated 
as information to create a better targeting system for inspection but should not be followed-
up. Efforts should be pinpointed on those who have previously committed offences as a 
prioritised group. The current routine follow-up practice makes a number of minor cases pile 
up and causes inspectors to feel that their job is unfinished, and then discourages them from 
making records even in cases where they can issue a warning. 
Evidence needed for prosecution should be revised to make it easier to collect. The need for 
proof of selling should be re-considered otherwise the difficulties in data collection itself are 
the barrier to exercising authority. Administrative staff should take over making appointments 
with police, preparing documents related to the cases, and so relieve inspectors of some of 
the time-consuming but essential administrative parts of pursuing violations. This could save 
inspectors time to spend on inspection as well as decrease their frustration in dealing with 
the police. 
6.4.3.2 Participation from Inspectors 
Fragmentation and compartmentalisation in the TFDA bureaucratic administration needs to 
be overcome to minimise the antagonistic views between lawmakers and law-enforcers. 
Participation and consultation with inspectors in any changes, revision or promulgation is 
strongly suggested. With increased participative roles, inspectors would gain more self-
esteem and thus be more motivated and enforce regulations more whole-heartedly (Fincham 
and Rhodes 1999). Instead of having one inspector represented in the TFDA legislative 
process, arranging a workshop for the whole group would enrich input for better, responsive 
regulations. Real problems would be taken into account, which would help balance the over-
protective legal control trend exerted by experts, and thus reduce the gap between intent 
and practice. 
Regular meetings, such as every two months, between enforcers and executives should be 
established. Enforcement problems would be taken into the office to find out solutions, which 
may require support from executive level. The improved communication not only yields more 
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responsive regulations but also enhances inspectors' involvement, interest and increases 
their commitment through better motivation (Handy 1999; 279). 
Motivation theories recognise participation in decision-making as an important factor for 
individual satisfaction (Fincham and Rhodes 1999, Handy 1999). Participation is assumed to 
have its effect because it increases an individual's perception of control and fairness in the 
process (Fincham and Rhodes 1999; 142). Increasing inspectors' participation in the VAG 
process is as important as it is in the legislative process. TFDA inspectors should be present 
in the VAC considerations. Their desire to see the cases through should be fulfilled. 
Knowledge of results or getting feedback about their performance can have considerable 
impact on both motivation and learning (Handy 1999). Participating in the VAG meeting 
would give inspectors the needed sense of control and fairness including feedback and help 
inspectors experience the meaningfulness of their work (Fincham and Rhodes 1999). 
Feedback can also improve relationships in organisation by breaking the compartmentalised 
authority structure (Fincham and Rhodes 1999). By opening the process, ambiguity will be 
minimised, and possibly avoid the feelings of mistrust as well as increase inspectors' 
willingness to send cases for the VAG consideration. 
6.4.3.3 Discretion, code of prectlce and monitoring 
Although centralisation is good in terms of uniformity, there are disadvantages - it can be 
resource consuming, make less immediate action, be less adaptive and less responsive. 
Discretion is essential in real world enforcement as indicated from the literature review and 
the results of this study. Site-level discretion could increase immediate deterrence effects 
imposed on offenders, increase bargaining power for inspectors, increase organisational 
efficiency and increase motivation of inspectors (Bardach and Kagan 1982, Morgan 1997). 
Increasing discretion such as allowing inspectors to make on-the-spot fines would cause 
difficulties to the TFDA and inspectors due to the public mistrust of government officers. The 
pros and cons would have to be exhaustively weighed and explained. But without 
acknowledging the existing uses of discretion, measures to counterbalance misuse cannot 
be introduced in the system, which already has weak monitoring. By acknowledging it, 
organisations could use supplementary methods to prevent bias or misuse. There are many 
ways to monitor - such as re-inspection or joint inspection. However, with the limited number 
of personnel, inspectors' actions in the field are seldom monitored or supervised (Kelman 
1981). In the absence of a strong monitoring system, the TFDA needs to build-up public 
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pressure, including the media, to help monitor violation and inspection in pharmacies. This 
can be done by informing the public of the problems or violation in pharmacies, their health 
impact as well as how pharmacies are regulated, that is increasing public awareness of the 
issues. 
More transparency and accountability are required to ensure appropriate use of discretion 
both at the TFDA and at site-level. Increasing the role of outsiders, such as the media or 
non-governmental organisations, in the TFDA enforcement process would help counter-
balance any interference and declare the TFDA neutrality and good intentions to protect the 
public. For example, the Royal Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain has media 
participating in their disciplinary meetings at which offenders could be reprimanded as well 
as face more serious sanctions; the UK Food Standard Agency has media and the public 
participating in their meetings regarding food safety issues. Some agencies give discretion to 
inspectors but inspectors are required to make citations in all offences detected and be 
ready to clarify and justify their decisions (Kelman 1981). 
Consideration to give inspectors discretion officially would be controversial and take a long 
time. In the meantime, the TFDA should devise remedial measures. The TFDA should 
establish a 'Code of Practice' to help inspectors interpret regulations in more precise actions 
to help their decision-making. A Code of Practice is often used in regulatory agencies. The 
UK Health and Safety Commission establishes an 'Approved Code of Practice and Guideline 
in relation to the Workplace' (Health, Safety and Welfare Regulations 1992). The TFDA, with 
input from inspectors, should develop, first, the criteria of 'weak evidentiary cases', allowing 
these cases not to be charged officially but to be recorded in inspection records for the 
purpose of further follow-up. These cases are currently missing from the TFDA database 
because inspectors usually use their substituted measures and do not record the offences. 
Records of previous history are indicated in the study to prompt more serious legal action. 
Second, the TFDA should prioritise severity of offences. The Code should establish clear 
procedures telling what action needs to be taken in replacement of the legal action. The 
TFDA may be criticised as not following the Act, but there are examples of cases not 
prosecuted by courts, and minor cases that would not be worth the full prosecution process. 
The greater transparency would benefit the public as more cases are brought into the 
system and monitored. 
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6.4.3.4 Advancement, promotion and motivation 
Career advancement would playa significant role in maintaining and motivating inspectors. 
Nevertheless, the TFDA system seems not able to provide enough advancement within the 
system. Currently inspectors are likely to fulfil themselves only through GMP inspection, 
which is perceived as more professional. Inspectors are regularly trained nationally and 
internationally, which increases self-growth - one motivational factor (Handy 1999). More 
thought needs to be given to enhance motivation regarding pharmacy inspection. 
Specialisation in pharmacy inspection may be one consideration. The TFDA might need to 
revise the appropriate proportion between GMP and pharmacy inspection and allocate 
resources accordingly. A group of inspectors responsible mainly for pharmacy inspection is 
one possibility. Being specialists in one area is suggested as a way to increase self-esteem 
- one component of motivation (Collins 1994, Morgan 1997, Fincham and Rhodes 1999). 
The US Food and Drug Administration inspectors are encouraged to become specialists on 
some aspect of their work and to write about it or give cases for other inspectors (Bardach 
and Kagan 1982). There is much less advancement for pharmacy than GMP inspection, and 
the TFDA needs to bring the former into line with the latter. 
6.4.4 Enforcement strategies 
Results from this and independent studies show a high incidence of various breaches in the 
law, and the limitations of using legal authority. This suggests that the current TFDA 
enforcement policy and practice need to be reconsidered. The lack of inspectors' willingness 
to charge those committing widespread violations is clearly a result of using only inspection 
and punishment without support from executives to combine other supplementary measures. 
There are many enforcement alternatives. The appropriate enforcement style should be 
identified by considering number of staff, the Thai culture, business influence, problems in 
the health care system and other context. Having effective enforcement is complex, thus it is 
important to select a combination of strategies that would compensate deficits and fit with the 
context. 
A co-operative enforcement style is one possibility that may fit the Thai system better than 
the punishment style. This style is used by many regulatory authorities in Sweden, Australia 
and Japan (Kelman 1981, Braithwaite et a11987, Aoki 2000). Although co-operation between 
the TFDA and RPA seems to be established at a certain level, it has not been used 
systematically in the whole enforcement system. By using a co-operative system in a more 
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structured and official way, other measures could be introduced such as giving certificates, 
self-regulation, increasing community awareness. Meanwhile, mass education, reinforcing 
non-governmental organisations' participation in the TFDA processes would strengthen 
enforcement without increasing the number of inspectors. Other options include consultation 
with professional organisations. However, the TFDA needs to espouse more clearly its 
expectations of its inspectors, which will give clearer enforcement direction. 
To change the strategy is difficult especially when dealing with the pharmaceutical industry, 
which the global sales of prescription drugs and some aTe were £ 156 billion (Anon. 2002), 
and which is known to have a powerful influence in both international and domestic arenas 
(Dukes 1985, Drake and Uhlman 1993). The TFDA may need to identify the need for change 
and convince all parties involved to reinforce the changes. Participation from parties outside 
the TFDA would counter-balance business pressure as well as the TFDA instability due to 
frequent SG reshuffles. The TFDA should analyse successful conditions regarding the GMP 
strategy and adapt them to bring better compliance in pharmacies. 
Analysing the magnitude of problems caused by violation in pharmacies compared to those 
of manufacturers and importers is suggested in order to allocate resources proportionally. 
Studies of harm, risk or health impact occurring in the field, suggested in 6.4.1, would not 
only be useful for inspectors' better decisions, but are also important to gain attention from 
policy-makers' and the public in order to mobilise more needed resources. In the area of 
traffic accidents, which has recently been on the national agenda, health and economic loss 
is addressed more clearly, such as how helmets can prevent death and injuries and save the 
MOPH budget (Chartbunchachai 1993). This strategy would comply with the principle of risk 
management, which is the new trend of regulatory control (Adams 1999, Braithwaite 2000, 
Francis et al 2001). 
But as the problem is the result of a bureaucratic system, it is not easy to solve. Overcoming 
constraints within the TFDA, especially the desire to hold onto the power instead of 
decentralising to inspectors, will not be easy. The different enforcement attitudes between 
inspectors and managers who are not inspectors also requires some mutual understanding 
and acceptance. Although the change of the TFDA enforcement philosophy may not happen 
suddenly, it is necessary and this issue may require re-visiting in the future. 
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6.6 Limitations of the study 
While every attempt has been made to comply robust and rigorous methods of design and 
analysis in this study, some limitations need to be acknowledged, not only for methodological 
overview (described in chapter 3) but to assist readers in determining the reproducibility and 
generalisability of these results in other countries. 
The small number of interviewees is one weakness, although all those involved in TFDA 
pharmacy inspection in the TFDA were recruited. In compensation, they were interviewed 
until information was saturated. Also interviews will have been influenced by the Thai 
context, which may be different from other countries. Another limitation of this study, though 
part of its strength, was that it focused only on the role of inspectors of pharmacy, who are 
only one part of the whole pharmacy regulation. Inspectors were from the Drug Control 
Division of the TFDA and represented inspection of pharmacies in Bangkok only. Although 
this group of inspectors shares a number of commonalities with other types of inspectors, 
such as being civil servants, working in a government ministry, and working within similar 
context, some issues are specific to this particular group. Generalisation, therefore, while 
valid for all pharmacy inspectors in Thailand, will need to be cautiously applied to inspectors 
in other countries. 
There are a number of stakeholders acting in the enforcement process, inspectors are only 
one group and are largely engaged in the implementation of regulations. The research did 
not explore other stakeholders' views of inspection such as pharmacists. This was a 
deliberate decision, largely based on pragmatic reasons of time and resources (see chapter 
3). Nor did the research explore extensively the policy formulation process - the process by 
which the Drug Act 1967 was promulgated and amended. Greater understanding of the 
stakeholders in policy formulation as well as other groups involved, and how the different 
influences were exercised might have given greater explanatory power to the way inspectors 
perceived their role in the TFDA. 
Being an insider researcher had huge advantages, in terms of rapport, gaining access to 
material, and acceptance among a small, relatively close group. However, I acknowledge 
that my own educational training as a pharmacist may have biased me in my interpretation of 
the data from interviewees, and also may have limited my understanding of social science 
and psychological perspectives in analysis. I may not have been sensitive enough to capture 
the hidden meanings in the interviews, which may be relevant for a greater understanding or 
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deep explanation of the problems. Attempts were made to overcome the possible 
weaknesses from training at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (see 
chapter 3). 
6.7 Contribution to knowledge 
In spite of some limitations, this study has contributed to knowledge in a number of ways. It 
confirms other research that suggests that policy implementation should not be viewed as 
separate from the policy making process, and that where this occurs, implementation deficits 
result. Interaction between the many parties concerned is significant to the success of 
implementation. The study also shows that only having policy, even if supported by law, 
cannot guarantee successful implementation. Conducive conditions are essential. 
There has been little research on the policy process in developing countries and this study 
therefore adds to the few studies that exist, deepening the understanding of such process in 
Thailand. 
In relevance to enforcement studies in other countries, most studies found are conducted in 
developed countries and mostly in the areas of pollution, and occupational safety and health. 
This study adds empirical support that inspectors' decisions are multi-componented. A 
number of similarities are found in terms of inspectors' views and attitudes on their jobs, their 
authority and their views in using discretion as a useful tool to achieve their work. 
Professional knowledge and exhaustive information provided for inspectors are always 
important in making concrete enforcement decisions. The TFDA views on its inspectors are 
limited compared to the views of other regulatory authorities, which are likely to use 
inspectors as experts in bringing regulatory compliance through flexibility and various 
enforcement strategies. 
In the area of enforcement in pharmacies, information generated by this study fills the gap of 
understanding of the role of pharmacy inspection and the problems inspectors encounter in 
their work. This study is the first in Thailand to provide this scientific analysis. The problems 
detected in the study will help policy makers to design and implement more appropriate and 
more sCientifically accepted strategies for enforcing regulations. The greater understanding 
generated from this study will illuminate how various policy options can best be structured to 
achieve desired outcomes. 
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The research helps to point out factors possibly adversely affecting enforcement, that have 
been taken for granted and which hopefully will raise concern from policy makers. One 
outstanding example is the issue of inspectors' double role as enforcer and professional-in-
charge. By raising this as a potential conflict of interest, this research may begin a process of 
re-constitution of laws regarding double-roles, especially since it comes with an insider's 
perspective. 
The TFDA is currently undergoing decentralisation, passing its authority to the Bangkok 
Metropolitan Authority. Pharmacy inspection is one target of the decentralisation, and the 
TFDA will have only a supervisory role in the future. Based on interviews the study has 
concluded the salient conditions against imposing legal authority and the lessons learnt from 
this study will be useful in order to avoid problems in the future. 
6.8 Direction for future research 
This study is only a piece of the whole enforcement picture. There are a number of potential 
areas that could throw further light on problems in using legal authority entailing more in-
depth research. The study result should be used to build up more in-depth research. Studies 
of other groups of stakeholders such as drug sellers, professionals-in-charge and customers 
would give a deeper understanding of the issues around violation and regulation from 
different angles. Issues of corruption should be explored. Constraints raised by inspectors 
should be tested with other groups. It may also be useful to compare other groups of 
inspectors who use different regulations to see if there are lessons from other fields. 
Problems or constraints suggested by this study should be investigated in more detail. For 
example, the Drug Act 1967, which is often raised as conflictual, should be explored in 
relation to the appropriateness of its criminal nature, types of sanctions and level of penalty. 
The advantage and disadvantage of the VAC closed consideration should also be an issue 
of further study. Some of the recommendations suggested may need to be tested first 
through small studies and convince policymakers to gather more evidence. 
The limitation of primarily using inspectors to enforce regulation indicated from this research 
could be used as a starting point to investigate the possibility of moving enforcement in 
pharmacy to a broader perspective, for example, by enhancing public awareness, increasing 
education or introducing incentive enforcement measures. Research would be needed to 
explore the most efficient model. 
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This study shows conflict within the organisation and a weak communication system. In this 
situation participatory action research might be an appropriate method to conduct research 
to test various methods of improving communication. The method would bring together 
officers having antagonistiC or different views, consultation would be brought in through the 
research process and compartmentalisation would be broken down. Consequently, the study 
results might be more accepted through mutual recognition and understanding and thus 
would be easier to implement. 
Pharmacy inspection by the TFDA inspectors has been conducted for more than 20 years. 
Problems regarding enforcing the Drug Act 1967 have been subject to complaint by 
inspectors but with no systematic review. This study investigated problems preventing 
inspectors from using their legal authority fully. However, this is only a preliminary step for 
such a highly-impact issue like enforcement. Further research in each component raised in 
this study is essential to bring more in-depth and concrete evidence in order to communicate 
with policy-makers for changes. Further research could bring mutual recognition and 
understanding among parties concerned for developing solutions to solve the problems from 
within. 
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Section and sub-section 
Annex 1 
The current OeD staff 
( 30 June 2001) 
Number of staff 
Pharmacy Non-bachelor 
background degree background 
1. The Research and Development Section 9 2 
-Planning and evaluation 2 -
-Research 2 -
-System development 1 -
-Regulation development 1 -
-Product classification 2 -
-Information and database 1 -
2. The Pre-marketing Control Section 30 10 
-New drugs 5 -
-Generic drugs 11 -
-Biological products 4 -
-Traditional drugs 5 -
-Advertisement control 5 -
3. The Post-marketing Control Section 19 3 
-Supportive team 2 -
-Evidence compilation 2 -
-Premises licensing 3 -
-Inspection 12 -
Annexes 
Annex 2 
Document Pro Forma 
1. Regulations 
- The Drug Act 1967 
- The Penal Code 1956 
- The Drug Act Revision Working Group meeting minutes 
- MOPH ministerial and TFDA orders 
Issues I Check list items I Description 
1. The Drug Act 1967 
The pharmacy licensing Legal requirements detail 
system 
The scope of the regulations Issues regulated identified by clauses of the Act detail 
required for pharmacy e.g. quality of medicinal drugs, manner of 
practice stated in the Act practices 
Clarity of the Act All technical terms are defined yes/no- detail 
exceptions 
No contradiction between any controlled issues yes/no - detail 
exceptions 
Logic of the Act All the regulations are still in practice yes/no, detail 
(will be checked also at interview) 
Loopholes in the Act All actions are regulated consecutively yes/no 
All offences have penalty yes/no 
Authority given to officers Legal authority of officers in charge detail 
regarding pharmacy 
inspection 
Authority given is the same for all officers yes/no 
Authority given covers all regulated activities, yes/no 
including related activities 
Authority is given to issue verbal warning yes/no 
Authority is given to issue warning letters yes/no 
Authority is given to collect data and then yes/no 
proceed to the police authority 
Authority is given to assign community work yes/no 
Authority is given to assign continuing education yes/no 
Authority is given to seize offenders yes/no 
All authorities given can be exercised fully by yes/no 
inspectors themselves 
All authorities given can be exercised by yes/no 
inspectors directly when violations are found 
Inspectors are protected by the Criminal Law in yes/no 
the same way as policeman 
Sanctions Range of sanctions detail 
Characteristics of sanctions detail 
Maximum imprisonment sentences handed down detail and case 
Minimum imprisonment sentences handed down detail and case 
Minimum fine issued detail and case 
Maximum fine issued detail and case 
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Matching of violations and sanctions; then detail 
analyse how the measures are used in various 
types of violation 
List measures to encourage compliance detail 
List measures to deter offenders detail 
2. The Penal Code 1956 
The scope that relates to the Find out issues that would hinder or facilitate the detail 
Drug Act 1967 use of inspectors' authority 
3. The Drug Act Revision Working Group meeting minutes 
How the regulations are Composition of the working group detail 
drafted 
Inputs used in the drafting process detail 
4. MOPH and TFDA orders 
Contents of the orders Explanation of rationale: adequacy and clarity detail 
2. Inspection records 1980 - 1996 
Issues Check list items Description 
The records where violations Range, minimum and maximum time spent by time spent 
are found inspectors on each type of violation 
Describe the written actions identified from those detail by types of 
records by type of violations violations 
Describe evidence needed identified from those detail by types of 
records by type of violations violations 
Were all records written in the same pattern? yes/no 
Did all records contain all the necessary yes/no 
information? Compare with manuals or 
handbooks, if any. 
Cases that prosecution decisions did not comply detail/number 
with the prosecution guideline 
How often were inspectors' decision reversed? statistics and 
detail 
The records where violations Range, minimum and maximum of time spent on time spent 
are not found those cases 
The records required for Action furthering the orders to make follow-up cases that 
follow-up corrections are 
not made 
All inspection records Find irregularities, special orders, special cases detail 
3. Prosecution process and prosecution profiles 
-VAC Guideline. 
-VAC meeting minutes. 1995 -2000. The Regulatory Affairs Unit, TFDA, MOPH 
-Prosecution reports. 1990 -2000. The Regulatory Affairs Unit, TFDA, MOPH and the 
Inspection Division 
-The TFDA Order regarding the Violation Adjudication Committee Appointment. TFDA, 
MOPH. 
-The TFDA Order on Violation Adjudication No. 0701/RAU 80 dated 13/01/1992 authorising 
inspectors to issue official warnings 
_ NDC meeting minutes 1988-1999. TFDA, MOPH. 
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Issues Check list items Description 
1. The VAC Guideline 
How offences are dealt with Describe processes involved in prosecuting detail of 
offences processes by 
violation cases 
Describe who are involved in prosecution process officers involved 
in violation 
cases 
Time spent on the prosecution process time spent in 
each step 
2. The VAC meeting minutes 1995 -2000 
Meeting minutes Number and composition of the committees detail 
Presidents (chairs) of the meetings detail 
Secretaries of the meeting detail 
Any evidence of conflict in the meetings detail 
Duration of the meetings detail 
Conflicts in the meetings detail 
Content of the meetings detail 
Data from fieldwork were used yes/no 
Issues considered in the meetings detail 
3. Prosecution reports. 1990 - 2000 from the Regulatory Affairs Unit, the DCD and the 
Inspection Division TFDA, MOPH. 
Prosecution reports Number and types violations prosecuted statistics 
Number and types of sanctions used by type of statistics 
violations 
4. The TFDA order regarding the Violation Adjudication Committee Appointment and the TFDA 
order on Violation Adjudication No. 0701/RAU 80 dated 13/01/1992 authorising 
inspectors to issue official warnings 
The TFDA orders Rationale of the orders detail 
Content of the orders detail 
5. NDC meeting minutes 1988·1999. TFDA, MOPH. 
Meeting minutes Number and composition of the committees detail 
Presidents (chairs) of the meetings detail 
Secretaries of the meeting detail 
Any evidence of conflict in the meetings detail 
Duration of the meetings detail 
Conflicts in the meetings detail 
Content of the meetings detail 
Data from fieldwork were used yes/no 
Issues considered in the meetings detail 
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4. The TFDA goals, policies and activities 1979 -2000 
- The Royal Gazette. 
-The 6th (1987-1991) and th (1992-1996) Consumer Protection Programme Evaluation, 
TFDA. MOPH. 
-The th ( 1992-1996)and 8th (1997-2001)National Health Development Plan. MOPH 
-The TFDA Annual plans 1989 -2001 
-The TFDA Annual reports 1989-2001 
Issues I Check list items I Description 
1. The Royal Gazette 
The official organisational Main roles and responsibility of the TFDA and its detail 
structure and responsibility divisions 
Whether the roles and responsibility changed over detail 
time 
Main roles and responsibility of inspectors regulator, 
indicated educator etc. 
The overall goal of TFDA and in relation to detail 
enforcement 
Do conflicts exist between roles and yes/no 
responsibilities? 
How well matched are the roles and detail 
responsibilities indicated in the royal gazettes and 
the authority given by regulations? 
How relevant are the roles and responsibilities to detail 
TFDA policy and plans? 
How well matched are the roles and detail 
responsibilities with the suggested authority in 
WHO guideline? 
How have the roles and responsibilities detail 
developed or changed over time since the 
enactment of the Thai Drug Act 19677 
How well matched are the roles and responsibility detail 
with the authority given by the Drug Profession 
Act? 
2. The 6u , (1987-1991) and 7'" (1992-1996) Consumer Protection Programme Evaluation, TFDA, 
MOPH. 
3. the 7th ( 1992-1996)and 8th (1997-2001) National Health Development Plan, MOPH 
4. the TFDA Annual plans 1989 -2001 
TFDA policies and projects What is the proportion of these projects compared ratio, detail 
related to pharmacy and to other projects? What is the content of the 
pharmacy inspection in the projects and directions given? 
last five years. 
Such as: 
-the Self-regulating policy 
-Compliance Policy 1995 
-Standard Pharmacy 1994-5 
-Pharmacy for community 
1997-1999 
What is the frequency of appearance of issues number and 
about problems in pharmacies and their content? detail 
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Aims of the policies detail 
Statements of what are the problems in yes/no 
pharmacies 
Statements of what are the violations in yes/no 
pharmacies 
Statements about using authorities to tackle yes/no 
problems 
Describe support for each policy detail 
Which issues have been targeted in policies : choice 
enforcement or education? 
Matching of policies and violations recorded detail 
Were data used as main sources of information? yes/no, detail 
Calculate manpower needed to fulfill policy goals number of 
about pharmacy inspection, if nature of policies inspectors to 
permits fulfill policy 
goals 
Enforcement goal existence 
Budget spent on TFDA activities over time budget used in 
each activities 
5. TFDA Annual Reports 1979·2000 
Activities highlighted in The highlighted issues that related to pharmacies number and 
annual reports and pharmacy inspection compared to other detail 
activities 
Activities reported in annual Matching of activities with policies and plans detail 
reports 
The reported issues that related to pharmacies number and 
compared to other reported activities detail 
Calculate ratio of violation cases to total number annual ratio by 
of pharmacies inspected by type of violation type of violation 
(to be baseline 
data to compare 
with data at 
interview about 
the perception of 
inspectors 
regarding the 
incidence of 
violations) 
Achievement of policies Statements showing failure or achievement; and yes/no, detail 
reasons 
Statement about problems in pharmacies detail 
6. TFDA Annual Action Plans 1990-2000 
Inspection activities in the Matching of activities stated in roles, detail 
last five years responsibilities, policies and plans 
Coverage of pharmacies and manufacturers statistics 
Compare activities set in plans and in annual differences 
reports 
The use of authorities was specified in plans yes/no 
and/or rationalised 
Activities supporting the use of authorities existed yes/no 
The extent to which targets related to policies detail 
The extent to which targets related to enforcement detail 
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Resources allocation in the Analyse time input vs. manpower vs. violation adequacy 
last five years prevalence 
A trend of total budget given for inspection annual amount 
A trend of proportion of resources used for number 
pharmacy inspection compared to manufacturers 
inspection 
7. Inspection reports 1985 -1996 (Inspection Division) 1998-2000, DCD, TFDA, MOPH. 
Activities carried out Inspection of manufacturers, importers, detail 
pharmacies 
Type of inspection detal 
Violations detected Types and number of offences detected detail 
5. Evaluation and job appraisal 
- The TFDA Performance Appraisal Guideline 1997. 
- The Civil Servant Performance Appraisal Order No. 10/1995 dated 29 June 1995. Bureau 
of Civil Servant. 
Issues Check list items Description 
Process of evaluation Describe evaluation processes detail 
Describe composition of the evaluation detail 
committee 
Describe the extent to which inspectors are detail 
involved in the evaluation processes 
Explore the subjectivity of the process detail 
Describe what happened when plans were not detail 
achieved 
Were all inspectors evaluated? If not, why not? detail 
Were any steps taken to improve the inspection detail 
process as a result of evaluation? Describe 
Process of appraisal Job appraisal procedures are written yes/no 
Issues indicate that enforcement is given special yes/no 
consideration 
Who appraises inspectors? detail 
How often are inspectors appraised? detail 
What is objectivity of the appraisal? detail 
Is there a mechanism to address under-
performance and to reward good performance? 
Is there evidence that actions were taken to 
address under-performance and reward good 
performance? 
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6. Independent studies related to enforcement in pharmacies 
-Tonteerawongs, B., Sri-aramroungroeng, P., Yoongtong, W. and Taengtai, N. 1997. 
SituationAnalysis of Consumer Protection in Thailand 1997. TFDA, Ministry of Public Health. 
(in Thai) 
-Saorumnee, P. and Bunyarat, D. 2001. Situation Analysis on Consumer 
Protection in Thailand 2001. TFDA, Ministry of public Health. 
-Oonhalekagha, A. 1999. The 1998 Consumer Protection Survey. TFDA, MOPH. 
-Tanasit, P., Praweenwongwut, W., Kraisin, K., Srisung, S., Wongyai, S.,Sooksriwongse, C., 
Lawanprasert, Y., Tephasadin Na Ayuddhaya, N.,Assawakitwiree, W., Rienjaroen, T. and 
Janpraparb, S. 1996. Modernizations of Requlatory Measures Regarding Medicinal Drugs, 
Biochemicals and Herbs. TFDA, Ministry of Public Health. 
-Loven, B. 1994. A Consultation Report on Improving GMP Compliance. Inspection 
Division,TFDA. 
-Bowarnwattana, P. and Siripan, A., 1992. Enhancement of the TFDA Effectiveness. 
Epidemiology Board of Thailand. 
Issues Check list items Description 
Incidence of violation by Matching of studies and inspection records comparison data 
types of violation 
Management problems Content from the studies detail 
regarding pharmacy 
inspection 
7. The TFDA field operational manual and/or handbooks on pharmacy inspection 
-Inspection Manual. 1979. TFDA 
-Inspection Manual. 1989. TFDA 
-Inspection Manual. 1999. TFDA 
-Inspection SOP 1996 (Standard Operation Procedure) 
Issues Check list items Description 
Official enforcement Procedures of pharmacy inspection are speCified yes/no 
procedures 
The inspection procedures are written in a yes/no 
practical manner 
The written inspection procedures cover all yes/no 
aspects of inspection 
Procedures of investigation are written yes/no 
The investigation procedures are written in a yes/no 
practical manner 
The written investigation procedures cover all yes/no 
aspects of the procedure 
Procedures of compiling evidence - is written yes/no 
The compiling evidences procedures are written yes/no 
in a practical manner 
The written compiling evidences procedures yes/no 
cover all aspects 
Procedures of note-taking are written yes/no 
The note-taking procedures are written in a yes/no 
practical manner 
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The written note-taking procedures cover all yes/no 
aspects 
Reporting procedures are written yes/no 
Reporting procedures are written in a practical yes/no 
manner 
The written reporting procedures cover all yes/no 
aspects 
Publication year of the manual - any revisions? year 
Matching processes written in manuals and what detail 
are done checked from inspection records 
Working procedures Who arranges inspection schedules detail 
How are the schedules arranged? contingency/ 
daily/weekly/ 
monthly 
How are the jobs prioritised? criteria to 
Who ensures that the jobs are actually carried prioritise jobs 
out? 
If jobs are left undone, is there a procedure for 
addressing this problem? 
Complexity of prosecution Describe steps to be taken when violations are detail 
process found 
(e.g. compiling evidence, 
submitting reports, 
committee meetings, going 
to court etc.) 
Describe time spent on each step detail 
(use data from operation manuals) 
Describe status of officers involved in each step detail 
Practicality in using Matching of violation types and evidence detail 
authority compilation process 
Matching of evidence needed to the process of detail 
compiling evidence and the penalty 
Matching of violations and evidence needed for detail 
prosecution 
Guidance for making decisions detail 
8. Training programs on pharmacy inspection 1979 - 2000 
- Inspection Training Curriculum. 1992-1999. 
Issues Check list items Description 
Training programs Are there specific training programs for pharmacy yes/no 
inspection within the overall Thai FDA training 
program? 
Explore the contents and types of programs types and 
inspectors have attended and how often (e.g. number of 
Technical, management, problem-oriented, public training 
health, regulations) in the last five years. programs 
How many training programs are specific for percentage 
inspectors compared to the overall program? 
Explore objectives of the training programs. detail 
If there were training programs on pharmacy yes/no 
inspection, how often were they provided? 
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9. Feedback information system 
Issues Check list items Description 
Process A written system exists yes/no 
Frequency of information given in the last five number 
years 
Information is given directly to inspectors or to inspectors or 
supervisor supervisor 
Content Statements showing information given in the last Detail 
five years 
10. Morale support schemes for inspectors 
Issues Check list items Description 
Morale support insurance scheme yes/no 
special promotion yes/no 
11. The Retail Pharmacy Association Magazines 1979 -2001. 
Issues Check list items Description 
Content in the magazines Issues related to law enforcement detail 
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Annex 3 
A list of interviews 
No. Date of interview Job title 
1 27 - 02 - 2001 Inspector 
2 28 - 02 - 2001 Inspector 
3 1, 22 - 03 - 2001 Inspector 
4 2 - 03 - 2001 Inspector 
5 6 - 03 - 2001 Non-Inspector 
6 9 - 03 - 2001 Inspector 
7 12-03-2001 Inspector 
8 12,15 - 03 - 2001 Non-inspector 
9 14 - 03 - 2001 Inspector 
10 16 - 03 - 2001 Inspector 
11 19-03-2001 Inspector 
12 21 - 03 - 2001 Inspector 
13 26 - 03 - 2001 Inspector 
14 2 - 04 - 2001 Inspector 
15 3 - 04 - 2001 Inspector 
16 5 - 04 - 2001 Non-inspector 
17 9 - 04 - 2001 Non-inspector 
18 11 - 04 - 2001 Inspector 
19 12 - 04 - 2001 Inspector 
20 17 - 04 - 2001 Inspector 
21 19 - 04 - 2001 Inspector 
22 20 - 04 - 2001 Non-inspector 
23 26, 29 - 04 - 2001 Non-inspector 
24 2 - 05 - 2001 Non-inspector 
25 9 - 05 - 2001 Non-inspector 
26 14 - 05 - 2001 Inspector 
27 17 - 05 - 2001 Inspector 
28 22 - 05 - 2001 Non-inspector 
29 23 - 05 - 2001 Inspector 
30 25 - 05 - 2001 Inspector 
The first group meeting 15 - 06 - 2001 Four inspectors 
The second group meeting 22 - 06 - 2001 Three inspectors 
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Annex 4 
A semi-structured interview questionnaire for the TFDA SG and ex-SG 
Introduction I am conducting research related to inspection as a part of my doctoral study. I 
am particularly interested in pharmacy inspection, so your work experience is a crucial part 
of the study. The research is an effort to collect and analyse existing data scientifically. 
Without your contribution, the study is not possible. 
All information given will be treated confidentially. Data will be presented anonymously. The 
study is approved by TFDA but this is an independent study. Summarisation of the interview 
will be presented to you. The London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, University of 
London will academically approve the analysis. 
Please consider the following section as an introduction to an exchange of experience 
rather than a formal interview. For analysis purposes, it would be greatly appreciated if you 
would allow me to tape-record the interview. Please feel free to tell me at any time if you 
want your interview off-record. 
1. What do you think about enforcement on the Drug Act performed by the TFDA? 
2. In your idea, what are measures or strategies to gain regulatory compliance? 
3. In your view, what are appropriate roles for the TFDA to carry out effective consumer 
protection? 
4. Violations in pharmacies have been rampant. For example, selling outside of the duty 
hour, selling without supervision of professionals-in-charge, selling non-registered drugs, 
selling drugs other than permitted, selling drugs without licence. 
5. What is your view about hazards caused by those violations? 
- when compared to violations conducted by manufactures and importers? 
- when compared to other problems under the TFDA? 
6. The Drug Act 1967 has been enacted for a long time, why there are still high violations? 
7. Why is it good in using a warning measure performed by the TFDA? 
8. In your idea, what should the TFDA do to reduce those violations? 
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Annex 5 
A semi-structured interview questionnaire for regulatory officers 
Introduction I am conducting research related to inspection as a part of my doctoral study. I 
am particularly interested in pharmacy inspection, so your work experience is a crucial part 
of the study. The research is an effort to collect and analyse existing data scientifically. 
Without your contribution, the study is not possible. 
All information given will be treated confidentially. Data will be presented anonymously. The 
study is approved by TFDA but this is an independent study. Summarisation of the interview 
will be presented to you. The London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, University of 
London will academically approve the analysis. 
Please consider the following section as an introduction to an exchange of experience 
rather than a formal interview. For analysis purposes, it would be greatly appreciated if you 
would allow me to tape record the interview. Please feel free to tell me at any time if you 
want your interview off-record. 
1.How are the contents and penalties of the drug regulations obtained, including penalty 
level and sanctions? 
2.What is the participation from inspectors in drafting, revising or proposing the regulations? 
3.ln your view, how do inspectors agree with the rationale or penalty level of the regulations? 
4.The drug regulations are often commented as too idealistic or not practical for the Thai 
context. What is your idea about the comment? 
5.ln your idea, what makes the regulations, e.g. selling out of the duty hours, not fully 
enforced? 
6.Why is the VAC allowed to give warnings without authorisation from the Drug Act? Should 
this be assigned to field inspectors who face the real situation and to shorten the prosecution 
process? 
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Annex 6 
A semi-structured interview questionnaire for managers and ex-managers 
Introduction I am conducting research related to inspection as a part of my doctoral study. I 
am particularly interested in pharmacy inspection, so your work experience is a crucial part 
of the study. The research is an effort to collect and analyse existing data sCientifically. 
Without your contribution, the study is not possible. 
All information given will be treated confidentially. Data will be presented anonymously. The 
study is approved by TFDA but this is an independent study. Summarisation of the interview 
will be presented to you. The London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, University of 
London will academically approve the analysis. 
Please consider the following section as an introduction to an exchange of experience 
rather than a formal interview. For analysis purposes, it would be greatly appreciated if you 
would allow me to tape record the interview. Please feel free to tell me at any time if you 
want your interview off-record. 
1. Could you please explain your job and responsibility? 
2. In your idea as a manager responsible for consumer protection, 
What are pharmacies expected to be? 
How would inspection help to achieve the expectation? 
What is the support from the TFDA? 
3. About pharmacies in Bangkok, 
What is the compliance situation regarding pharmacy? 
What are the main offences (main problems)? Why they are selected? 
How serious are the offences in terms of health hazard compared to those of 
manufacturers and importers; and to the rest of TFDA responsibility? 
How are the problems recognised by executives in terms of violation degree and risks? 
In your idea, what are causes of violation? 
4. About inspection performed by inspectors, 
What is your view about enforcement in pharmacy? How satisfactory is it? 
What are the problems and causes of problems on enforcement? 
What is the impact of violation regarding pharmacy practice? 
In your idea, how can enforcement be made more effective? 
5. Whose responsibility is it to increase regulatory compliance in pharmacy? 
6. What do you think are appropriate and effective strategies to gain or maintain compliance 
regarding pharmacy? How can enforcement support this? 
7. In terms of management.. .. 
What are the main management problems about inspection and enforcement regarding 
pharmacy inspection? 
What do you need from the TFDA to support better enforcement? 
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Annex 7 
A semi-structured interview questionnaire for inspectors and ex-Inspectors 
Introduction I am conducting research related to inspection as a part of my doctoral study. I 
am particularly interested in pharmacy inspection, so your work experience is a crucial part 
of the study. The research is an effort to collect and analyse existing data scientifically. 
Without your contribution, the study is not possible. 
All information given will be treated confidentially. Data will be presented anonymously. The 
study is approved by TFDA but this is an independent study. Summarisation of the interview 
will be presented to you. The London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, University of 
London will academically approve the analysis. 
Please consider the following section as an introduction to an exchange of experience 
rather than a formal interview. For analysis purposes, it would be greatly appreciated if you 
would allow me to tape record the interview. Please feel free to tell me at any time if you 
want your interview off-record. 
1. How long have you been an inspector? 
2. What did you do before becoming an inspector, and for how long? 
3. What motivated you to become an inspector? 
4. What do you like about being an inspector; and what do you dislike? 
5. As you are both a civil servant and also the authorised officer according to the Drug Act, is 
there any conflict between these two roles? Are you assigned the same roles and 
responsibilities regarding pharmacy inspection? 
5.1 In your idea, what is pharmacy inspection for? 
5.2 What do you think 
- are roles and responsibility according to the Act? 
- are roles and responsibility according to the position? 
- your authority according to the Act is for? 
5.3 How do you know what is expected of you? 
5.4 How is your work regarding pharmacy inspection supported by TFDA? 
5.5 What do you normally do during pharmacy inspection? 
- How long does it take per inspection: offence found, offence not found? 
- How many pharmacies do you visit per week? 
6. How often are offences found in pharmacy inspection? 
6.1 In your view, how serious are the majority of the offences in terms of health hazards? 
6.2 Are all offences prosecuted? 
- When are offences likely to be prosecuted? 
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- When are they unlikely to be prosecuted? 
- Why don't you apply your authority to all offenders? 
6.3 What do you do when offences are found and you do not want to prosecute to ensure 
consumer protection? 
6.4 Why do you think those alternative methods are as good as formal measures? 
6.5 Why are you not afraid of being accused of corruption for not applying your authority? 
7. The following offences are found in pharmacies, one offence in one pharmacy. 
Please indicate your actions on those offences with reasons and how your decisions will be 
changed if you are informed of the following information 
Topics How your decision would change 
if .......... 
Pharmacist absence during the registered period If there is a policy 
Antibiotics tablets are found in Type B pharmacy at If drugs found are four items of 
the front counter prescription drugs and six items of 
injection 
Ten tablets of fake antibiotics are found in a small If they are found in type A pharmacy 
grocery 
Non-registered contraceptives pills are found on a If they are traditional Thai drugs 
working desk 
A dozen of expired eye drop If it is diabetes drug expired according to 
are found at the front counter its label 
A grocery with 10 tubes of steroid cream and 4x 30 If they are antibiotics and non-OTC anti-
tablets of non-OTC cold remedies inflammatory drugs capsule 
Sale of low back pain drugs by non personnel-in- If you are informed of 100 million baht 
charge loss due to irrational dispensing by those 
non-pharmacist counter attendants 
8. How far do you feel you work autonomously? What management support or procedures 
would be helpful to improve enforcement of good pharmacy practice? 
9. Finally, in your view, how would it be possible to reduce violations regarding drug selling? 
What role is there for enforcement? 
10. Would you change your decision to be an inspector, if you could? 
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The school's letter 
London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine 
(University of London) 
Keppel Street, London, WC1 E 7HT 
Switchboard: 0171-6368636 Telex 8953474 
Department of Public Health & Policy 
Telephone: +44 (0) 171-927 xxxx 
Fax:+44 (0) 171-4363611 
E-Mail: x.xxxxx@LSHTM.AC.UK 
To Whom It May Concern: 
Annexes 
Duangtip Hongsamoot is a DrPh student in the Department of Public Health and Policy at the 
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (LSHTM), University of London. She is 
carrying out research into pharmacy inspection, which is funded by the World Health 
Organisation as part of her DrPH. In earlier parts of his research. she has carried out 
documentary analysis concerning the specified issues. She now wants to interview 
managers/inspectors/regulatory officers on that matter. The interview is likely to take no 
more than one hour. The contribution is greatly useful to the research. 
Complete confidentiality will be maintained throughout. The provider of any information WIll 
not be identifiable. This study will, we hope, prove valuable to pharmacy inspection practice 
Yours sincerely, 
( Professor Gill Walt, the supervisor) 
( Duangtip Hongsamoot, the research student ) 
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Annex 9 
Format Data Sheet for Documentary Analysis 
-Code of the document 
-Title of the document 
-Source of the document 
-Division 
-Person 
-Date/month/year of the document 
-Types of the document 
-Length of the document 
-Date of data collection 
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Interview documentation aheet 
General information about the interview and interviewee 
Interviewee's name: 
Date of interview: 
Place of interview: ( Indicate situation) 
Duration of the interview: ( indicate interruption, if any) 
First/second/third time interviewing: (indicate situation) 
Sex: 
Age: 
Marital status: 
Education background: 
Job title: 
How long the interviewee has been an inspector : 
Previous job/how long : 
Have job with any pharmaceutical company or not 
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Annex 11 
Detail of MOPH staff and their profiles 
Department Number of staff 1999 Budget 
Professional Non- ( million baht) 
professional 
1. Permanent Secretary Office 149.141 37,441 48.730.2 
2. Medical Department 7.572 3.087 3.307.4 
3. Health Department 2.626 2.586 877.0 
4. Communicable Disease Control 4.216 4,757 5.098.7 
Department 
5. Medical Science Department 1.158 376 3.713.5 
6. Mental Health Department 3.332 1,438.1 
7. The Thai Food and Drug 376 134 480.2 
Administration 
- Secretary - General Office 20 25 20.1 
- The Food Control Division 59 16 34.9 
-The Drug Control Division 58 17 33.2 
-The Narcotic Substance Control 37 15 21.8 
Division 
-The Cosmetic Control Division 32 12 19.1 
-The Medical Device Control 30 7 18.0-
Division 
-The Toxic Substance Control 29 6 14.4-
Division 
-The Technical Division 30 11 110.5 
-The Advertisement Control and 23 13 189.1 
Public Relation Division 
-The Inspection Division 48 7 10.2 
-The Regulatory Affairs Unit 10 5 8.9 
NB: 40 baht = 1 pound until April 1997 then devalued to 65 baht = 1 pound. the minimum 
daily wage for non-skilled labour is 150 baht (2001). 
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Annex 12 
Inspectors' profile 
Topic Number 
Ex-Inspectors Current Inspectors 
1. Sex 
- Male 6 9 
- Female 1 3 
2. Degree 
- Bachelor 5 9 
- Master 2 3 
- Have lawyer degree (as well as) 2 3 
3. Experience as inspector 
----------
- ~ 15 years 7 8 
- 3 - 14 years - 4 
- less than 3 years - None 
4. Inspector is the first job 4 4 
5. The first job 
- hospital 2 
- medical representative 1 2 
- registration work at the TFDA 3 
- laboratory work 1 
- run family business ( pharmacy) 2 -
--6. Families have pharmacy business 2 3 
--7. Work part-time in pharmacies or drug 5 4 
importers 
'-'-~r------8. Work part-time in hospitals -
---
166 
Annexes 
Annex 13 
Comparison of penalties between the two Drug Acts 
Offence Penalty 1967 Penalty 1950 
1. Sale without license Imprisonment not more than 5 Imprisonment no more 
years and fine no more than them 6 months or fine < 
10,000 baht 1,000 or both 
2. Sale of fake drug 
- knowingly Imprisonment 1-20 year and fine Imprisonment < 10 year or 
2,000 - 10,000 baht fine <10,000 or both 
- not knowingly fine 1,000-5,000 baht Fine 2,000 baht 
3. Sale of substandard 
drug 
- knowingly Imprisonment 6 months - 3 years Nla 
and fine 1,000 - 5,000 baht. 
- not knowingly Fine no more than 5,000 baht Nla 
4. Sale of expired drug 
- knowingly Imprisonment no more than 1 Imprisonment no more than 
year or fine no more than 3,000 1 year or fine no more than 
baht or imprisonment and fine 3,000 baht or imprisonment 
and fine 
- not knowingly Fine no more than 3,000 baht Nla 
-
5. Sale of non-registered Imprisonment no more than 3 nla 
drug years or fine no more than 5,000 
baht or fine and imprisonment 
6. Sale without supervision Fine 1,000-5,000 baht Nla 
of personnel in charge 
7. Sale drugs other than Fine 2,000-5,000 baht Fine < 2,000 baht 
allowed 
8. Sale of mixed drugs in Imprisonment < 5 years or fine < Nla 
one container 50,000 baht or both 
--9. Sale prescription drugs Fine 2,000-5,000 baht Nla 
with out prescription 
-
10. Sale withdrawn drugs. 
- knowingly Imprisonment 6 monthes to 3 Nla 
years and fine 1,000-5,000 baht 
- not knowingly Fine no more than 5,000 baht Fine <2,000 baht 
11.Sale drugs with Fine 2,000-10,000 baht Nla 
incorrect labeling 
12. Do not show or show Fine 1,000-10,000 baht -N/a ------------.----. 
incorrect sign plate 
---------_._--
13. Conduct incorrect entry Fine 1,000-10,000 baht Nla 
record 
-
NB: 40 baht = 1 pound until April 1997 then devalued to 65 baht = 1 pound, the minimum 
daily wage for non-skilled labor is 150 baht (2001). 
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